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ABSTRACT PAGE

This dissertation examines the creation and evolution of the agricultural economy and labor
relations of South Texas from the late Nineteenth Century to the Nineteen Sixties. The
changing demographic reality of Mexico, with massive population shifts northward during
the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, caused massive emigration to the United
States once the violence of the Mexican Revolution erupted after 1910. Hundreds of
thousands fled north of the border, most of them traveling to South Texas. This migration
wave out of Mexico met another group of migrants traveling from the Southeast and
Midwest who sought to purchase farm land in South Texas as the region underwent a
transition from ranching to agriculture.
A new regime of labor and racial relations emerged from these simultaneous migrations,
built on a system of social and residential segregation, continued migration from Mexico,
and seasonal immobilization of workers. While this system never stopped the mobility of
the Mexican and Mexican American populations of South Texas, it did allow the region to
continue paying the lowest wages in the nation even as production and profits soared.
Agricultural interests in the rest of the COl;Jntry were not long in taking notice, and began
recruiting workers from South Texas by the thousands during the Nineteen Twenties after
immigration from Europe had slowed down following the passage of restrictive immigration
legislation in 1917, 1921, and 1924.
The South Texas model of labor relations then went national during the era of the Bracero
Program from 1942-1964. Originally meant to be an emergency contract labor program
between the United and Mexico during World War II, it morphed into a method by which
growers could replicate the labor market conditions of South Texas, with basic rights of
choice, mobility, and citizenship disregarded in favor of cheap and easily exploitable
foreign labor.
Throughout the Twentieth Century, in other words, South Texas has not been a peripheral,
backward region with little importance for the rest of the nation. Instead, the rest of the
nation has followed in the footsteps of South Texas.
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The Shadow of the Revolution

2

Introduction

"Texas history is a mixture of selected fact and generalized myth."
Rodolfo Acuiia 1
The year 1968 produced what many believed was a worldwide crisis of
order. Protesters, rioters, soldiers, and tanks filled the streets of Washington DC,
Chicago, Paris, Prague, Mexico City, and dozens of other cities around the world.
In response to this situation the leaders of the city of San Antonio, Texas, did
what they do best. They threw a party.
Envisioned as a celebration of the commonalities of the nations of the
Western Hemisphere, San Antonio's World's Fair, dubbed HemisFair, opened on
April 6, 1968. Ninety acres of previously residential land on the southern edge of
downtown were used to construct the ultra-modern fairgrounds in a celebration of
both the "confluence of civilizations in the Americas" (the fair's official slogan)
and the economic possibilities of San Antonio and South Texas. The year 1968
was chosen for the fair because it was the 250th anniversary of the founding of
San Antonio by the Spanish. More than just a birthday party, however, HemisFair
was a "vivid recognition of the growth potential of a particular region and its
peoples." 2 Moreover, fair organizers claimed that "San Antonio lays claim to a
lustrous heritage spun from the colorful threads of many cultures. On that
foundation, HemisFair 68, in the truest sense, is the outcome of visionary, 20th
Century pioneering." 3 On opening day, April 6, the San Antonio Express-News

happily stated, "With the flags of many nations whipping in the breeze, San
1

Rodolfo Acufia, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos. 3rd Ed. (New York: Harper Collins,
1988), 9.
2
HemisFair 1968 Official Souvenir Guidebook (Dallas: A.H. Belo, 1968), 21.
3
Ibid.
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Antonians and people of the nation and the world poured into what was once a
haven for winos, stray dogs and junked cars," where now "[m]oney flowed like
water." 4
The timing of such civic and regional boosterism was unfortunate,
however. Two days before the fair opened Martin Luther King, Jr., was killed,
setting off a wave of urban rebellions across the nation. Coming immediately on
the heels of MLK' s assassination, with inner cities across the nation still
smoldering, HemisFair advertised San Antonio as a place of ethnic and cultural
confluence, a city that embodied social peace. According to the Official Souvenir
Guide, the fair "intended to demonstrate the actual life-giving process of cultural
confluence. It sought to show how diverse threads had been woven into a strong,
new social fabric." 5 Thus, HemisFair sold itself as a place where diversity was
celebrated, with San Antonio as the living example of peaceful cultural
confluence in a time when such peace seemed quite rare.
Much was made of San Antonio's Spanish heritage by the fair's
organizers. "In a Europe that was beginning to question the feudal system and
seeking new ways of life, Spain took the lead as a Modernist," according to an
article on the Spanish Pavilion in an 80-page insert on the fair in the San Antonio

Express-News. "The discovery and civilization of the New World were,
therefore, the necessary consequence of an historical situation in which Spain was
the only nation capable of carrying out this task, from a technical, political and

4

5

"Big Daddy of All Fiestas is a Gusher," San Antonio Express-News (April 7, 1968).
HemisFair 1968 Official Souvenir Guidebook, 24.
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cultural point of view." 6 In this way, the Spanish conquest and the founding of
San Antonio were depicted as necessary steps in the advancement of civilization
as inherited from Europe. This version of history, in addition to its curious
portrayal of Spain as the leader of a modernizing Europe, left out many
intermediate steps between Spanish conquistadors and modem San Antonio.
Most notably, Mexico was entirely absent. The commemorative insert included
only one short article on Mexico, entitled "Mariachi Music Will Lure You to
Mexican Pavilion."7 While Spain was depicted as an integral part of the heritage
of San Antonio and Texas, Mexico was little more than a scenic and quaint
neighbor with little historical or cultural connection to the dominant white
civilization of Texas. Never mind Texas' years as a Mexican state, or the fact that
the majority of the population of South Texas was Chicano - the Spanish heritage
made a much more convenient linear historical narrative in which a civilized
Spain gave way to the United States with no major complications in between.
HemisFair advertised Texas by supplementing older Texan mythological
traditions with a limited type of multicultural tokenism that legitimized the
contemporary political and social order. Gone were the overtly racist depictions
of the past that had so dominated the popular and academic history of the state. 8

6

"Spain Returns to Texas," San Antonio Express-News (April7, 1968).
"Mariachi Music Will Lure You to Mexican Pavilion," San Antonio Express-News (April?,
1968).
g The ultimate example of this older historiography is Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers:
A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1935). Webb famously wrote,
"Without disparagement it may be said that there is a cruel streak in the Mexican nature, or so the
history of Texas would lead one to believe. This cruelty may be a heritage from the Spanish of the
Inquisition; it may, and doubtless should, be attributed partly to the Indian blood. Among the
common class, ignorance and superstition prevail, making the rabble susceptible to the evil
influence of designing leaders. Whatever the reasons, the government of Mexico has ever been
unstable, frequently overturned by civil war, and changed but seldom improved by revolution ....
7

5
These images were replaced by bland affirmations of frontier cultural interaction
in the borderlands of San Antonio and South Texas. Rather than symbolizing a
substantive change in which Mexican Americans were welcomed as equal
partners, however, these public pronouncements of cultural confluence veered
toward the romantic image of the "noble savage" with Mexicans playing the part
of savages. 9 By 1968, according to HemisFair's organizers, Mexicans and
Mexican Americans were little more than quaint remnants of a supposedly dying
culture, picturesque but ultimately impotent and unimportant. Meanwhile, Anglos
paraded through old Spanish missions and helped themselves to healthy doses of
Mexican food while listening to mariachi music. This theme-park exoticism was
the essence of the "confluence of civilizations" and cultures for HemisFair's
organizers.
No mention was made, for instance, of San Antonio's former mayor, Juan
Seguin, forced to flee the city in the 1850s after death threats against his family by
newcomer Anglos. From his forced exile he wrote, "San Antonio claimed then,
as it claims now, to be the first city of Texas; it was also the receptacle of the
scum of society. My political and social situation brought me into continual
contact with that class of people. At every hour of the day and night, my
countrymen ran to me for protection against the assaults or exactions of these

[The Mexican] won more victories over the Texans by parley than by force of arms. For making
promises- and for breaking them- he had no peer." (Page 14) Slightly more updated, though no
less reliant on mythology, is T.R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans
(New York: Collier, 1968). Walk into any chain book store and you are more likely to find these
two books than any of the more recent or insightful books on Texas history that litter the footnotes
ofthis study.
9
See Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 15-41, esp. 24-31.
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adventurers." to Nor were the visitors to HemisFair told of the sprawling slum just
west of the fairgrounds where they could actually see the majority of the city's
Mexican and Mexican American population. Instead, the fair remained a selfcontained fantasy universe that selectively depicted the history of the region as an
exotic variant on the larger American pattern, with the Spanish mission standing
in as a metonymic architectural and institutional presence that precluded any
substantive examination of the continued Mexican and Mexican American
presence in the region.
San Antonio may have represented a confluence of civilizations to the
leaders of HemisFair, but it was a confluence on their terms that did more to
legitimize their own social standing, as a sort of evolutionary certainty, than it did
to expand the narrow narrative of Texas history or provide a truthful survey of
cultural contact and integration in the region north of the Rio Grande. Without a
usable past to draw from, a fantasy heritage had to be created. HemisFair became
the living embodiment of this fantasy heritage, where the history of South Texas
was commodified and repackaged as a cheerful justification for the political
dominance of conservative elites.
This dissertation seeks to look beyond this tendentious historical heritage
of mythology and Lone Star bluster and examine the real "confluence of
civilizations" that created South Texas. It analyzes the development of the system
of labor and racial relations that came together in the fields and towns of South
Texas from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s, as Mexican and Anglo

10

Juan Seguin, as quoted in David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas,
1836-1986 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 27.
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migrants fashioned an agro-empire out of the scrub and desert. While a number
of historians have examined aspects of migration, the borderlands, and labor
during the Twentieth Century, they have tended to compartmentalize the different
facets of this history along chronological and methodologicallines. 11 This study

11

In the past twenty years a number of historical studies have directly challenged the traditional
depiction of the history of the Texas-Mexico border region. Even a quick glance through the
footnotes will reveal the importance of all of the works listed below for this study.
There have been a number of recent studies of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
South Texas. Each does an excellent job of illuminating the larger trends at work within the
region during these tumultuous years, but they fail to examine the importance of these changes for
later decades. They examine the immediate effects of Porfirian era development, the entry of the
railroad in South Texas, and the Mexican Revolution, but do not examine the importance of these
events for the years that followed. See Benjamin Heber Johnson, Revolution in Texas: How a
Forgotten Rebellion and Its Bloody Suppression Turned Mexicans into Americans (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003); Andres Tijerina, Tejano Empire: Life on the South Texas Ranchos
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998); and Elliott Young, Catarina Garza's
Revolution on the Texas-Mexico Border (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Johnson's
study ends in the 1930s and fails to confront issues like immigration restriction or labor relations.
Tijerina's study provides a fascinating snapshot of relations in rural South Texas, but does little to
establish the importance of these experiences for the future of the region. Young examines the
short-lived Catarina Garza rebellion and its effects on the transition from inclusive borderland to
divided border region, but fails to carry the story into the Twentieth Century when both Mexico
and the United States completed their consolidation of control over the border region.
Likewise, there is a growing historiography focused on the Texas-Mexico border region
in the mid-Twentieth Century, but these studies have also tended to focus on a brief time period
without examining the forces that built the region or the longer-term effects of these changes. See
Richard A. Garcia, Rise of the Mexican American Middle Class: San Antonio, 1929-1941
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991 ); and Zaragoza Vargas, Labor Rights are
Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005). Garcia and Vargas both focus on the Depression era, but do little to
connect their studies with the developments of the 191 Os and 1920s. Nor do they examine the
importance of the Depression-era repatriation efforts for the legal standing of Mexican and
Mexican American citizenship and labor rights within the United States in the years after World
War II.
There are two important studies that examine this history over a longer period, but both
tend to isolate Texas and ignore the overwhelming importance of migration in and out of the
region for the shaping of Texas history: Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and
Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and
Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans. They focus on issues of racial identity and political power, but
do not expand their analysis any further than that. The interstate migrant stream, immigration
restriction, and a number of other essential factors in understanding the history of South Texas are
left out. This neglect obscures the essential linkages between Texas and the world around it.
Only by integrating their histories with the work and methodology of scholars who
examine the politics of migration and mobility can a fuller picture appear. See Cindy
Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers and the Making of Migrant
Poverty, 1870-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Frank Tobias Higbie,
Indispensable Outcasts: Hobo Workers and Community in the American Midwest, 1880-1930
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and
the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Gunther Peck,
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examines the history of the Texas-Mexico border region over a longer period and
disentangles the interrelated nature of migration flows, labor conditions,
economic growth, and political change. It reveals the ways in which the TexasMexico border region emerged in the early Twentieth Century from geographic
and economic isolation. The social and political changes that arose in South
Texas were driven by Mexican economic development and later by Mexico's
revolution. Change, in other words, first came to Texas from south of the border.
Migrants-both Anglo and Mexican-were key to the making of South
Texas. Despite its peripheral location and the seemingly unquenchable Texan
desire to proclaim Lone Star exceptionalism, economic and social change entered
the sprawling region between the Rio Grande and San Antonio from without. 12
Migrants leaving war-torn revolutionary Mexico and emergent capitalists leaving
the crowded farming areas of the Midwest and Southeast transformed South
Texas agriculture. This was the real "confluence of civilizations" that built South
Texas and San Antonio along with it. During the first half of the twentieth
century, these migrants helped build a thriving agricultural economy that relied on
the introduction of outside capital and the availability of migrant workers coming
across the border from Mexico. Yet this was not a confluence based on harmony
and equality, despite the fevered imaginings of HemisFair's organizers.
Employed by Anglo farmers, Mexicans and Mexican Americans found
themselves relegated to the bottom of this emerging order, welcomed across the
Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 18801930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
12
See David Weber, "Refighting the Alamo: Mythmaking and the Texas Revolution," in Myth
and the History of the Hispanic Southwest (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988),
133-151.

9
international boundary to be exploited for their labor but excluded politically and
socially. What emerged was a social, political, and economic arrangement built
on a cross-border caste system.
These changes have had profound effects on the nation as a whole. The
lessons learned by the growers of South Texas were not isolated to the border
region. Their effects migrated across the country just as Mexican and Mexican
American farmworkers did in the decades after the Mexican Revolution. Rather
than a social and political backwater (a sort of Southwestern version of
Mississippi), South Texas became an important model for agricultural interests
throughout the nation. The migrant labor stream based in South Texas grew
throughout the nation as Mexicans and Mexican Americans sought better
opportunities, which helped recreate the racially-segmented workforce on farms
far removed from the border. Mexicans and Mexican Americans, regardless of
their country of birth, were consistently depicted and treated as an alien presence
within the United States that lacked the ability to join the dominant society. Their
resulting lack of citizenship rights recommended them to employers across the
nation.
They represented the ideal labor supply for agriculturalists. They were
highly mobile and available for seasonal employment, but were often stripped of
their basic employment rights because of their racially subordinate position and
inability to exercise the privileges of citizenship. As such, the importance of the
development of a South Texas model of labor relations extended beyond the fields
of the Southwest and has directly affected the development of an increasingly

10

globalized model of labor relations. As the farms of South Texas continued to
grow, they relied more and more on labor from Mexico. The growers in the rest
of the United States followed suit and increasingly drew their labor from Mexico
and other foreign sources as a means to ensure a surplus labor supply and low
wages. In the race to the bottom among farming interests, the growers of South
Texas led the way.
The first chapter, "Porfirian South Texas," covers the demographic and
economic changes that swept over the U.S. Southwest and Mexican North in the
last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. Massive economic and demographic
upheaval disturbed previously isolated regions of both countries as lands on each
side of the border were pulled more closely toward central government control at
the same time that cross-border ties grew in importance. Chapter 2, "Revoluci6n
en la Frontera," deals with the Mexican Revolution and its immediate
consequences for the border region, focusing especially on the outbreak of race
war in South Texas in the aftermath of the discovery of the irredentist Plan De
San Diego. The near-apocalyptic violence helped accelerate the previously
gradual transfer of political and economic control from traditional elites and
smallholders to newcomer farm interests.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine the effects of the demographic and economic
changes caused by the Porfirian and revolutionary periods in Mexico during the
1910s and 1920s. The focus for Chapter 3, "The Revolution in Texas:
International Migration, Capitalist Agriculture, and the Growth of the Tejano
Diaspora," is the birth of commercial agriculture in South Texas during the 1910s
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and 1920s as improved transportation and irrigation facilities combined with the
massive numbers of migrants leaving the violence and disorder of revolutionary
Mexico to create an agricultural boom in the previously desolate ranching region.
Chapter 4, "Securing the Revolution: Political Restructuring and the Attempted
Immobilization of Labor in South Texas," examines the political and social
consequences of this new agricultural regime. Newcomer farmers dismantled
older political structures and established a strictly segregated social and political
environment, culminating in efforts to immobilize the surplus labor pool within
South Texas. Through these separate strands, agricultural and political interests
created the South Texas model of labor relations, whereby farming interests
guaranteed themselves cheap and plentiful labor through a varied regime of labor
controls and a reliance on continuous influxes of workers from Mexico. Chapter
5, "Nativism, Nationalism, and the Evolution of Immigration/Emigration Policy
on Both Sides of the Rio Grande," focuses on the ways in which the increased
militarization of the border and debates over immigration policies in both the
United States and Mexico helped strengthen this form of labor relations during the
1910s and 1920s.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 move the analysis to the Great Depression. Chapter
6, "The Politics of Depression in South Texas," illustrates the conditions of the
Great Depression in South Texas and the failure of local and state governments to
deal with the worst consequences

o~ the

international economic crisis. Public aid

remained almost nonexistent, but when it did come, local and state politicians
wielded relief policies as the latest in a long line of laws meant to tilt the power in
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labor relations further away from workers. Chapter 7, "Deportation and
Repatriation from South Texas," examines the exodus of Mexicans and Mexican
Americans from Texas during the Great Depression, which helped to further
cement the status of Mexican and Mexican American workers as a group unable
to exercise any notion of labor rights. Despite the unsteady economic and social
situation, however, Mexican and Mexican American workers in South Texas still
launched a series of militant struggles to achieve their basic rights, providing the
focus for Chapter 8, "Organization and Rebellion in Depression-Era South
Texas."
Finally, Chapter 9, "Texas is Everywhere South of the Canadian Border:
The Bracero Program and the Nationalization of South Texas Labor Relations,"
argues that the bracero program, begun as an international agreement between the
US and Mexico to fill agricultural labor shortages during World War II, served as
a way for agricultural interests in the rest of the nation to recreate the labor supply
conditions enjoyed by the growers of South Texas. As a result, the bracero
program served as a way to mobilize large numbers of foreign workers, stripped
of their basic rights of choice and mobility, for use all over the country. The fact
that Texas and California served as the primary users of bracero labor only
revealed the level of fidelity to the South Texas model of labor relations the
program exhibited.
This study examines the history of South Texas that remained
unmentioned and intentionally ignored by HemisFair and its promoters. It is the
phase between Spanish conquest and the present day that they deemed important

13

only in its exoticism. It provides little cause for triumphalism, but it does
illuminate a larger importance for South Texas and the social system that
developed there during the first few decades of the Twentieth Century.
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Chapter 1: Porfirian South Texas

On January 15, 1876, General Fidencio Hernandez made a
pronunciamento against the government of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada. He

declared the beginning of the Revolution of Tuxtepec under the leadership of
General Porfirio Dfaz. Dfaz was then in exile in Brownsville, Texas, across the
Rio Grande from Matamoros, Tamaulipas. 1 This was merely the latest in a long
series of unsuccessful coup attempts by Dfaz, stretching back to the late 1860s. 2
Dfaz's verbal crossing of the Rio Grande set off a chain of events that,
over the following three decades, drastically altered the demographic realities of
Mexico. By bringing political stability and economic growth to the nation after
decades of periodic warfare and political volatility, Dfaz helped usher in rapid
capitalist modernization. Railroads connected the far-flung northern and southern
territories to the older central regions of Mexico, bringing increased capitalization
in their wake. The increased availability of capital allowed for the expansion of
the internal market, while also opening large swaths of previously isolated land to
agricultural production for domestic and international markets. As a result, the
years after Dfaz took control of Mexico witnessed a marked population shift
toward previously desolate areas of the north and away from the more crowded
central plateau.

1

For a letter from Porfirio Dfaz while in exile briefly explaining his opposition to the government
of Lerdo de Tejada, see Porfirio Dfaz to Manuel Gonzalez, Fondo CXC, Centro de Estudios de
Historia de Mexico Condumex, Mexico, D.F.
2
As with all things relating to Latin American history, the best basic source is the Cambridge
History of Latin America series: Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America. 11
Vol. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Leslie Bethell, ed., Mexico Since
Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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These same forces came to bear on South Texas during the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. The entry of railroads and increased capitalization
transformed a previously isolated region that remained largely outside of the
purview of the federal government in Washington and unattached to the domestic
market of the United States into an important agricultural region tied into the
volatile international market economy.
The timing of these changes north and south of the Rio Grande was not
coincidental. They represent a process that began in the central plateau of Mexico
and worked its way north. Even though an international boundary separated
South Texas from Northern Mexico, the changes that occurred in South Texas
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century followed from the economic and
demographic changes occurring south of the border. The same forces unleashed
by Dfaz that brought modernization to Mexico dragged South Texas into the
international market.

***
Mexico had seen only temporary respite from turmoil in the decades
before 1876. After a brutal civil war in which the Liberals under Benito Juarez
defeated the Conservatives, an invading army from France deposed the Liberals in
1861 and ruled Mexico for six years thanks to Conservative collaboration. The
execution of Emperor Maximilian brought the end of the French Intervention in
1867 and ushered in the Restored Republic. The next few years brought some
semblance of stability to the nation as a whole, but also witnessed the extension of
modernization efforts that began during the first Liberal reign in the 1850s that
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fell heavily on the peasant majority of rural Mexico. As historian Friedrich Katz
has written, the Liberals "envisaged the replacement of what they considered the
unsteady pillars of the old order- the church, the army, the regional caciques, the
communal villages - with a 'modem foundation. "' 3 In spite of their high-minded
ideals, their efforts to reform communal landholding patterns did not create an
agricultural middle class, as they hoped, but led instead to rapid consolidation of
landholding in the hands of large hacendados. Thus, these early attempts at land
reform created more tension in the countryside and accelerated the dispossession
of many rural Mexicans. Yet the central government in Mexico City still
exercised slight influence in much of Mexico's sprawling national territory.
Much of the south remained unknown to officials in the Distrito Federal, while
the arid north had only the most tenuous ties to the central government. Banditry
remained endemic across much of the country, making commerce and travel
dangerous.
The governments of Benito Juarez and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (who
was elected president over Porfirio Dfaz upon Juarez 's death in 1871) tried to
deal with these problems, but were never able to achieve any lasting stability.
The creation of the famed Rurales police force helped limit some of the more
overt signs of violence and banditry, largely by converting some of the bestknown bandits into Rurales, but was not able to solve the endemic violence of the
Mexican countryside during the years of the Restored Republic. 4 These issues of
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during the Juarez presidency. The Rurales did become much more prominent during the
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stability were exacerbated by the slow disintegration of the Liberal coalition after
the end of the French Intervention, as the elite and middle class wing of the party
moved further away from the more radical popular sector of the population.
Juarez and Lerdo angered the popular sector with their land reform efforts, but
were not much more successful in their efforts to appease the elite by bringing
economic growth to Mexico. Mexico badly needed additional capital to create an
infrastructure that would allow for the growth of large-scale mining, industry, and
commercial agriculture, but the continuing instability in Mexico limited the
availability of outside investment.
The death of Juarez eliminated much of the popular support still enjoyed
by the Liberals, though Diaz was unable to defeat Lerdo in the election of 1871 or
by means of a coup in 1872. Diaz again ran for the presidency against Lerdo in
1875, was again defeated, and once again was unable to nullify the election by
means of a coup. Still, the Lerdo regime was on shaky ground by the mid-1870s.
Not only, as Friedrich Katz has noted, did Lerdo lack the prestige that Juarez had
built up during his years of leadership during the Reform Wars and the French
Intervention, but, as a criollo, he did not appeal to indigenous Mexico in the same
way that Juarez, a Zapotec from Oaxaca, had. 5 In addition, Lerdo had begun to
anger investors from the United States by attempting to limit the amount of
investment entering Mexico from the United States. Railroad interests in New

Porfiriato, however, helping Dfaz to consolidate his control over the nation by acting, in
Vanderwood's words, as "peacekeepers, but, much more important for the dictator, they were his
means for political centralization, and they represented his determination to have his will obeyed.
They also assured national security for capitalistic investors and became the showpiece of a
modernized Mexico." Paul J. Vanderwood, Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican
Development (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 104.
5
Katz, "Liberal Republic and the Porfiriato," 64.

18
York and ranching interests in Texas viewed Lerdo' s hostility as dangerously
obstructionist and made it known that they would not be opposed to regime
change in Mexico City. The Texas interests were also quite eager to have Mexico
deal with issues of border violence from their side of the Rio Grande, and they
believed that Lerdo was unsuited for the task. Dfaz, on the other hand, seemed
just the man for the job. 6
These Americans were well aware of Dfaz and his strong belief in the
need for both pacification of the Mexican countryside and economic
modernization. For his part, Dfaz actively sought this support while he was in
exile in Texas after his last unsuccessful coup attempt. He was in contact with
economic, political, and military leaders in the United States and promised to
make Mexico a more hospitable place for foreign investment when he took
power. He also promised Texans that he would move immediately to crack down
on violence along the Rio Grande. 7 Thus, with the blessing of interests within the
US, Dfaz moved again to overthrow the Lerdo regime in January 1876.
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American man who had worked on a Cortina family ranch. When Cortina tried to stop the
beating, the marshal insulted him, so Cortina shot the officer and rode off with the injured
Mexican American man. What followed was a war along the border between Cortina's forces and
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The Plan of Tuxtepec declared the need for Mexicans to rise up against the
reelection of Lerdo de Tejada, which Dfaz called the first step toward tyranny.
Dfaz had made similar pronouncements before his previous unsuccessful coups,
but this time he extended the logic of anti-reelectionism down to the municipal
level, and thus was able to rally many throughout the nation to his side with what
appeared to be a promise of more local democracy. 8 Also essential to this victory,
which began with an invasion of Mexico from north of the Rio Grande, was the
refusal of the military commander in South Texas, General Edward Ortho Cresap
(E.O.C.) Ord, to comply with orders to enforce neutrality laws. Ord was a friend
of Richard King, one of Dfaz's largest supporters in South Texas. He justified his
failure to stop Dfaz from using Texas as a staging ground for an invasion of
Mexico by arguing that it would "violate the civil liberties of Mexicans," even
though Ord and his troops had earned a reputation in the previous years for
raiding across the international boundary at will and killing a number of
"suspicious-looking" Mexicans on the both sides of the Rio Grande. 9 Thus,

Mexico City, far away from his base of operations along the Rio Grande. He remained there until
his death in 1892. It is interesting to note that news of the Cortina War reached the rest of the state
and country shortly after the raid on Harper's Ferry, and many in South Texas believed that
Cortina's efforts were every bit as dangerous as those of John Brown in Virginia. See Jerry D.
Thompson, ed., Juan Cortina and the Texas-Mexico Frontier, 1859-1877 (El Paso: Texas Western
Press, 1994).
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Further, as historian John Tutino has argued, while Dfaz never promised any sort of agrarian
reform, his calls for local autonomy could easily have been mistaken for a more thoroughgoing
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political disaffection in Mexico combined with connivance of a U.S. military
official to allow Dfaz to topple the Lerdo regime.
Contrary to much of the post-revolutionary nationalist historiography of
Mexico, Dfaz's policies were not a drastic departure from the Liberal regimes of
Juarez and Lerdo de Tejada. The Porfiriato was very much a continuation of the
policies and ideology of the Liberal governments that preceded it. These
similarities are most obvious in Dfaz's land policy, which remained the same as
the Juarista and Lerdista policies. All three stressed the elimination of communal
lands in an effort to create a new form of highly-capitalized agriculture in the
Mexican countryside.
But there were also a few important differences between the regimes.
First, the Porfirian regime dealt far more harshly with any signs of disorder, and
was rapidly able to bring a semblance of order to Mexico. Second, Dfaz and his
advisors allowed unprecedented levels of foreign investment into Mexico in an
attempt to rapidly modernize the newly stabilized nation. Diaz, then, did not try
to alter the course that had been laid by Juarez and Lerdo, but instead sought to
augment their liberal reforms with a healthy dose of political centralization and
. 10
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violations of the neutrality laws by adherents of Lerdo who were gathering and plotting in the
vicinity of El Paso. Conditions in the El Paso region were further complicated by the outbreak of
the Salt War, in which a small-scale race war broke out between Anglos and Mexicans in which
the Texas Rangers played a prominent role. For an examination of these events that is
sympathetic to the Rangers, see Robert M. Utley, Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the
Texas Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 192-206.
1
For an interesting examination of the elite ideology that served as the basis of the Porfirian
regime, see William H. Beezley, Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).
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The Dfaz regime as it evolved in the years from 1876 to 1910 was built on,
in the words of Friedrich Katz, "two processes: the achievement of internal
stability (the Pax Porfiriana) and the emergence of an effective and powerful
Mexican state. These developments in turn were inextricably linked to the
economic development of the country" which was driven by the massive increase
in foreign investment that came with the first signs of stability under Dfaz. 11 The
backbone of this effort to consolidate the Porfirian regime and modernize the
Mexican economy was the expansion of Mexico's railroad network, which
consisted of little more than a run-down line that linked Mexico City to Veracruz
when Dfaz took power. In the years after Dfaz took control of the government
foreign investment flooded into the nation to help construct a modem
transportation system.
The entry of rail networks into previously isolated areas of Mexico,
especially the arid north, had a number of important effects. 12 Political
integration and consolidation was greatly aided by the new transportation
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network. With easier access to even the most isolated parts of the national
territory, Diaz was able to rein in the political power of regional caciques in
Guerrero, Jalisco, Sinaloa, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Nuevo Leon, among
others. 13 The implementation of central power was not necessarily achieved
through coercion, though such means were used in some areas. 14 More
emblematic of the Porfirian system and the fragile Pax Porfiriana is the northern
state of Chihuahua, which was ruled as a virtual fiefdom of the Terrazas-Cree!
family until 1884, when Diaz had the family removed from political power.
Instead of declaring against the Dfaz regime, the Terrazas-Cree! clan did their best
to take advantage of the economic modernization that Dfaz brought to the
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Mexican North, temporarily abandoning their political primacy in the state while
consolidating their economic power. 15 In many ways, this situation provides the
perfect symbol for the Dfaz regime and its relation to the Mexican upper class,
where political power was surrendered to the central government in favor of
increased economic opportunity and stability.
Increased economic opportunity was another one of the important effects
of the expansion of the Mexican railroad network. In one way, market access and
capitalization of the Mexican countryside allowed for the expansion of capitalist
agriculture into areas of the nation that had never been commercially feasible
before the Porfiriato. The railroads may have been built by foreign capital, but
they gave landowners and capitalists in Mexico the chance to compete within a
growing internal market. 16 Thus, the Mexican internal market expanded
drastically, as more currency now circulated even in the most isolated areas of the
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country. But, as happened at the same time in the US West with the expansion of
the railroad network, this increased capitalization brought a number of
complications with it.
Rising land values and the introduction of massive amounts of foreign
capital in the Mexican countryside led to an acceleration of land dispossession for
many rural Mexicans, especially in the densely populated central regions, and the
consolidation of landholdings. As John Hart has described, the railroads' ability
to bring isolated areas into contact with the world market "caused agricultural,
livestock, timber, and mining land values to skyrocket and brought about a
transformation of the land tenure system through foreclosures and seizures that
resulted. For the eighty-seven percent of the people who lived in the countryside,
the opening up of their communities to the outside world meant a dramatic change
in life-style and in their way of earning a living. For the campesinos, that sixtytwo percent of the population that worked the land, it meant economic
disenfranchisement, social dislocation, and violence." 17
This turmoil first emerged during the planning stages of the railroad
network, when the seizure of lands meant for track construction caused localized
uprisings among campesinos throughout the nation. 18 This dispossession and
violence continued throughout the Porfiriato, as the legal assaults on communal
landholding that had begun during the Juarez regime were extended during the
Dfaz regime, boosted by foreign investment and the possibility of massive profits
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for hacienda owners. 19 As a result, by 1910 almost 90 percent of Mexico's rural
population was landless and tied to hacendados through wage labor or debt
peonage. 20 The result of these trends was growing poverty and disaffection
among the rural population that festered for decades before it finally exploded in
the Mexican Revolution in 1910.
These systemic changes in the nature of land tenure also caused enormous
demographic changes, as many began to leave the crowded central rural regions
for cities and the rapidly developing northern states. 21 During the Porfiriato,
according to Friedrich Katz, the entry of railroads, "illustrated in the most
palpable way possible that what had once been a frontier was being transformed
into 'the border' and what had once been largely beyond the reach of any country
was now within the reach of two countries at once." 22 The importance of these
changes was comprehensive, according to historian Juan Mora-Torres:
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The northern states emerged as the showcase of the Porfirian economic
"miracle" with its impressive railroad network linking cities, mining and
industrial sites, and agricultural complexes to the United States and central
Mexico. One of the far-reaching consequences of the "frontier to border"
transition was that the center of economic gravity in Mexico tilted toward
the north. As the zone binding Mexico and the United States, the border
states leaped from their "peripheral" status vis-a-vis emergent capitalist
development in Mexico to a "core" position. 23
The most important effect of this economic re-centering was the steady flow of
migrants leaving central Mexico and settling in the north, often as one step in a
longer chain of migration.
These trends gripped all of northern Mexico, which can be seen most
clearly in a close examination of the Laguna region, an area covering more than
two thousand square miles that spreads across the southwestern portion of the
state of Coahuila and the northeastern corner of the state of Durango. When Dfaz
took control of Mexico in 1876 the Laguna was a desolate area unsuited for any
large-scale economic activities or high population densities. By the end of the
Porfiriato, the Laguna had become the primary agricultural region in Mexico, as
well as an important mining and industrial zone. The ways in which this
transition occurred provide important insights into the nature of Porfirian
economic and social change, in addition to providing a clear parallel to the
changes that would sweep South Texas in the coming decades. 24
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As was the case throughout the Mexican North, water was the Laguna's
most important and scarcest resource. The Nazas River runs through the region
and was the sole source for water before the arrival of the railroads brought
enough capital to make large-scale irrigation possible. Cotton was first planted in
these areas in the 1840s, and would increase throughout the following decades.
But the Laguna remained little more than an isolated, underdeveloped enclave that
served as a regional source of cotton. The entry of the railroads into the Laguna
brought increased economic opportunity and enhanced access to outside markets
that helped recreate the Laguna as a thriving agricultural and industrial region.
It is clear that the rapid development of the Laguna occurred as a

consequence of the program of railroad expansion that was initiated by Porfirio
Dfaz. The Mexican Central came to the Laguna in 1884 as it moved north from
Mexico City to El Paso. The Mexican International, connecting Mexico City to
Eagle Pass, arrived in the Laguna four years later. Once the railroads arrived, the
area of cultivation extended down river, as well as spreading away from the river
as irrigation became economically feasible. As a result, the amount of cultivated
land and total production doubled between 1890 and 1910. Investment poured
into the Laguna from both foreign investors and Mexican elites. Cotton became
the primary agricultural product, but the early years of the twentieth century also
saw a boom in guayule production, a rubber-bearing shrub that grew wild in

Revolutionary Politics: A Social History of La Comarca Lagunera, 1888-1911" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1980); William K. Meyers, "La Comarca Lagunera: Work,
Protest, and Popular Mobilization in North Central Mexico," in Benjamin and McNellie, Other
Mexicos, 243-274; William K. Meyers, Forge of Progress, Crucible of Revolt: The Origins of the
Mexican Revolution in La Comarca Lagunera, 1880-1911 (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1994).
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northern Mexico and was much in demand thanks to the pneumatic tire industry. 25
Larger potential agricultural profits allowed for the expansion of railroads,
irrigation, roads, and telegraph facilities, making the Laguna "the most highly
capitalized and well-communicated area in Mexico." 26
As would be the case in South Texas twenty years later, the only thing
missing from the Laguna during the early years of this economic boom was a
large surplus labor pool. The solution to this problem was the enormous number
of migrants who were forced off the land in central Mexico. In the thirty years
from 1880 to 1910 the rural population of the Laguna grew from 20,000 to
200,000, with an extra 40,000 annually living in the region during the harvest
season that lasted from July to October. 27 These workers were propelled by their
worsening economic situation in central Mexico. By 1910 wages paid to cotton
pickers in the Laguna were as high as six to eight pesos a day, several times larger
than the sixty centavo wages that prevailed in other parts of the country. 28 In
addition, the Laguna's integration into the national railroad network made it an

25

The guayule boom was fairly short-lived, however. Investors first tried to ship the plant to
Germany where it was processed into rubber. Dfaz ended this practice by placing an enormous
export tax on the plants. Speculators then rushed into the Laguna and bought up every inch of
land that was previously deemed too dry even for livestock because much of the land contained
guayule plants. This caused a real estate bubble in the Laguna in the first decade of the twentieth
century that popped in the depression of 1907, but not before land values throughout the region
had quadrupled in a matter of a few years. Continental Rubber, backed by many of the largest
financiers in the United States, soon moved in and cornered the guayule market, while also
building a massive processing factory in Torreon. Shortly after Continental gained control of a
lion's share of the guayule market, however, it became clear that guayule shrubs took fifty years to
grow, and that Continental's aggressive move to control its cultivation in northern Mexico had
been designed to eliminate the guayule shrub as a market competitor for their rubber production
elsewhere. Thus, the guayule boom soon dissipated, and by 1910 the rubber shrub was no longer
a major part of the Laguna agricultural economy. Meyers, Forge of Progress, 75-76, 146-148.
26
Ibid., 31, 33.
27
Ibid., 34.
28
Ibid., 7.

29

easy place to reach on short notice for seasonal work, and an easy place to leave
once the work was done.
The agricultural work-force of the Laguna was made up of three groups.
The first, and smallest group, were called peones acasillados, and were full-time
resident workers. The second were the peones eventuales, who lived in the
vicinity of the haciendas but were landless wage laborers who worked seasonally
when labor demand increased. The third were cotton pickers who came to the
Laguna each year for the cotton harvest and then left. 29 Again, these demographic
outlines look very similar to the labor and population arrangements that would
form in the US West in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, but they
represented nothing less than a complete overturning of the normal agricultural
patterns of Mexico.
Migrants to the Laguna did not come in order to find free land. Instead, it
was the offer of high wages and steady employment that attracted them. This
change in the nature of the Mexican agricultural economy would have profound
effects in the twentieth century. 30 The Laguna represented the beginning of a
substantial pool of landless wage laborers in Mexico who were highly mobile and
attuned to the nature of seasonal labor demands. These changes are what led to
the tremendous growth of the number of cotton pickers and the peones eventuales.
By 1910, the peones eventuales constituted a third of the region's non-harvest
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agricultural population.
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During harvest time, these numbers were bolstered by

the large number of pickers who came for a few months.
The peones eventuales remained in a very precarious economic situation
despite their relatively high wages and the absence of the sort of coercion and
peonage practices that characterized central and southern Mexico. 32 As with any
agricultural laborers, their income depended on the tumultuous world agricultural
market, and thus they remained at risk of depressed market conditions, poor
harvests, wage fluctuations, and the rest of the uncertainties that are part and
parcel of commercial agriculture. Yet, by the late nineteenth century, it was a
seller's market for labor as Laguna growers, mining, and industrial interests in
northern Mexico, and growers in the US Southwest all competed for the same
workers. This led to the passage of anti-enticement laws in the Laguna to try and
limit the mobility of the peones eventuales. 33 Growers also hired contractors who
went to central Mexico and the towns and cities of northern Mexico to recruit
seasonal workers when large crops were expected or when labor shortages were
feared.
Planters in the Laguna also complained about increasing assertiveness
among workers who had traveled to the United States to work. One hacienda
administrator complained in 1905, "In the last five years everything has changed
with respect to workers in the Laguna; before the peon was content with simply a

31

Ibid., 125.
See Joseph and Wells, Summer of Discontent.
33
Meyers argued that workers used these anti-enticement laws and the labor competition that
produced them to demand wage increases and additional benefits from the growers. It is unclear
thus far in my research whether there is a similar negotiation instigated by workers after the
passage of anti-enticement laws in Texas. I have seen little evidence of it, but it deserves more
careful study. Meyers, Forge of Progress, 127.
32

31

reed hut and 32 centavos a day. Now he demands an adobe house and a salary
two or three times larger. All the haciendas in the Laguna are constructing
hundreds of fincas for their workers and you can understand that if we don't do
the same we will not be able to attract workers." 34 In fact, many growers so
feared the increased migration to the United States and the bad habits picked up
by these migrant workers that many demanded that the Dfaz government provide
them with more Chinese laborers to fill in the holes in the labor force that growers
feared were imminent 35
In many ways, the Laguna perfectly illustrates the broad features of
Porfirian Mexico. 36 As many historians have argued, however, the stability and
prosperity of the Porfirian regime were shallow and tenuous. 37 The economic
modernization of the late nineteenth century uprooted the population and
propelled people into an unstable economic environment dependent on the
vagaries of the world market economy and the decisions of foreign investors. It is
no accident, then, that the collapse of the Porfirian regime in 1910 occurred in
part because of intense unrest in the Laguna.
The events that led to the growth of revolutionary pressure in the rest of
Mexico in tum had profound effects on the Laguna. The Depression of 1907,
which badly destabilized the economic growth throughout Mexico, was especially
difficult for the Laguna. The market collapse devastated the agricultural, mining,
and industrial interests in the region. The economic downturn also led
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immigration officials in the US Southwest to deport Mexican agricultural
workers, pushing a large pool of unemployed workers into the Laguna seeking
jobs. 38 Planters reacted by arming their peones acasillados to keep the migrants
from remaining in the region. 39 In addition, the 1907 harvest was damaged by the
region's worst drought in more than a decade. 40 The result was an about-face by
the planters of the region, who now ignored their anti-enticement demands and
instead, joining with industrial and mining interests, forcibly demanded that
migrant workers leave nortfiem Mexico and go to the United States. 41 Thus the
workers confronted a drastic reversal of the situation prior to the depression of
1907. They were not wanted by either the United States or the Laguna. 42 Not
surprisingly, such a situation made the Laguna fertile ground for the anti-Dfaz
appeals of the anarchist Partido Liberal Mexicano, whose activities and fiery
rhetoric were important for the development of the Revolution in all of Mexico. 43
Revoluci6n
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Agrarian unrest was not new to the Laguna, but it grew to unprecedented
levels after 1907.

44

Social conflict became ubiquitous in the region, causing some

in the Laguna to see threats that never existed. Reports traveled quickly around
the region that an armed group called the "Mexican Cotton Pickers" were crossing
from Texas into Coahuila to begin an uprising, while the Governor of Coahuila
warned a number of local officials that a disturbance was imminent in the
Laguna. 45 To be fair, a number of armed attacks did occur in the towns of the
Laguna between 1907 and 1910, but there is no evidence that the "Mexican
Cotton Pickers" was anything but the creation of overactive imaginations. This
continued unrest severed much of the support for Dfaz from the Laguna elite. It is
no surprise that the person most identified with the beginning of the Revolution,
Francisco Madero, was a major investor in the Laguna who felt that the Porfirian
system had stagnated after more than three decades. When Madero made his call
for revolt against the Dfaz regime in 1910, dissidents within the Laguna were
some of the first to act. 46 In the months that followed, the rest of Mexico became
engulfed in what began as a political rebellion but quickly turned into a social
revolution.

***
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The Porfiriato was also a period of profound change across the Rio Grande
in South Texas. One aspect of this was the Porfirian campaign to rid the border
region of raiders who had plagued the area since the Rio Grande became the
dividing line in the aftermath of the Texas Rebellion and the US-Mexico War.
Diaz repaid the financial and military support that was given to him in the United
States by bringing an end to large-scale raids against property north of the border.
South Texans did not have to think back very far to remember the last outbreak of
violence caused by these border raids. In March 1875, what has come to be
known as the Skinning War broke out as a group of thirty armed Mexicans rode
through the vicinity of Corpus Christi attacking stores and homes, killing five
people in the process. This attack represented the beginning of a series of raids
from Mexico, and an even greater number of counter-attacks by vigilantes that
swept through the Nueces Strip attacking Mexican ranchers and stealing their
land. 47 Diaz put an end to these attacks and counter-attacks by cracking down on
his side of the border. In fact, it appears as though the raids could only be stopped
from the Mexican side because, as David Montejano has argued, "the Nueces
Strip of South Texas ... remained 'untamed' for nearly fifty years after
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annexation. A frontier battalion of Texas Rangers, stationed in the border zone
until 1920, represented the armed force of the Anglo-Texas order." 48 These raids
would not resume in any substantial way until the early years of the Mexican
Revolution, when Diaz's grasp on northern Mexico was finally relinquished. 49
As in Mexico, peace and relative stability in South Texas attracted outside
capital in unprecedented amounts. In fact, the history of South Texas during the
period from 1876-1910 parallels the economic and demographic development of
contemporaneous Mexico to a striking degree. Further, the burgeoning market of
northern Mexico helped fuel many of these changes. As Anglos flooded into
South Texas, they wrested economic control of the region from the previous
landholders as they attempted to profit from the economic opportunity of northern
Mexico at the same time that they worked to gain possession of lands belonging
to Mexican Americans in the still underdeveloped region.
The first rail connection to South Texas was completed by the Southern
Pacific at San Antonio in 1877, though this only served the far northern portion of
the region. 5° It did eliminate the need for long trail drives to the Midwest for
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ranchers looking to send their livestock to market, but it remained too distant to
act as a catalyst for agricultural growth along the rich lands of the Rio Grande
Valley. The arrival of the railroad also resulted in the dispossession of those few
Mexican American landholders who had managed to maintain control of their
land. There were no land reform laws in the United States like those passed by
the Juarez, Lerdo, and Dfaz regimes, but dispossession proceeded along very
similar lines, moving slowly in a series of waves that eventually reached the
Lower Rio Grande Valley in the early twentieth century. Land transfers in South
Texas therefore differed in some ways from what was happening at the same time
in Mexico, but they were also accomplished through a similar combination of free
market pressures and naked coercion, the invisible hand aided by the trigger
finger.
As in Mexico, this dispossession was an uneven process that occurred at
different times in different parts of South Texas, but some aspects of the process
remained constant regardless of when or where land transfers took place. A
combination of market pressure and physical compulsion forced many off of their
land in ways that make differentiation between legal and illegal methods almost
impossible.
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efficient mechanism of market competition also operated there. " 52 Likewise, he
argued that "land displacement of both a legal and fraudulent character generally
expressed a market-related logic. Even conflict and outright dispossession
demonstrated a sensitivity to market demands." 53 Further, "[o]nce the region had
been integrated with the national market economy, there was little need for
outright fraud on the part of the Anglo pioneer entrepreneurs. The natural course
of free enterprise accomplished more or less the same result. The play of the
market did the trick, triggering both voluntary sales and involuntary sheriff's
sales." 54
Newly arrived lawyers greased the skids for these changes. They first
descended on South Texas in the aftermath of annexation and the Mexican War,
though they did not become central actors in the history of the region until the
Porfirian period brought a measure of stability to the border. The growth of the
northern Mexican market attracted investors to South Texas from the East Coast
and Europe (primarily Britain). Lawyers well-versed in Spanish, Mexican, and
US land laws became "critical intermediaries between the land-based Mexican
elite and the capital-based Anglo merchants." 55 The most successful of these
lawyers worked both sides of the conflict, "defending the land rights of certain
52
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Mexican families" while "persuading others that they never really owned the
land." 56 Not surprisingly, these land lawyers also became central figures in the
political machines that came to dominate the region, with James Wells becoming
the archetype of the South Texas political boss. In essence, then, those who had
access to credit and the best lawyers were the ones who kept their land during
these years.
Regardless of the method of dispossession, land transfers fell more heavily
upon Mexicans and Mexican Americans than Anglos, adding a racial component
to the tangle of economic pressure and physical coercion. This was partially due
to the fact that the Anglo population remained fairly small in most of South Texas
until the early twentieth century, so Mexicans and Mexican Americans were much
more likely to be dispossessed because they made up the vast majority of the
population. But the specifics of these land transfers reveal a pattern of credit
arrangements that served as a catalyst to dispossession. The inability of Mexican
and Mexican American ranchers to secure credit during the frequent economic
downturns and droughts of the last quarter of the nineteenth century meant that
they did not possess the financial flexibility that Anglo newcomers did. The
expansion of the King Ranch provides an example of these dynamics, as the pace
of land purchases accelerated during economic downturns. 57 That fact alone is
neither surprising nor proof of anti-Mexican prejudice, but when combined with
the prices that were paid for these lands, a pattern becomes clear. As Montejano
wrote, "Mexicans parted with their land more easily under financial duress. The
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record of King Ranch expansion, once organized according to cattle market
conditions and ethnicity of seller, directly reveals the marginal situation of many
Mexican landowners in the late nineteenth century. While some Anglo
landholders experienced similar circumstances, many sold their property not
because they had to but because of an attractive purchase offer." 58
The timing of the dispossession of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in
different areas of South Texas can also be traced by the gradual expansion of the
rail network into the rest of South Texas in the years after 1877. From San
Antonio, the Southern Pacific expanded to the border at Eagle Pass in 1878
(which then ran to the Laguna), while the International and Great Northern
arrived in Laredo in 1883. At the same time, the ranching impresarios Richard
King and Mifflin Kenedy combined with Corpus Christi merchant Uriah Lott to
build a railroad from Corpus Christi to Laredo that was completed in 1881. These
rail links had a number of important effects. First, they brought wide swaths of
South Texas closer to rail heads, and therefore led to a new wave of land transfers
as Anglo ranchers pressured their Mexican and Mexican American neighbors off
of their lands. Second, and most importantly, by building the line between
Corpus Christi and Laredo, the Lower Rio Grande Valley entered a period of
isolation when Brownsville lost its spot as the primary commercial center on the
Texas-Mexico border. These effects were not accidental, but instead were
planned by the primary financiers of the Corpus Christi-Laredo railroad as a way
to destroy the power of the Brownsville merchants, whose control of the border
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trade depended on a vast network of riverboats and wagons that reached deep into
the interior of Mexico. 59
The arrival of railroads also affected the occupational structure of South
Texas in ways that were related to the increasingly landless Mexican and Mexican
American populations. It is important to remember that agriculture was not the
primary mode of employment in South Texas during the late nineteenth century.
Ranching and trade were still the primary economic activities, and therefore were
the primary sources of employment. Agriculture only replaced them after the
farming boom of the early twentieth century. In 1850, one-quarter of the labor
force of Bexar County (San Antonio is the county seat) were carreteros, arrieros,
or some other variety of teamster working in the extensive trade network that
extended beyond the border into the interior of Mexico. 60 The economic changes
that followed in the wake of the railroads and the integration of South Texas into
the national and international markets drastically altered this occupational
59
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structure by 1900, with clear differences emerging between Anglo and Mexican
occupational structures, as historians Amoldo De Leon and Kenneth Stewart
have shown in their statistical analysis of nineteenth century South Texas. "The
impact of economic transformation on occupations in the Mexican region, then,
was distinct," they argued.
Labor in the state as a whole shifted from the agricultural sector to the
service, trade, transportation, and unspecialized segments. Something
approaching the reverse was true in the Mexican region, where declining
opportunities were concentrated not in agriculture, but in the other
specialized labor categories; the number of workers engaged in service,
trade, transport, and manufacturing fell by over 35 percent between 1850
and 1900. Since demand for specialized agricultural labor neither
increased nor decreased significantly, an extremely large number of
workers turned for a living to unspecialized or general-labor pursuits. The
shift in this region was not from agriculture to commercial and industrial
specializations; rather it was from specialized, skilled occupations to
unspecialized, unskilled ones. 61
Thus, by 1900 there is a clear shift in the occupational structure, with a trend
toward labor market segmentation developing that would only accelerate in the
early twentieth century when the growth of agriculture in South Texas further
reshaped the labor market.
The political structures that grew in South Texas in these years were
both products of this gradual dispossession and bulwarks that acted to blunt the
worst features of land transfers. Political machines developed throughout South
Texas that were based on a patr6n-pe6n bond between the Anglo political bosses
and the majority Mexican and Mexican American population. Thus, these

machines maintained power, like the system of jefaturas politicas in Porfirian
Mexico, through an uneasy system of overlapping mechanisms of coercion and
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accommodation. This "peace structure," as David Montejano has described it,
worked best in the more isolated portions of South Texas. 62 The entry of
railroads, however, drained the strength of the machines, allowing traditional
machine politicians to maintain their control only in isolated areas like Cameron,
Hidalgo, Starr, and Duval Counties into the twentieth century.
The best example of a South Texas political boss was Cameron County's
James Wells, who parleyed his land law practice into a dominant position within
the county's Democratic Party organization. By 1910, Wells's authority stretched
into neighboring counties, where proxy machines practiced what historian Evan
Anders has called "the peculiar brand of South Texas politics that combined graft,
voter manipulation, and armed confrontation." 63 Fraudulent poll tax payments,
pay-offs, and intimidation of political opposition marked each election cycle as
the machine balanced the necessity of wooing Mexican American voters against
the fear of the numerical superiority of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in
South Texas. When the tamalada was not enough to maintain power, the
machine turned to the Texas Rangers. 64 As Evan Anders has argued, machine
politicians were well aware of the tenuous nature of their control: "The past
outbreaks of racial strife revealed the dangers of taking Mexican American
subservience for granted, and the more perceptive politicians and ranchers
understood the need to satisfy the popular expectations of paternalistic support
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and protection. Even as followers, the Hispanic majority strongly influenced the
pattern of racial conduct. " 65
As with changing landholding patterns, the collapse of these paternalistic
political machines can be traced by the spread of railroads. Laredo's paternalistic
politics came to an end in the years after the arrival of the railroads, as two parties
formed in the mid-1880s that tore apart the "peace structure" that had been in
place for decades in the border town. The Botas represented the newcomer
interests that flooded into Laredo after the arrival of the railroad, while the
contending Guaraches came from the older ranching elite. When the Botas swept
fiercely contested elections for county and municipal seats, a riot erupted between
the supporters of each party. Regardless, the Guaraches soon disappeared as a
meaningful political presence, relegated to junior partner status in the newly
formed bipartisan Independent Club that dominated Laredo politics until the
1970s. 66 Similar events happened throughout South Texas in the wake of the
railroads, with older machines collapsing, while new, but substantively different,
machine organizations grew up to replace them. As a result, the paternalistic
politics of the late nineteenth century gave way to the appeals to white supremacy
ofthe twentieth century. Areas that remained relatively isolated even after the
railroads had reached Brownsville, such as Starr and Duval counties, continued to
exist under the paternalistic machine politicians long after they disappeared in the
rest of the region.

***
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Stepping back and examining these changes, it is clear that the same
mechanisms that created such momentous changes throughout Mexico also acted
as catalysts for massive change in South Texas, with increased capitalization
bringing political and economic modernization in its wake. As these larger
structural changes occurred south of the border, land consolidation created the
pressures for migration among the rural population that pushed them north out of
central Mexico and toward the Texas-Mexico border. Once the railroads reached
the border from Mexico they met up with the lines that stretched into the interior
of the United States, as northward and southward waves of economic
modernization came together along the Texas-Mexico border.
As a result, South Texas in the years after 1900 found itself in a situation
similar to the Laguna twenty years earlier. The infrastructure of economic
modernization had arrived, and with it came floods of outside capital, but the
region remained sparsely settled. As had occurred in Mexico, much of the rural
population had been driven off their land by these changes, creating the
beginnings of an agricultural labor force. Yet, South Texas found itself at a
crossroads. It possessed the transportation facilities and the capital to create a rich
agricultural region, but lacked sufficient labor. Meanwhile, sky-rocketing land
values triggered by this unrealized potential made traditional cattle ranching less
economically viable.
The solution to these problems for the would-be planter elite of South
Texas came with the collapse of the Dfaz regime in 1910. Widespread violence
would replace the enforced quiet of the Porfirian years and trigger a demographic
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shift more momentous than the gradual northward population drift of the previous
three decades. The Mexican Revolution, in other words, would change the
trajectory of both nations.
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Chapter 2: Revoluci6n en La Frontera 1

In 1913, journalist John Reed described the border town of Ojinaga,
Chihuahua, across the Rio Grande from Presidio, Texas, as a place where "hardly
a house had a roof and all the walls gaped with cannon shot. . . . Along the main
street passed an unbroken procession of sick, exhausted, starving people, driven
from the interior by the fear of the approaching rebels, a journey of eight days
over the most terrible desert in the world. They were stopped by a hundred
soldiers along the street, and robbed of every possession that took the Federals'
fancy. Then they passed on to the river, and on the American side they had to run
the gauntlet of the United States customs and immigration officials and the Army
Border Patrol, who searched them for arms." 2 Similar circumstances obtained in
the rest of Chihuahua, in much of Northern Mexico, and in large parts of Mexico
as a whole. The endemic violence of the Mexican Revolution led, even forced,
many to leave their homes throughout the nation and set off on the migrant trail.
Some sought refuge in places like Mexico City, Monterrey, and Torreon before
they ventured to the United States, but for many, crossing north of the border was
the ultimate outcome of the Revolution. As Ernesto Galarza wrote in describing
his own emigration away from the upheaval of the Revolution, "What brought me

1

I am using the Spanish phrase for the title for a few reasons. For one, the English version,
"Revolution on the Border," connotes a rigid cultural and social boundary that does not exist
between South Texas and Northern Mexico. Likewise, "Revolution on the Frontier" carries too
much possible Turnerian baggage. The Spanish word "frontera," however, avoids the rigidity and
preconceived notions of the English translations, and instead connotes the permeable nature of the
international boundary separating South Texas from Mexico during the first quarter of the
twentieth century.
2
John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New York: International Publishers, 1969 [1914]), 31.

47
and my family to the United States from Mexico also brought hundreds of
thousands of others like us." 3
This chapter will examine the immediate effects of the Mexican
Revolution on the Texas-Mexico border region. As a political rebellion deepened
into a thoroughgoing social revolution, the consequences of these changes and the
intense violence that accompanied them had profound effects on both sides of the
Rio Grande. Within Mexico, the Revolution destabilized the nation, especially
the North, and created an enormous refugee population. Coming on the heels of
the momentous changes of the Porfirian years, the demographic pressures created
by the collapse of the Mexican state pushed hundreds of thousands of people
across the border into the United States. This population movement occurred at
the same time that the last stages of modem economic development occurred
along the northern bank of the Rio Grande. The combination of these two
changes had profound effects on the border region, pushing South Texas through
years of intense change and near apocalyptic violence that both overshadowed
and added to the changes that had occurred in the last decades of the nineteenth
century.

***
On February 14, 1911, Francisco Madero crossed the border from Texas
into Mexico, walking into the midst of a revolution that had begun, according to
the nationalist historiography of the Mexican Revolution, in his name. 4 Four
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months earlier, Madero, the scion of one of the wealthiest families in Mexico, had
left the north-central Mexican city of San Luis Potosi after his release from
prison, where he was sent for his opposition to Diaz' s reelection in 1910. He fled
to Texas, where he immediately went to work gathering support for the overthrow
of Diaz. The irony that Diaz had done the same thing thirty-four years earlier
seems to have been lost on Madero. Shortly after arriving in San Antonio,
Madero announced his Plan de San Luis Potosi, back-dated to October 5, 1910,
(Madero's last day in San Luis Potosi) to avoid the appearance of any violation
of United States neutrality laws. The plan called for a series of ill-defined,
decidedly modest reforms that would be carried out when Madero had secured the
presidency. The rebellion was scheduled to begin on November 20, 1910. Two
days before that fateful date, Madero left San Antonio to join up with a force of
hundreds of Coahuilans who would then lay siege to the symbolically important
border town of Ciudad Porfirio Dfaz (now Piedras Negras), across the Rio Grande
from Eagle Pass, Texas. On the way, however, they became disoriented and spent
a night wandering through the chaparral of South Texas. Finally, on November
19 they crossed the border and met a contingent of only ten men. 5 Realizing that
their tiny force would accomplish little, Madero abandoned his plans and returned

the Porfiriato (which were little more than an attempted coup d'etat which promised no more
reform than Dfaz had in his Plan de Tuxtepec) were little more than peripheral events within a
wide-ranging social revolution that began while he was still in exile in San Antonio. His
centrality, therefore, is built more on oft-repeated myths than any sound historical interpretation.
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to San Antonio, where he would remain for three more months. Thus began the
Maderista Revolution. 6
While Madero remained in exile, however, his mostly urban supporters
watched as a rural rebellion developed beyond their control. He finally re-entered
Mexico at the head of a hundred men, one step ahead of US law enforcement.
Mexican spies, the private detectives of the Furlong Agency, and US federal
investigators had been harassing Madero in San Antonio, but by February it

6
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became clear that Madero would be arrested for violation of US neutrality laws if
he remained in Texas any longer. 7 In addition, by February, a number of
nominally Maderista forces had emerged throughout the North, threatening to
move beyond Madero's leadership. Once in Mexico, then, Madero tried to rein in
the revolutionary forces, which, at that point, had not seized any of the cities but
held unquestioned control throughout the mountains of Northern Mexico. Having
taken on a logic of its own beyond Madero's leadership, the Revolution continued
to spread. By April, 1911, the Laguna was overrun with rebel bands. Only
Torreon remained in federal hands, and then only until May 15 when the federal
commander retreated under dark, giving up one of the primary cities of the North
without a fight.
Torreon's fall came just five days after the federal garrison at Ciudad
Juarez surrendered to the forces of Pascual Orozco, a native northerner who laid
siege to the city in spite of Madero's insistence that a siege of the border city
could cause damage across the Rio Grande in El Paso and trigger intervention
from the US, a seemingly ever-present concern for northern revolutionaries. With
these twin victories at Ciudad Juarez and Torreon, the Dfaz regime disintegrated,
with Dfaz agreeing to step down on May 25. With the image of authority now
gone, armed bands multiplied across the nation. Madero and his associates would
spend the next several months trying to consolidate their control.
If everything had ended after Madero's election as president in October

1911, there would be little reason to call this a revolution. The importance of
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these events for the course of Mexican history would have been negligible, and its
consequences north of the Rio Grande temporary and slight. There was obviously
violence and turmoil during the anti-Dfaz uprising, especially in the North, but it
paled in comparison to what would come in the next years as shifting alliances
and political assassinations led to continuing upheaval that would engulf parts of
the nation into the late 1920s. The Maderista Revolution, then, was merely the
first halting step in a devastatingly destructive, thoroughgoing social revolution
that would have profound effects on both sides of the border.
Rebellions plagued the Maderista state, with two separate military forces
attempting uprisings from exile in Texas: the first a farcical disaster (Bernardo
Reyes in 1911 ), while the second posed a dangerous challenge to the stability of
the new regime (Pascual Orozco, the former Maderista general, in 1912).
Madero's refusal to push for agrarian reform led to another rupture within the
anti-Dfaz coalition, as the Zapatista rebels of Morelos continued their fight against
the new federates, seeing no difference between Madero and Dfaz when it came
to their agrarian concerns. In addition, a number of local serrano rebellions broke
out throughout the nation as villages tried to reassert autonomy at the same time
that Madero's government sought to strengthen its own shaky hold over the
national territory. Madero had only achieved a tenuous authority over the major
leaders in northern and central Mexico when he was unceremoniously overthrown
and assassinated in 1913 by Victoriano Huerta, the head of the reconstituted
federal military.
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Huerta's coup threw gasoline on the already combustible situation
throughout Mexico, igniting even fiercer and more destructive fighting.
Widespread guerrilla war rapidly seized the Mexican countryside. Northern
Mexico again took the lead in this revolt, though in various, often conflicting
ways. 8 The first to pronounce against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza, a
Sonoran active in Porfirian politics, who went into exile in San Antonio at the
same time as Madero, but remained there until the fall of Ciudad Juarez , entering
the revolutionary fray at the last minute as an important northern power-broker.
Carranza became the standard-bearer of one strand of the northern revolution,
which was a top-down, moderate reformism that dominated the states of Sonora
and Coahuila throughout the 1910s.
The most important aspect of the northern revolution (at least in its antiHuerta phase), however, was the popular revolution as embodied in Pancho Villa
and the ill-defined serrano bands that cohered under his control as the Division
del Norte. While Villa and Carranza later split, during the fight against Huerta
they maintained a strong alliance, united under the banner of Constitutionalism,
with Villa acting as the bludgeon that routed the federal troops throughout
strategically important north-central Mexico, while Carranza put forward the
respectable face of a moderate landholder who would rein in the more radical
tendencies of the popular revolutionary groups. By the middle of 1913 Villa's
army had moved south from its home base in Chihuahua and driven the federals
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out of Torreon, forcing Huerta to relinquish control of much of the North outside
of a few cities.
The combined onslaught of Villa's northern forces, the constant
harassment of the Zapatistas just south of the capital, and the hostility of the
Wilson administration in Washington, led Huerta into exile by mid-1914. As in
1911, however, the disappearance of a common enemy led to the fracturing of the
Constitutionalist coalition into its component parts. The resulting fight, pitting
the armies of Carranza and Obregon (maintaining the name Constitutionalist)
against the loosely allied and geographically separated armies of Zapata and Villa
(grouped together under the title of Conventionists), would bring an even more
destructive period of civil war which saw massive conventional armies crisscrossing the nation in the midst of a continuing guerrilla war that often took on
the aspects of organized banditry (especially to the jaundiced eyes of exiled elites
and threatened landowners). 9

9

While there were certainly differences in the leadership of these groups, as Alan Knight has
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When this stage of the Revolution began, Villa held unquestioned control
of most of the Mexican North, most importantly the valuable arms trade routes
along the US-Mexico border. Villista control also extended into much of western
Mexico. Carranza and Obregon, on the other hand, remained isolated in
Veracruz, with other small pockets of control scattered throughout the nation.
Still, in a series of battles in 1915, Obregon was able to defeat Villa and destroy
the Division del Norte as the nation's dominant military force. The collapse of
the Villista military pushed Carranza into unquestioned national political
dominance, a position he would maintain until 1920. Thus, in some ways, the
decisive events of 1915 brought an end to one phase of the Revolution, and
thereafter the Carrancista state would remain intact in spite of almost continuous
upheaval and rebellion that would continue until the end of the 1920s. 10
Regardless, much of Mexico faced continued violence, often unattached or only
nominally attached to the factional squabbles apparent on the national level, that
was every bit as disruptive as the more traditional military campaigns of previous
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years. This general pattern would continue, in fact, into the late 1920s, as
localized violence continued to plague much of the nation as the central
government remained largely unable to create a stable national state. 11
The state of Chihuahua provided the best example of this continued
instability. As the cradle of the revolution, Chihuahua endured almost constant
upheaval throughout the 1920s. First, the specter of Villa continued to haunt the
state, even after he laid down his arms after coming to terms with Obregon in
1920. Even after his assassination in 1923, the remnants of the Villista military
force maintained the capacity to wage guerrilla war in the rugged mountains of
Northern Mexico. In addition, hardly a year passed without some major uprising.

11
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In 1921 the state militia crushed an uprising of hundreds of indigenous villagers
in southwestern Chihuahua. A number of rebel bands operated throughout the
state in 1922, though they were eventually dispersed by federal troops. In
December 1923, one of the largest rebellions of the 1920s began when Adolfo de
la Huerta, who had been interim president after the overthrow of Carranza in
1920, pronounced against Obregon and rallied much of the military to his side.
Delahuertista forces continued fighting in Chihuahua through much of 1924.
Nicolas Hernandez, a leader of the delahuertista rebellion, declared his own
rebellion in mid-1925, and continued guerrilla operations until 1927. A coup
against the state governor in 1927 led to another guerrilla outbreak that lasted
until 1928. In addition, banditry remained endemic throughout the decade,
sometimes melting into the organized violence of the above mentioned
uprisings. 12 Thus, as Mark Wasserman has argued, "all Chihuahua earned for a
decade of civil war was another decade of chaos." 13
The most disruptive outbreak of the decade, however, occurred in westcentral Mexico, and would have repercussions throughout the nation. In some
ways, this struggle was a continuation of the traditional struggle between liberals
and the Church in Mexico. But the Cristero Rebellion, as it came to be known,
was also a complex struggle between the Mexican state, which sought to destroy
the power of the Church as one aspect of its effort to consolidate centralized
control, and a dissenting popular movement that contested the outcome of the
Revolution and its institutionalization- part religious war, part renewal of the
12
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localized rural violence of the Revolution.

14

The uprising occurred in a part of

Mexico that had seen little military action during the 191 Os, and had little voice in
the construction of the post-revolutionary state. For three years west-central
Mexico became a battleground between advocates of local control of politics and
land, and the Callista state which sought to use agrarian reform and a form of topdown anti-clericalism to crush a movement they depicted as
counterrevolutionary. 15

***
This continued violence forced more than a million Mexicans to migrate
to the United States during the 191 Os and 1920s. These exiles left behind the
continued disorder and potential danger of the revolutionary process for a number
of different reasons, though most embarked on their journey north of the border
with the belief that it was temporary.
Politics and factionalism helped create a large body of emigrants. Former
Porfiristas, Huertistas, and any number of other out-groups left for the United
States throughout the 191 Os and 1920s. San Antonio became the unofficial
capital of exiled Mexico, though elite exile communities also developed in Los
Angeles, El Paso, and New Orleans. Many of these emigres hoped to eventually
return to their homeland, but remained on the sidelines while the Revolution
continued. There was also a noisy minority of this political exile population who
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sought to re-enter the fray, hoping to retrace the steps taken by both Dfaz and
Madero in conquering Mexico from across the Rio Grande.
Another factor that fueled emigration was the threat of impressment into
one of the countless armed groups that circulated throughout the country. Huerta
became notorious for his indiscriminate use of the leva to fill his Federal Army,
but all military forces used the tactic at some point during the Revolution. Pablo
Mares, a miner from a village near the western city of Guadalajara, Jalisco, "had
to come to the United States, because it was impossible to live down there with so
many revolutions. Once even I was at the point of being killed by some
revolutionists. . . . The Villistas pressed me into service then, and took me with
them as a soldier. But I didn't like that, because I never liked to go about
fighting, especially about things that don't make any difference to one. So when
we got to Torreon I ran away just as soon as I could. That was about 1915 .... I
went from there to Ciudad Juarez and from there to El Paso. There I put myself
under contract to go work on the tracks." 16 For those who chose not to fight, then,
exile often seemed the safest option.
Beyond the direct threats to life and limb occasioned by military violence,
the Revolution demolished the Mexican economy, leading many to emigrate to
avoid starvation. The Porfirian economic growth had been built on the
construction of a modem transportation and communication network, which
allowed for the expansion of commercial agriculture, mining, industry, and every
facet of the national economy. When this economic infrastructure collapsed
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under the pressure of years of civil war, hyper-inflation, decreased agricultural
and industrial production, disrupted trade networks, and food shortages reached
catastrophic proportions. At the core of these problems was the deterioration of
the national railroad network, which remained the linchpin of the Mexican
economic system. Part of the problem stemmed from lack of investment capital
within the disordered nation, which precluded any large-scale rebuilding efforts,
but direct physical damage wrought the most devastation. The professional
militaries ripped up tracks across the nation, especially in the North, to cut the
supply lines of opposing armies. The Villista forces became notorious for their
use of "maquinas locas," train engines packed with explosives that would be sent
careening toward opposing troop and supply trains. 17 Guerrilla forces often
targeted tracks, bridges, and other railroad facilities, and would continue to do so
well into the l920s. 18 With Mexico's transportation network thus disrupted for
years, mining and agricultural enterprises, where such activities were still possible
in spite of the violence, had difficulty reaching secondary processing facilities in
urban areas, which then had trouble finding access to international markets as rail
lines to Veracruz, Tampico, and the US-Mexico border had been reduced to scrap
metal.
The consequences of this deterioration of primary production, processing,
and trade were dire. These economic disruptions caused the peso to decline
against the dollar, first slowly, but then rapidly beginning in 1913. In January
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1913 the peso was worth 49.5 cents (US). It dropped to 7 cents two years later in
January 1915, stood at 2 cents in May 1916, and continued to drop. 19 These
problems were only exacerbated by Carranza and Villa, who printed massive
amounts of paper money that continued to deteriorate in value from the moment
they were printed.

° Capital circulation collapsed, and much of the nation

2

reverted to a barter economy wherever foreign currency was not available. In the
North, dollars became the primary legal tender, though access to dollars was
limited by the hyper-inflation which made pesos almost worthless in relation to
the dollar. These problems combined with the transportation situation to create a
chronic shortage of circulating capital that rapidly became a crisis of subsistence
for much of the nation. 21
Disease also ravaged Mexico's population during the Revolution and its
aftermath. Typhus, which often follows in the wake of war, devastated much of
the nation, reaching its high point in 1916 and 1917. When that epidemic
subsided, it was replaced in 1918 by the worldwide influenza pandemic. Northern
Mexico's war-weary population was especially hard-hit by influenza during an
especially deadly, if relatively brief, outbreak.
Thus, there were many pressing reasons why the Revolution created large
emigration waves during the 191 Os and 1920s, even if some historians have
19
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ignored these factors.

22

Violence, economic collapse, food shortages, disease, and

any number of other factors helped create a massive body of exiles and refugees,
some of whom had previously been driven out of the central plateau by the
changes wrought by Porfirian modernization, who moved across the largely
unguarded border into the United States. 23

***
For the first two decades of the twentieth century migration across the USMexico border was largely unregulated. Customs and immigration officials
staffed "ports of entry" along the international boundary, but were neither
equipped nor trained to deal with those immigrants who crossed into the United
States at any point other than designated entry zones. The scant immigration
legislation on the books in the early twentieth century was written with sea ports
in mind, and limited only certain types of immigrants. Restrictions targeted the
diseased, prostitutes, anarchists, those likely to become public charges, contract
laborers, and Asians as threats to the general welfare.
Immigration officials largely ignored the entry of Mexicans into the US
for the first fifteen years of the century. An Immigration Service report from
these years stated that "the policing of 2,000 miles of border line is practically
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impossible."

24

The problem for the Immigration Service was not immigrants

from Mexico, but instead was "aliens who arrive in Mexico" who "do not enter
that Republic with the intention of remaining permanently. The bulk of them are
contract laborers, but whether they come under contract or not, they proceed to
Mexico with the idea that they can reach the United States easier and escape the
prescribed examination by simply evading the regular points of crossing, and
entering surreptitiously."

25

Particularly distressing for immigration officials was

the attempted entry of Japanese and Chinese workers via Mexico, though
immigrants from Europe and the Middle East were also targeted as frequent
violators of US immigration law.
In 1908 the Secretary of Labor and Commerce (whose department then
housed the Immigration Service) wrote to the Secretary of State that "little if any
difficulty is experienced in dealing with citizens of Mexico; the difficulties
encountered relate almost wholly to foreigners of other nationalities." 26
Immigration officials displayed some concern over Mexicans who came to the
United States on labor contracts, in violation of the 1886 Foran Act, which
prohibited such arrangements between US employers and foreign workers. As
historian Gunther Peck has shown, however, enforcement of contract labor law
was anything but consistent, and largely dependent on the whims of immigration
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inspectors

27

J.W. Berkshire, the Supervising Inspector in El Paso, who was

notorious for selectively ignoring contract labor violations committed by favored
contractors, summed up the feelings of elements within the immigration service in
1910 when he wrote, "any restriction against the Mexican laborer would be an
unfair discrimination as long as no additional restrictive measures are enforced
against aliens of other races." 28
Before the most violent phases of the Revolution, in other words, the
Immigration Service viewed immigration from Mexico as expected and nonthreatening. Indeed, the Commissioner-General of Immigration wrote in 1913
that "Mexico is a natural supply of labor for the Southwest, and therefore the
movement of laborers across the border is for the most part a natural one. Such
laborers have been passing back and forth over the border for years, and in the
great majority of cases the only apparent inducement to migrate is a knowledge
that work at better wages than prevail in Mexico can be found here. Such
immigration, of course, is not in violation of law." 29
Still, refugees who reached the US-Mexico border during the early years
of the Revolution were hardly welcomed into the United States with open arms.
The well-dressed walked across the border with little problem, but many who
tried to cross at the designated border crossing stations, such as Brownsville and
Laredo, often met with opposition from immigration agents and other officials in
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the United States who sought to limit the refugee flow. The Immigration
Inspector at Laredo described the Revolution's effects on the type of immigrant
that entered the United States:
Before the revolution began and for some time after, we had each day
from two to four Pullmans, most well filled; three to five first-class
coaches and two to four second-class coaches. First the Pullman class
disappeared, then the first-class traveler, until now we have only the
second-class arrival; and even this class has deteriorated. In normal times
we had many of the laboring class who were in the prime of life and fine
specimens of physical manhood. This class has almost entirely
disappeared, and only the ordinary laborer and a few women and children
.
30
are now commg.
An incident from October 1913 provides a good example of the ways in
which US border officials reacted to these Mexican immigrants. On October 1
and 2 thousands of refugees crossed from Piedras Negras to Eagle Pass, Texas, as
the Constitutionalists seized the town from the Federals. Almost all returned by
the 5th, but that night word spread that the Federals planned to attack the town.
The next morning, October 6, the County Commissioners in Eagle Pass declared a
quarantine against Piedras Negras, in a transparent effort to keep the new influx of
refugees from remaining in Eagle Pass. Since most of the population of Piedras
Negras attempted to cross via the international bridge, the quarantine created a
combustible situation where thousands of refugees crowded on the bridge,
creating the very real possibility of trampling deaths. The Immigration Service
Inspector for Eagle Pass brought these concerns to the County Commissioners,
but they refused to allow refugees into Eagle Pass. The Immigration Service was
then forced to provide temporary refuge outside of the city limits, and at 1 PM
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"such of the aliens as were admissible were permitted to enter during the
afternoon, but the crowd, instead of lessening, seemed to steadily increase." 31
The crowds continued to congregate on the bridge for the next twenty-four hours,
with the Immigration Service estimating that eight thousand crossed the bridge on
the second day alone. When the Federals entered Piedras Negras that afternoon,
the refugee waves ended as the troops stopped all traffic over the bridge.
On the next day, however, the Immigration Service decided that "if the
aliens in detention were fed they would continue on our hand indefinitely.
Therefore, it was decided to discontinue feeding them." 32 Since many of these
refugees were Constitutionalists, they knew that return to Piedras Negras could be
deadly, but officials in Eagle Pass were intent on sending the refugees back as
soon as possible. Immigration inspectors "found that a considerable number
belonged to the excluded classes [that is those 'likely to become a public charge'].
Up to that time, very few had signified a willingness to return to their homes and,
realizing that some immediate and positive action was necessary, it was decided
to take a number, at least, of the excludable aliens out of camp and return them to
Piedras Negras." 33 Over the next two weeks hundreds of refugees were sent back
as excludable aliens. Some were given temporary admission, but not before
undergoing a physical examination, a series of vaccinations, and fumigation of all
belongings. The Immigration Service Supervising Inspector ended his report on
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this incident by stating that, while cooperation from officials in Eagle Pass would
have alleviated some of the strains of the refugee situation, immigration officials
should proceed along these same lines in future incidents, allowing refugees into
the US when necessary, but maintaining a strict prohibition against the excludable
classes that would force many of these migrants back to Mexico. 34
Clearly, while no coherent legislation yet limited who could enter, the
"likely to become a public charge" prohibition became a simple way for
immigration officials to limit the number of entrants during the Revolution. In
addition, poor women were often denied admittance because it was feared they
were prostitutes who would bring disease and immorality into the United States. 35
Thus, while nothing like the Chinese Exclusion Act existed to keep Mexicans
from entering the United States, the class and racial assumptions held by
immigration officials and Anglos in the US meant that there was a loosely
enforced exclusionary spirit that animated contact between border guards and
Mexican immigrants. Thus, the years of the Revolution marked the beginning of
a more conscious, if still largely unofficial, policy of limiting who could and
should enter the United States from Mexico.

36

***
The world that these immigrants walked into when they crossed the
border, with or without authorization, was a rapidly changing one. As outlined in
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the last chapter, South Texas underwent profound changes during the Porfirian
years as the entry of railroads helped create an entirely new social and economic
system. The one exception was the Lower Rio Grande Valley, which remained
isolated from these changes for two decades, as the rail link from Corpus Christi
to Laredo bypassed Brownsville and left Cameron and Hidalgo Counties largely
unchanged despite the turmoil in the rest of South Texas. When a rail link finally
reached Brownsville in 1904, it brought profound consequences for the Lower
Valley and all of South Texas along with it.
All of the problems of increased capitalization that had occurred in the rest
of South Texas during the last two decades of the nineteenth century now
occurred rapidly in the deep South Texas counties of Cameron and Hidalgo,
turning them seemingly overnight from sparsely settled, arid ranching lands into
prime farm properties. The combination of the two decade reprieve that the
Lower Valley enjoyed while the rest of the region dealt with issues of
displacement and landlessness, and the rapidity of these changes in the years after
1904, led to an explosive situation in which a boom economy recreated a far more
intense form of social tension that fell especially hard on the remaining Mexican
American landowners.
One of the most important consequences the entry of railroads had for this
region was the impetus it gave for the development of irrigation works. Before
1904, some had tried to use the Rio Grande as an irrigation source, but it required
pumps and lifts to utilize the streamflow, since the geography of the region did
not allow for gravity irrigation. Since the river often changed its channel and was
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prone to flooding, installing expensive irrigation equipment without a reliable
trade link to the US market made little economic sense. Only with the
construction of the St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexican Railroad did the possible
profit begin to outweigh the risk. With the introduction of large-scale irrigation
the Lower Rio Grande Valley made a rapid, chaotic transition from ranch to farm.
Large-scale irrigation only amplified the problems introduced by the
railroad, though it also brought a new series of issues that would have equally
profound effects on both sides of the Rio Grande. As landowners and prospective
farmers rushed to draw water from the river that connected South Texas to
Northern Mexico, they used up almost all of the dependable streamflow of the Rio
Grande. 37 The timing of these developments was essential, because the fighting
in Mexico meant that no central authority existed to deal with issues like water
rights. Also important were the legal traditions of each nation. Mexico abided by
Hispanic law, in which the state owned the water. Water rights had to be
contracted out to landowners. The US, on the other hand, followed the English
tradition of riparian rights which gave possession of water to the landowner.
Thus, the US government, which had the capacity to deal with issues of illegal
water usage during the 1910s while no government held sway in Mexico, instead
stood back and claimed that riparian rights doctrine tied its hands. According to
the ill-defined international law on the subject, Mexico should have been allowed
the right to half the streamflow, but with no leverage during the development of
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these irrigation works, and with the US government eventually declaring that
"prior rights" of irrigators in Texas trumped all other concerns, the violations
continued.

38

Thus, by 1920 the pattern was set, and most of the dependable

streamflow of the Rio Grande was diverted into the fields of South Texas, helping
to tum it into one of the most fertile agricultural areas in the nation. The adjacent
state of Tamaulipas, which had the potential for similar development, had no
means for securing irrigation water. The land under irrigation in South Texas
increased from 54,000 acres in 1909 to 228,000 acres in 1919. In Tamaulipas,
2,000 acres were under irrigation in 1910, which only increased to 20,000 acres
by 1930. 39 Thus, as James Sandos has argued, "Mexico unwillingly paid with
water" for the development of large-scale agriculture in the Lower Rio Grande
Valley. 40
With market access and a reliable water supply, the shift from ranching to
farming in the Lower Valley began in earnest. Increased land values led to
increased tax valuations, which meant that many ranchers had to sell their
unimproved lands. Pasture land in the late nineteenth century cost between fifty
cents and two dollars an acre. By the 1910s, unimproved land cost as much as
$300 an acre, while land close to existing irrigation facilities sold for as much as
$500 an acre.

41

For some, these land sales led to a profitable retirement. In 1911,

an observer noted that a new type of nouveau riche appeared in San Antonio:
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"rich rancher- bought land for a trifle and sold to farmers - worth half a
million."

42

For others, the farm boom offered an opportunity to leave the sagging

livestock market. For many ranchers, however, selling their land promised
nothing more than economic uncertainty and a possible slide into wage labor. As
in the late nineteenth century, these changes were especially damaging for
Mexican American rancheros faced with a potent combination of market pressure
and violence. Lon Hill, a landowner and developer of an irrigation company in
Harlingen, was notorious for taking land from Mexican rancheros through threats.
Speaking to a jury looking into the legality of one of his land seizures, Hill
bragged that he told a Mexican ranchero "to pack up his doll rags and piss on the
fire, and he was gone." 43
At the same time that these economic changes occurred in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley, South Texas also struggled to deal with the implications of the
Revolution occurring just across the border. A number of factions went into exile
in South Texas, waiting for a chance to reenter the fray within Mexico, making
San Antonio the center of revolutionary machinations. These plotters shared the
city with spies, private detectives, arms smugglers, and others drawn to the
vibrant and conspiratorial exile community. 44 Widespread fears circulated as the
refugee population grew throughout South Texas, leading many Anglos to view
the immigrant wave as a possible fifth column in the rapidly changing region.
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Finally, frequent cross-border attacks led to an unprecedented military
mobilization along the border that turned South Texas into an armed camp. When
these rising tensions combined with the pressures created by rapid social and
economic change, the consequences were nothing short of apocalyptic.
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s San Antonio served as the capital of
exiled Mexico, though Los Angeles, El Paso, and New Orleans also served as
important centers where "frustrated politicos, defeated generals and dispossessed
landlords met, conspired, hoped and dreamed, churning out protests, plans and
polemics, all under the watchful eye of Mexican and American intelligence." 45
Madero was just the first in a long line of exiled leaders to organize an opposition
movement in the United States before returning to Mexico at the head of an armed
force. Bernardo Reyes spoke openly in 1911 of organizing in San Antonio so that
he could return to Mexico and overthrow Madero, and his organizing efforts were
aided by politicians and power brokers in South Texas. 46 The Adjutant General of
Texas even complained that "federal, county, and city authorities seemed to be
sympathetic to the Reyes movement, or at least apathetic." 47 Even more brazen,
and even less successful, was the plot hatched by Victoriano Huerta and Pascual
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Orozco in 1915. The two plotted loudly in the El Paso area, complete with press
coverage of Orozco's travels to San Antonio, El Paso, and New Orleans to gather
support, funds, and arms, but before they could launch their invasion during the
summer of 1915 Huerta and many of his co-conspirators were arrested by federal
agents. Orozco managed to escape, and remained at large for two months. In
August, however, he was ambushed and killed by a posse led by Texas Rangers.
His "death was explained to the public as the ultimate justice to be expected by
Mexican cattle thieves." 48 Huerta died in a Texas prison in January 1916.
No major conspiracies came from South Texas after the deaths of Orozco
and Huerta, but exile activity continued well beyond 1915. Radical Magonistas
had been active since the late Porfirian years, and despite harsh repression at the
hands of local law enforcement and federal agents, their activities continued
within exile communities. 49 There was also a seemingly endless stream of
secondary factions that waited out parts of the Revolution in the United States,
many of them eventually settling permanently.
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brought a number of exiles into San Antonio. From 1926 to 1929 dozens of
archbishops and bishops settled in the city to escape and monitor religious
violence in Mexico, while also rallying Catholics in the United States to their
cause. 51
These conspiracies and plots did not go unnoticed in South Texas, adding
to an atmosphere of concern and fear, especially among the Anglo minority.
Uncertainty over what was happening in Mexico, who the refugees were, and
whether the revolutionary violence would spread into Texas complicated already
tense relations. Indeed, throughout the early years of the Revolution small crossborder raids entered South Texas to seize supplies, arms, livestock, and any
number of other goods that were in short supply in Northern Mexico. These
conditions led to a massive military build-up along the Texas-Mexico border.
President William Howard Taft began the build-up in 1911, creating the
Maneuver Division, which brought one-fourth of the active duty military to the
Texas-Mexico border. The official explanation for this massive troop movement
was to aid in the enforcement of neutrality laws, but it also appears to have been
the first step toward a possible intervention in Mexican affairs by the United
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States. 5 2 The troop build-up peaked in 1916 when the majority of the regular
army and all of the National Guard were stationed in Northern Mexico or along
the border. 53
In addition to the massive federal mobilization, state and local officials in
Texas sought increased defensive capacities while criticizing what they
characterized as federal inaction. Governor Oscar Colquitt was especially vocal
in his criticism of the Taft administration, claiming that the federal government
did nothing to protect US citizens on either side of the Rio Grande. Colquitt
claimed that "scores of women have been outraged by Mexicans," and that only
by forcefully threatening the Mexican factions could the safety of US citizens on
either side of the border be guaranteed. 54 Reaction to Colquitt's statements
varied. The Chicago Record-Herald denigrated the governor's efforts as "gassy
patriotism," while the Dallas News attacked Colquitt's selective outrage: "The
criminal record of Mexico moves him into insulting the President because he will
not urge war to redress fewer outrages than are committed by Texans against
Texans under the complacent eye of its Governor." 55 Colquitt also had his
defenders, however, such as the New Orleans Times-Democrat, which applauded
his declaration that "in the event Mexicans start any trouble we will protect our
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citizens and not wait for Washington to act." 56 Likewise, the Houston Post
claimed that the "Texas Revolution had for its cause no greater outrages" than the
supposed violence against US citizens by Mexicans on both sides of the border,
continuing the unfortunate Texan habit of relating everything back to the Alamo
and San Jacinto. 57
The saber-rattling of Colquitt and others both reflected and influenced the
increasingly tense relations between Anglos and Mexicans throughout South
Texas. Politicians and officials were inundated with pleas for help from
frightened landowners as rumors of shadowy conspiracies among Mexicans and
Mexican Americans spread throughout the region. In June 1911, Ranger Captain
John R. Hughes reported that "during the course of the revolution in Mexico we
had more calls for assistance than we were able to answer. Lawless characters,
both Americans and Mexicans, took advantage of the unsettled conditions along
the border to steal a great many horses and cattle, and commit other depredations,
such as robbing small stores, remote from the railway and having no telephone or
telegraph connections. " 58 In reaction to these cross-border raids, Anglos
clamored for protection, often demanding that the state protect their towns or
property with a detachment of Texas Rangers. 59 The Rangers, founded as a
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frontier defense force in the mid-l91h century, acted in the early 20 1h century as a
highly-politicized military force charged with eliminating any sign of political or
social dissent, an American version of Dfaz's rurales. 60 And it was a military
solution that many in South Texas sought as the specter of violence grew in the
years after the beginning of the Revolution.
T.W. Dee, whose letterhead identified him as the District Deputy Supreme
Dictator for South Texas of the Lodge of the World Loyal Order of the Moose,
claimed that all Mexicans in the Kingsville area "spend every cent they can get
buying up cartridges and storing them away. If they cannot buy a whole box, they
buy a half box."61 Another Anglo claimed that Mexicans "are holding meetings
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regularly, going, or on the move night and day and nearly all carrying guns," and
because of these activities, "[ o ]ur people must be protected. Our women are very
much troubled." 62 Likewise, the District Attorney for San Antonio, W.C. Linden,
warned that, "while I am not an alarmist in any sense of the word, there are too
many evidences of a deep-seated intention of a large and powerful organization,
composed largely of the criminal classes, who openly say that they hurl defiance
at all law and at all authority, to do some atrocious and lawless act in connection
with this matter." 63 Similarly, Dudley Lansing, a Texas National Guard Officer in
San Antonio, reported that "there were in this city, several thousand armed
Mexicans, under an acknowledged leader, who were ready to fire the oil tanks
east of the city, so as to attract police and fire protection, when they intended to
raid the hardware stores." 64 There were also related stories of the anarchist
International Workers of the World rallying and organizing Mexicans in the
Crystal City area, adding to the fears that some sort of outside agitation would
lead to violence in South Texas. 65 Whether these stories were fabricated became
immaterial as centrifugal forces threatened to pull apart the fragile social
institutions that had only partially preserved peace in the past.
These years also laid bare the potential for violence inherent in these
momentous social and cultural shifts. One example occurred in 1912 when
Alonzo Allee, a white tenant farmer near Laredo, murdered Francisco Gutierrez
and his son Manuel, wealthy ranchers who rented land to Allee. The shooting
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ensued after Allee refused to sign a contract, believing that Gutierrez did not
demand the same from his Mexican and Mexican American tenants. Before he
shot the father and son, Allee sputtered, "I am as good a man as any Mexican." 66
Allee's father, Alfred, had been a notorious gunman in the vicinity of Laredo and
had died sixteen years earlier after a shoot-out with the Laredo city marshal. 67
The social prestige of the Allee family, then, did not compare to the respected
Gutierrez clan. Still, when Allee went to trial he was represented by three law
firms, which the Allee family could not possible have afforded. It is unclear who
paid for Allee's defense, but it seems likely that the newcomer farming interests
saw the Allee case as a means to solidify the growing power of Anglo farmers.
By politicizing the justice system, they turned it into an instrument of racial
domination. Eighteen potential Spanish-surnamed jurors appeared before the
court, but defense attorneys disqualified all of them. The chosen jurors were
primarily newcomers to Webb County, and despite evidence of Allee's guilt he
was acquitted for both murders. Allee died four years later after a dispute with
Anglo cattlemen in Crystal City, but not before he unwittingly helped shift the
balance of power in South Texas even further toward the newcomer farmers who
had little interest in coexistence with Mexicans and Mexicans Americans. 68
Thus, by 1915 South Texas had all of the preconditions for the outbreak of
widespread violence. Economic change created a disfranchised population of
66
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Mexican Americans stripped of their autonomy by the two-headed monster of
racial animosity and the workings of the market. Political changes also tended to
take on racial connotations, as the new farm elite sought to wrest control from the
old county machines and their Mexican American voters. The Mexican
Revolution then pushed hundreds of thousands of refugees into South Texas.
Among these refugees were revolutionaries, political exiles, spies, arms dealers,
and other elements who heightened the already heated atmosphere of the region.
Finally, the feeling of many Anglos that Mexicans possessed the capacity and
willingness to become a fifth column within the United States added an ugly,
conspiratorial edge to what was already a powder keg.

***
When Basilio Ramos walked from Matamoros, Tamaulipas, to
Brownsville, Texas, in January 1915, he brought the spark that would convert this
situation from latent violence to an all-out race war. 69 Ramos had grown up in
Nuevo Laredo, but had lived a number of years in the United States, graduating
from high school in Norman, Oklahoma. 70 He had been a secretary at the customs
house in Nuevo Laredo from 1910 to 1914, but the Constitutionalists arrested and
imprisoned him when they captured the state of Tamaulipas in the later year.
69
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Upon his release, Ramos went to San Diego, Texas, and remained there until
December 1914, when he returned to Mexico despite his Huertista ties. Not
surprisingly, the Constitutionalists arrested him again. Someone smuggled a
document known as the Plan de San Diego into the prison in Monterrey that held
Ramos and some of his associates, which they signed. The person that smuggled
the document into the prison, as well as the Plan's author, remain unknown, but
the document called for an uprising to begin on February 20, 1915 at two o'clock
in the morning. Its goal was to achieve the "independence and segregation of the
States bordering on the Mexican nation, which are: Texas, New Mexico, Arizona,
Colorado, and Upper California, of which States the Republic of Mexico was
robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American imperialism." The
"Liberating Army for Races and Peoples" would welcome those who belonged
"to the Latin, the Negro, or the Japanese race," and would execute all Anglos over
the age of sixteen. In addition to breaking off the five southwestern states, the
Plan also called for the seizure of six neighboring states to serve as a homeland
for African Americans. 71 The conspiracy would begin in South Texas.
The Constitutionalists released Ramos from prison in January, and he left
for Texas to spread word of the uprising and form local juntas. He carried with
him a copy of the Plan, letters of introduction to individuals believed to be
sympathetic to the Plan in a number of South Texas towns, and a pass of safe
conduct through the Constitutionalist lines signed by General Emiliano Nafarrate,
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Carranza's commander along the Texas-Tamaulipas frontier. 72 Ramos went west
to McAllen to try and enlist Doctor Andres Villarreal in the Plan, but Villarreal
immediately informed the authorities, who arrested Ramos and discovered the
papers he carried with him. 73
Ramos's arrest gave Texas authorities their first knowledge of the Plan de
San Diego, which many Anglos viewed as proof that Mexicans formed a
dangerous element within their farming empire that needed to be controlled at all
costs and by any means. Anxiety intensified, with South Texans' worst fears now
confirmed. In the context of World War I, moreover, fears of German intrigues

72

Nafarrate has long served as the link some historians have attempted to draw between the Plan
de San Diego and Venustiano Carranza. According to this version of the story, Carranza used the
border raids of the Plan as a way to force the Wilson administration to recognize his government.
In other words, Carranza orchestrated the astounding violence that engulfed South Texas in 1915
and 1916 for his own political gain, using Nafarrate as his local organizer to ensure that their
schemes came off as planned. The foremost (and really the only) proponents of this position have
recently stated their argument as such: "Why would Carranza sponsor raids into Texas? Because
he desperately needed United States diplomatic recognition. At first glance this seems a
counterproductive policy, but in reality it was brilliant. ... He could, and did, argue that Mexican
exiles and other malefactors were causing all the trouble and suggest strongly that were he
recognized as president he would quickly put a stop to these incursions." Harris and Sadler, Texas
Rangers and the Mexican Revolution, 252-253. Harris and Sadler have been pushing this same
Sisyphean argument for thirty years, and have yet to produce any compelling proof that their
counterintuitive argument has any legitimacy and that Carranza had anything to do with the
conspiracy. They completely ignored the voluminous proof that Carranza had slight control over
many of his subordinates. For instance, a State Department official wrote in April 1915 that
"Carranza is reported to have very little authority or control except in his own vicinity.
"Information Relating to General Carranza's Control of His Subordinates," Box 8, Memorandum
I, Gray-Lane Files. Nafarrate did aid the Plan de San Diego raiders, but drawing a direct link from
that fact to connivance by Carranza in fomenting a race war distorts far more than it illuminates.
It also tends to point toward a potentially much uglier belief that this conspiracy must have had a
larger intelligence behind it- while Harris and Sadler soft-pedal the influence of German agents in
the development of the irredentist conspiracy, they do seem to discount the ability of local
conditions and local people in the Texas-Mexico borderlands to create such an effort. Just as
troubling is their assertion that South Texas Anglos' "attitude was that since the Mexicans were so
anxious to wage a war without quarter they would show them what a war without quarter was all
about." Harris and Sadler, 248. This inane breed of John-Wayne-like swaggering belligerence,
while not quite celebrating the horrific violence that occurred during these years, overwhelms their
entire study and makes it little more than a barely updated version of Walter Prescott Webb's
mythic telling of the Rangers. Their research is prodigious, but the uses they put it to are
unfortunate.
73
Sandos, "Mexican Revolution and the United States," 213-214.

82

within the US became entangled in rumors of Mexican conspiracies. 74 When the
date of the proposed uprising came and went without any violence, however,
tensions abated and talk of the Plan changed from terror to mocking. 75 When
Ramos stood trial in May on charges of sedition at the Brownsville federal court,
the judge ridiculed the prospects of such an uprising, and declared that the
defendant "ought to be tried for lunacy, not [for] conspiring against the United
States."76 Ramos posted bail, went back to Mexico, and disappeared from the
historical record.
The fragile peace continued until July 4, 1915, when the Border War
began in eamest. 77 On that day, a band of approximately forty armed, mounted
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Mexicans raided the Los Indios Ranch in Cameron County, beginning two weeks
of periodic attacks from this single group of raiders. The first confirmed death
occurred on July 9, when a foreman of the Norias Division of the King Ranch
killed one raider. 78 Three days later, two Mexican American police officers were
shot at a dance near Brownsville: one was killed and the other badly wounded.
Federal investigators argued that "the Mexican officers knew of the plans of their
fellows before the real beginning of the operations and that this was the cause of
the several efforts to assassinate them." 79 Over the next two weeks attacks
continued to occur throughout Cameron and Hidalgo counties. Reports of attacks
on police officers, raids on ranches and stores, and attempted assassinations of
landowners cropped up every few days.
The raids entered a more daring phase toward the end of July, and they
inspired a more thorough and random counterattack from law enforcement and
vigilantes. 80 On July 25 a band of mounted raiders burned a bridge of the St.
Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico Railroad and cut telegraph wires near Harlingen.
The raiders not only sought to isolate the Lower Valley by cutting its
transportation and communication links to the rest of the state, but also attacked a
clear symbol of the new order that came to South Texas with the entry of the
railroad. A few days earlier, Governor Ferguson sent Ranger Harry Ransom to
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the Lower Valley to lead a pacification campaign. Ransom was in his third tour
of duty with the Rangers (the first two in 1905 and 1909), but he rejoined the
force after stints as a guard on a state prison farm and Chief of Police of
Houston. 81 He left his position in Houston after killing a defense attorney.
Ferguson hired him after he successfully appealed his conviction in the murder
case. Ransom stocked his Ranger Company with other former prison guards, and
they went to the Lower Valley as an officially-sanctioned assassination squad that
turned the limited violence of the first few weeks of the Border War into a
scorched-earth campaign of annihilation. 82 Ransom declared that a "bad disease
calls for bitter medicine. The Governor sent me down here to stop this trouble,
and I am going to carry out his orders. There is only one way to do it. President
Diaz proved that." 83 While Ransom and his men did not commit all of the
atrocities that occurred over the next several months in the Lower Valley, they
instigated this type of violence and reflected the willingness of much of the Anglo
minority to use extreme methods to ensure domination at all costs. 84 In addition,
some justified this violent counterattack as a reckoning for past "crimes."
"Somehow," wrote one South Texan, "I have never been satisfied with the Alamo
and Goliad events, and always have felt that there was something yet due the
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Mexicans from us, and if there is a second call and for a war, the Mexicans will
certainly get what is due them from the Texans." 85
Coming on the heels of the events of the previous week, the lynching of
Adolfo Munoz on July 29 took on enormous significance. Farmers in San Benito
accused Munoz of scheming to rob a local bank and having connections with the
armed raiders that had been active in the area since the beginning of that month. 86
Cameron County Deputy Sheriff Frank Carr and Ranger Daniel Hinojosa arrested
Munoz and loaded him in a car to drive from San Benito to Brownsville. The
officers alleged that two miles outside of San Benito eight armed, masked men
stopped their car and forced them to tum over Munoz to them. The next day,
Munoz's corpse, riddled with bullets, hung from a tree along the road between
San Benito and Brownsville. 87 Whether he had been killed by vigilantes or the
Rangers had created the story to divert attention from their extra-legal murder,
Munoz's death marked a turning point. His spectacle lynching seemed to
embolden vigilantes and law enforcement, while it had a chilling effect on
Mexicans and Mexican Americans. According to J.T. Canales, "every person
who was charged with a crime refused to be arrested, because they did not believe
that the officers of the law would give them the protection guaranteed them by the
Constitution and the laws of this State." 88 While this sort of extra-legal killing
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had long been known as "rangering" or a "rinchada," the specter of these random
murders grew to a scale beyond anything seen in South Texas in decades (or
possibly ever). Conversely, William G.B. Morrison, a lawyer in San Benito,
described the lynching as "the spark that fired the flame among the white
people." 89 A federal investigator, however, saw the lynching as "an expression of
the indignation of the people against the repeated failure to enforce the laws."90
Despite these obvious differences in opinion, all saw Munoz's murder as an
important intensification of the violence, as Anglo law enforcement and vigilantes
continued to kill with impunity while more Mexicans and Mexican Americans
refused to cooperate with people they now viewed rightly as potential, even
probable, executioners.
Personal conflicts fueled some of this violence. The most important,
though by no means the only, example of personal conflicts taking on added
significance occurred on August 3, 1915, at Los Tulitos Ranch in Cameron
County. Aniceto Pizana owned Los Tulitos. His neighbor, Jeff Scrivener, had
long coveted Pizana's land. 91 No evidence has ever connected Pizana to the first
month of raiding, but Scrivener informed military and law enforcement officials
that Pizana harbored an armed band. In response, a posse of about thirty Rangers,
Deputy Sheriffs, and others launched an attack on Pizana's home. In the fire fight
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that ensued, Pizafia escaped, Pizafia' s son was shot in the leg, his brother was
arrested, one soldier was killed, and two Sheriff's deputies were injured. 92
In the aftermath of this attack, Pizafia followed his friend Luis de la Rosa
into active participation in the Plan de San Diego. DelaRosa had owned a small
general store in Rio Hondo, north of Brownsville, but when police arrested him in
early 1915 for slaughtering stolen cattle, he decided to leave South Texas instead
of continue suffering abuse at the hands of Anglo law enforcement. He moved
his family to Matamoros and joined the Plan de San Diego conspiracy. A few
days before the attack on Los Tulitos, he had written Pizana, asking that he join
the conspiracy too. 93 Before the attack, however, Pizana had too much to lose in
aiding the raiders. That changed on August 3, and thereafter Pizafia and De la
Rosa would be the primary military leaders of the Plan. 94
The Mufioz lynching and the Los Tulitos attack transformed the Plan de
San Diego from a cross-border conspiracy into a South Texas rebellion. The first
conspirators and raiders, such as Ramos and his associates, had been Mexican, but
as the violence continued more and more Tejanos appear to have joined in the
raiding. The nature of these bands makes it difficult to assert any definitive
conclusions about their composition, but the wanton violence of Anglo vigilantes
and law enforcement seems to have pushed many into league with the borderland
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revolutionaries that launched the conspiracy. An escalating cycle of reprisal
killings resulted.
The first of these revenge killings occurred just three days after the attack
on Pizana's ranch, on August 6. De la Rosa led a band which murdered A.L.
Austin and his son Charles in the town of Sebastian. Austin had recently moved
with his son to Sebastian, a new town established in the wake of the entry of the
railroad and the beginning of the land boom, to participate in the burgeoning
agricultural empire. He served as President of the Law and Order League which,
according to federal investigators, "had driven several bad men out of that
section." 95 Austin gained a reputation as a brutal racist, making him an obvious
target for raiders. There is no evidence that he participated in any of the vigilante
violence that preceded his murder, but groups like the Sebastian Law and Order
League formed an important component of the private forces, so his murder
served as a symbolic attack on these groups.
Not surprisingly, the reaction to the Austin killings was swift. By the next
day posses had killed several Mexicans unlucky enough to be in the vicinity. A
party led by Adjutant General Hutchings and Captain Ransom alone killed three
Mexicans, while a number of other bands took advantage of the open season
created by the Austin killings to massacre others. 96 These reprisals occurred at
the same time that raiders stepped up attacks on railroad and irrigation facilities
throughout the Valley. They tore up tracks, burned railroad bridges, and attacked
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repair crews, ratcheting up the fear of some Anglos that the raiders would be able
to isolate the Valley from the rest of the state and then carry out the genocide
promised by the Plan de San Diego.
On August 9, the most daring attack yet occurred, when sixty or seventy
raiders attacked the Norias Division of the King Ranch. 97 Again, the symbolic
importance of this attack was clear: the King Ranch had long been a hated symbol
of Anglo land thievery. Three raiders died in the ensuing battle. Texas Rangers
arrived at the ranch after the fighting finished. The next morning they tied the
corpses of the raiders to their horses, dragged them through the brush, and
deposited them in a clearing. The Rangers, J.M. Fox and Frank Hamer, then
posed with the corpses for a photograph, which was widely reproduced as a
picture postcard throughout South Texas and Northern Mexico. 98 Within the
context of the times, as Richard Ribb has argued, this photo evoked the same
lessons of racially-motivated violence as spectacle lynchings. 99 The Rangers
sought to document their violent solution for "banditry," in spite of the fact that
they had not been at Norias during the gun battle. Fox and Hamer had left Norias
half an hour before the raiders arrived, and did not return until the battle finished.
One of the Norias defenders demanded that the Rangers pursue the retreating
raiders, but instead they waited until after they had their photo opportunity the
next morning to chase the raiders, by which time they had crossed back to
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Mexico. 100 Thus, as America Paredes argued years ago, the Rangers were far
better self-promoters than they were law officers. 101
Violence continued to accelerate during August and September, with
almost daily killings and systematic attacks on railroad facilities, irrigation works,
and even army detachments posted near the Rio Grande. Probably the most
frightening attack of all, however, occurred on October 19, when a band of raiders
derailed a passenger train six miles north of Brownsville. "The Bandits went
through the train shooting all Americans," according to a federal investigator. 102
They did not attack Mexicans and Mexican Americans, which many took as
incontrovertible proof that non-Anglos were all in on the Plan de San Diego.
Again, the counterattack was swift and deadly, with unknown numbers caught up
in the blind vengeance of law enforcement and vigilantes. In the immediate
vicinity of the crash, Rangers captured four Mexicans. Captain Ransom walked
them into the brush and shot them in the back, after asking Cameron County
Sheriff W.T. Vann if he wanted to join him in what Ransom clearly considered a
joy killing. 103 Additionally, according to R.B. Creager, a lawyer in Brownsville,
blacklists circulated throughout the Anglo communities of the Valley, "and the
name of any Mexican who was suspicioned [sic] by any men of standing in the
valley or even half way standing who would report the fact that a certain Mexican
was a bad Mexican would be placed upon one of those lists and it was a common
rumor and report, and it was true, that in most instances that Mexican would
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disappear." 104 The Adjutant General's office received a flood of letters and
telegrams from would-be vigilantes volunteering to join the fight against the
raiders, with swaggering claims that "we will have them planting dead Mexicans
for weeks." 105
The cross-border raids slowed by December 1915, then revived during the
summer of 1916 in the vicinity of Laredo. 106 But these raids were overshadowed
by the ferocity of the counterattacks that followed. These counterattacks inspired
many Mexicans and Mexican Americans to flee the Valley by escaping south to
Mexico, in spite of the Revolution. The San Antonio Light reported that "2000
have left Texas through fear of sudden death." 107 It went on to state, "In outlying
sections away from towns, suspicion is still so great that Mexicans found out
alone at night might as well be dead, and a Mexican seen on horseback with a gun
or rifle at any time of the day is in danger of death." 108 A few days later, the Light
also reported that "some authorities have allowed Mexicans' bodies to lie where
they were shot so that their friends might find them and profit by this warning." 109
The next day, the same paper reported that a "strong force in restoring quiet
appears to be the stoppage of indiscriminate killing of Mexicans which has been
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charged against some peace officers. No violent deaths of Mexicans without the
semblance of legal formalities have been reported for several days."no
The counterattack, then, sought nothing less than ethnic cleansing. One
Valley resident later recalled that during "those troubles, one good citizen - a
lawyer who held high places in the judiciary of Texas - suggested to me that we
ought to compel all Mexicans resident on the Border to go across the river until
the troubles were over, and then go out and shoot all that were left." 111 While this
proposal was never put into practice, the Texas Rangers led what appeared to be a
systematic effort to rid large portions of South Texas of Mexicans through
wholesale, anonymous murder. The Plan de San Diego raids provided the excuse
for this violent reaction, but it did not create the situation, nor did the end of largescale raiding across the Rio Grande bring an end to vigilante and law enforcement
violence. In April and May 1916law enforcement learned of a plan to launch an
attack on San Antonio. Luis de Ia Rosa's cousin recruited Jose Morin, a former
Villista and Constitutionalist General in exile in Texas, to launch a new attack on
San Antonio, cutting rail and telegraph links before burning the city. Victoriano
Ponce, a baker in Kingsville, informed officials about Morin's activities, but a
federal agent arrested them both in Kingsville in May. 112 The sheriff of Willacy
County took both men from the prison in Kingsville and surrendered them to
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Captain J.J. Sanders's Ranger Company. Morin and Ponce disappeared, two
more victims of "rangering." 113
Peace began to return to South Texas by the end of 1915. War fatigue on
all sides probably helped diminish the violence. The most powerful force
opposing the indiscriminate killing of Mexicans and Mexican Americans,
however, appears to have been the large landholders who needed labor for their
farms. Commerce came to a screeching halt in mid-1915, and for the new farm
elite the lack of a labor pool soon trumped concerns over the Plan de San Diego
raids. By putting pressure on state officials, land barons were able to tame the
savagery of the Texas Rangers and local law enforcement, putting an end to the
worst of the slaughter by December 1915, but not before thousands had been
killed in a matter of months and untold thousands more had been driven from
their homes. Despite the cessation of violence, however, the hopes for AngloMexican accommodation, even on the skewed terms that had existed in previous
decades, disappeared. As Benjamin Johnson noted in his study of the Plan de San
Diego, "Texas Rangers and vigilantes not on the state payroll accomplished in
months what it might have taken years of economic pressure and more sporadic
violence to wrest from Tejanos." 114 South Texas reemerged from the Border War
vastly different than before.
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The Plan de San Diego and the Border War have always elicited the same
question from historians. How could the adherents of the Plan possibly hope to
accomplish their goals? For most, it looks like the "most bizarre irredentist
conspiracy in American history" or a suicidal attempt to foment a race war in the
United States.
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When placed within the context of the Mexican Revolution and

the momentous changes wrought by the entry of the railroad into the Lower Rio
Grande Valley, however, these events take on a new meaning and importance.
The Plan may still seem quixotic, but the motive forces behind it begin to emerge
only after teasing out the tangled strands of the society that straddled the Rio
Grande. The complexity of this situation can be maddening and difficult to boil
down to simplistic notions that fit within the pervasive mythology of Texas
history or the strictures of nationalist history, but it points toward the essential
linkages between the histories of the US and Mexico at the same time that it
provides an alternative vision of a past drowned in blood.
The Plan de San Diego and the Border War occurred because Mexican and
Mexican American rebels, who had seen their own society displaced and
marginalized by the rapidly changing economic order on both sides of the border,
sought to extend into Texas the revolutionary changes taking place just across the
river in Mexico. Conversely, the Anglo migrants coming to Texas from the north
brought their own ideas of revolutionary change with them. They sought to seize
political and economic control from the tottering old regime of South Texas.
These two clashing visions were both introduced into South Texas after 1905. All
of the changes that occurred within South Texas during the Revolution and in the
115
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coming decades flowed out of this clash. The victory of the Anglo vision for
South Texas was far from assured, but the overwhelming force of law
enforcement and Anglo vigilantes crushed the hopes for an alternative society to
develop in South Texas.
The violence of the Mexican Revolution, the wave of refugees that it
created, the economic changes in South Texas, and the Border War cannot be
understood independently. Together, they provide an explanation for the
momentous changes that turned South Texas on its head in the first twenty years
of the twentieth century. Gone was the gradual change of the late nineteenth
century, replaced by sweeping, violent upheaval that grafted capitalist agriculture
more firmly onto South Texas and dissolved what was left of inter-ethnic
accommodation in the region.
The revolution in Texas could now begin.
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Chapter 3: The Revolution in Texas: International Migration, Capitalist
Agriculture, and the Growth ofthe Tejano Diaspora
"We have got beyond soiling our hands and we want somebody else to do the real work."
John Davis, Laredo, Texas, cotton farmer'

Trainloads of prospective buyers and home seekers, derisively referred to
as "home suckers" by those in South Texas, headed south for the Rio Grande
Valley in search of land that had been too desolate and unproductive for largescale agricultural production only a few years earlier. Drawn by speculators' and
irrigation companies' claims of open land and fabulous wealth, these caravans left
regularly from the cities of the East and Midwest during winter. Many a snake-oil
salesman and huckster found employment enticing farmers south to the
burgeoning agricultural region.
While the organizers of these journeys counted on rising temperatures to
tempt winter-weary farmers to invest in the Rio Grande Valley, they also realized
that the sparse and forbidding landscape of much of Texas, especially the cattle
ranches north of the Valley through which all of these trains had to pass, posed a
potential problem. A few enterprising organizers of these trips developed a surefire method for distracting the potential buyers that soon became an industry
standard. Whenever the trains passed through particularly ugly landscapes, land
company employees called for prayer meetings. They closed window shades and
led group prayers and the singing of hymns. The meetings ended and the shades
came off the windows when the worst views had passed. 2
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Once they arrived in the Rio Grande Valley, the land parties began. The
prospective buyers would travel to land company holdings, and local teenagers
would drive them around to view the different properties. One of these makeshift chauffeurs recalled, "It was not difficult to sell these people land. You
brought 'em down here; they came down here out of the snow and ice. Most of
this was done in the winter time. You'd go and let 'em pick an orange or two off
of a tree; let 'em look at the palm trees. You'd take 'em across the river and feed
'em in Mexico. Show 'em the onions growin', the cabbages, and all the
vegetables growin'. They'd fall over themselves buying land." 3 The results of
these land parties and aggressive marketing of South Texas land was a massive
migration of people and capital from the north that met the growing immigrant
population in the region south of San Antonio. As a result, the populations of
agricultural areas like Cameron, Hidalgo, Zavala, and Dimmit counties grew
rapidly from 1910 until the outbreak of the Great Depression, while towns
appeared almost overnight throughout South Texas to provide population and
transportation centers throughout the new farm belt.

***
This chapter will examine the long-term effects of the Revolution on the
border region, South Texas, and the United States as a whole. The entry of
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans during and after the Revolution introduced an
enormous, exploitable labor pool to South Texas and the rest of the Southwest.
These migrants entered the region at the same time that newcomer farm interests
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descended on South Texas from the Midwest and Southeast. These simultaneous
population shifts allowed for the explosive growth of the agricultural economy
that began in the mid-l910s and continued, despite depressed conditions
elsewhere, into the 1930s. Agricultural (and some industrial) interests in the rest
of the United States watched this spectacular growth fueled by labor surpluses and
low wages and sought to draw much of this labor force away from the border
region, helping to create a nationwide migrant labor stream. In the aftermath of
the Mexican Revolution and the cataclysmic violence of the Plan de San Diego, a
farming empire developed in South Texas that was fed by continued immigration
from Mexico. This stream of workers entering South Texas spawned a
nationwide migrant labor stream that formed an essential building block for
agribusiness throughout the United States.

***
While the Plan de San Diego and the Border War that followed it were the
most extreme manifestations of the Mexican Revolution in South Texas, equally
(if not more) important was the rapid economic development made possible by
the refugees from wartorn Mexico. The refugee population entered into a
fledgling agricultural economy and these migrants helped build the agricultural
empires of South Texas, changing the endless stretches of scrub brush that
covered the semi-arid vastness of the region south of San Antonio into an
irrigated boom area. Early farming successes attracted huge amounts of outside
investment into the previously isolated, worthless land north of the Rio Grande.
While this growth was partially dependent on the entry of the railroad into the
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Lower Rio Grande Valley in 1904 and the impetus it gave to the construction of
irrigation facilities throughout the region, the entry of the new labor pool from
Mexico was every bit as important, if not much more so. The combination of
railroad, capital growth, and migrant labor force happened roughly
simultaneously in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and the Winter Garden. Other
boom agricultural areas in South Texas, such as the Laredo and Corpus Christi
regions, possessed rail links decades earlier but lacked the necessary surplus labor
pool. Mexican immigrants were the final necessary ingredient for the creation of
a thriving agricultural economy.
Labor migration from Mexico was not a new phenomenon of the
revolutionary era. Immigration officials, border residents, and agriculturalists
already viewed Mexican labor as "a natural supply of labor for the Southwest." 4
The difference lay in the scale of this population movement during the two
decades following the outbreak of the Revolution, and the uses to which these
immigrants could be put now that the other prerequisites for large-scale
agriculture existed in the border region. A Customs Inspector in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley clearly understood the relationship between Mexican immigration
and South Texas agriculture when he reported on conditions in the fall of 1913:
"practically the entire population of Northern Tamaulipas, opposite the counties
of Cameron, Starr, and Hidalgo, in the State of Texas, (something between five
and seven thousand people), are and have been sojourning in the United States
4
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since about the first of 1une, on account of conditions existing in that part of
Mexico at the present time." He continued, "It is true that in the lower Rio
Grande valley of Texas, on account of the immense irrigation projects and
agricultural interests, there has been a great deal of work." He worried, however,
that the same pressures for migration existed further west along the Texas-Mexico
border without the same opportunities for farm labor employment, creating the
potential for a large number of idle refugees. "There is very little of farming
interests along the Rio Grande, except in the lower valley, consequently the
Western part of the State has no opportunity for using cheap labor." 5 As the
inspector observed, the refugee population was spreading beyond the Lower
Valley and into the region west of Laredo along the Texas-Mexico border. He
worried that lack of employment opportunities would only exacerbate problems of
destitution for these immigrants, but he failed to recognize that these potential
laborers would build the agricultural economy in the Winter Garden region to the
west of Laredo from the ground up.
In fact, by 1913, agricultural growth was already in its early stages in the
Winter Garden. Only one year earlier, in the vicinity of Asherton, Mexican
American onion clippers called a strike for higher wages. The Carrizo Springs

Javelin reported that some "Asherton Mexicans got the idea that onion clipping
was skilled labor, and that they ought to be fashionable and strike. Likewise they
thought they had the onion growers where they couldn't kick. The onion raisers
couldn't see the raise. They offered to come through with half the extra money,
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but the clippers said it was a whole loaf or no crust, and they were pretty crusty
about it too. The onion men simply sent out for more Mexicans, and now the
former clippers are in the soup, no money, no job, and no strike fund in the
treasury." 6 Even if the customs inspector did not realize it, the farmers of South
Texas had already begun to tap into the new group of immigrants as a source of
cheap labor and, in this case, as potential strikebreakers. 7
Determining the total number of migrants that entered the area is
problematic, however. The total population growth of Mexicans and Mexican
Americans in South Texas can only be shown impressionistically, as census data
from the first half of the twentieth century are so flawed as to be almost useless.
The first problem, which continued throughout much of the Twentieth Century,
was the socially marginal position of many Mexicans and Mexican Americans
within the United States that made accurate census enumerations difficult if not
impossible. The second problem lies in the fact that Mexican/Mexican American
did not become a separate category until 1930. The censuses of 1910 and 1920,
which still maintained strict bi-racial enumerations, counted Mexicans and
Mexican Americans as "foreign born whites whose country of birth was
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Mexico." This distinction meant, at least in theory, that all immigrants and their
children fell under this distinction, while all others were classified as native-born
whites. These classifications changed in 1930, when a separate ethnic category of
Mexican appeared, defined as "all persons born in Mexico, or having parents born
in Mexico, who are not definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese." 9
But again, this system of classification differentiated between first and second
generation populations and those who had been in the United States longer,
divided haphazardly according to ill-defined distinctions and the racial notions of
individual census takers who very well could have applied whiteness to
individuals and families according to notions of class or acculturation rather than
the stated vague criteria.
The numbers for these years, as a result, are more useful for determining
patterns than for giving definitive data. The 1910 Census recorded 135,232
Mexicans and Mexican Americans in South Texas, or thirty seven percent of the
population.

10

According to the 1930 Census, the Mexican population in South

Texas had more than doubled since 1910, with 371,486 Mexicans and Mexican
Americans making up forty six percent of the population. 11 Just as importantly,
the Mexican American population in South Texas had spread out from the border
counties, especially into the San Antonio area and the Winter Garden district of
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Dimmit and Zavala Counties. 12 In 1910 only the eleven counties along the border
contained majority Mexican and Mexican American populations. By 1930,
however, several additional counties away from the border contained majority
Mexican and Mexican American populations, while no county in the region had a
Chicano population that made up less than a quarter of the total population.
Again, these numbers are certainly undercounts, but they do provide insight into
the broad outlines of demographic trends during the first two decades after the
outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and the onset of large-scale emigration from
Mexico to the United States.
The majority of immigrants entering the United States from Mexico came
to Texas. Not until the 1930s would more Mexicans enter the United States along
California's border, and not until the second half of the Twentieth Century would
the majority of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States live
outside of Texas. 13 In the late 1920s, a fact-finding committee appointed by
Governor C.C. Young of California wrote a report on Mexican immigrants in
California. It found that between 1909 and 1926 the vast majority of Mexican
immigrants (64-84%) declared Texas to be their "intended future permanent
residence." 14 While the growth of a resident Mexican and Mexican American
population and the birth of intensive agricultural enterprises occurred at roughly
the same time in Texas and California, the sheer numbers entering Texas created
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different dynamics than in California. 15 While California agriculture relied on
some migrant workers, South Texas relied wholly on the floating agricultural
workforce that emerged from Mexico and formed an interstate migrant stream
that began and ended in the region south of San Antonio.

***
South Texas had been a tall-grass land before the cattle industry reached
its peak in the 1880s. Overgrazing thinned the grass and allowed mesquite and
other shrubs to dominate the landscape. 16 By 1910 much of South Texas was
brush land dominated by mesquite, huisache, and cactus that had to be grubbed
out by hand in order to prepare the land for farming. 17 Thus, as ranching gave
way to farming and immigrants from Mexico sought some form of labor north of
the Rio Grande, many went to work clearing vast tracts of troublesome
vegetation. 18 Using flamethrowers and grub hoes to uproot and destroy the
shrubs, these workers performed the necessary first steps in preparing the land for
intensive agriculture. 19 According to Colonel Sam Robertson, a railroad and
irrigation impresario in San Benito in Cameron County much given to hyperbole,
"I do not know of any other race that could have stood the tick-infested jungles
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that covered the land when I built the railroad into it." 2 Clearing was still done
by hand even after the introduction of tractors and mechanical plows, largely
because landowners feared damaging their machinery and because hand labor
remained cheaper.

21

For their troubles, these workers received wages even lower

than contemporary railroad and farm laborers, stuck as they were in what was
unquestionably the bottom rung of the occupational ladder. In 1914 and 1915, for
example, these laborers earned $110.05 in total wages for clearing vegetation
from fifty-nine-acre properties worth seventeen thousand dollars each. 22
With the vegetation gone, the land had to be leveled for irrigation. This
leveling was also performed by contract labor at extraordinarily low wages. And
like the process of clearing the land, leveling drastically increased land values.
Once the land had been leveled, it could be provided with the irrigation water
controlled by the numerous irrigation companies that multiplied throughout South
Texas. 23 In 1909, irrigation reached 54,000 acres of farmland in Hidalgo and
Cameron counties. By 1919,228,000 acres received water from irrigation
companies, while the area of coverage spread beyond the immediate vicinity of
the Rio Grande. Irrigation reached 338,000 acres of South Texas land by 1929,
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now reaching even further north and west from the Lower Rio Grande Valley.

24

The rapid growth of land suited to intensive agriculture was made possible by a
continual process of clearing and leveling done almost entirely by common
laborers recently arrived from Mexico, with mechanization not providing a
replacement until the 1920s. Many South Texas growers, however, continued to
use hand labor well past the 1920s since it remained cheaper than machines.
Cleared land and irrigation pumps were of little intrinsic value without the
continuing presence of a large labor force capable of transforming the theoretical
wealth of prepared land into marketable crops. Migrants from Mexico arrived as
a fortuitous deus ex machina for those looking to make the transition to farming.
Increased migration from Mexico strengthened the pull on prospective farmers
who came to South Texas seeking cheap land, more plentiful cheap labor, and the
chance to make more money than was believed possible in the older farm areas
they left. Not surprisingly, land speculators also joined in this free-for-all.
"Railroads and land companies put on a shrill campaign to advertise the fortunes
to be made," wrote D.W. Meinig. "As a result the area was populated and
developed more by newcomers from the North than by Texans from nearby; its
colonization came not from the southward spread of an existing agricultural
pattern but from the implantation of a large enclave into the midst of a ranching
region." 25 The Agricultural Bulletin, a publication of the Missouri Pacific
Railroad, trumpeted claims that "[g]rowing Bermuda onions for the spring market
24
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has proved to be very profitable in many sections of Texas, but it has been
especially profitable this year in the fertile Winter Garden District, which lies
about 120 miles south of San Antonio, Texas, in a rapidly growing territory
served by the Missouri Pacific Lines. " 26
Local farmers associations and chambers of commerce also joined in the
efforts to draw outsiders and their money to the new farm areas, launching
national advertising campaigns. According to one of these newcomers, the
"people at Asherton are principally newcomers, largely from the north, but from
all parts, who came in after the railroad was put in .... We came in response to
advertisements." 27 Local boosters declared that Laredo and its vicinity would
soon become a fabulously wealthy agricultural area. "Laredo of the future will
undoubtedly be known as a famous citrus fruit-raising locality," the San Antonio
Express declared in 1911. According to the paper, there was "no better place than

Laredo for the man who desires to start an orchard for the growing of citrus
fruits" for "land will be worth many hundreds of dollars more per acre in the
future when there shall have been an influx of citrus fruit growers. " 28
The availability of cheap, exploitable labor was an important, if not the
primary, selling point for farm lands in South Texas. A pamphlet distributed by
the Carrizo Springs Chamber of Commerce, entitled "Your Opportunity May be
Waiting at Carrizo Springs, Texas," discussed the opportunities for farming in
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South Texas while also making it clear that not everybody was welcome: "This is
not a community for a man without money. That is due to the great supply of
Mexican labor that we have. A man depending on common labor for the up-keep
of his family cannot compete with them .... But to the man with $5,000 or more,
Carrizo Springs offers a better opportunity than any other section in the
country." 29 A land company in the Winter Garden similarly declared that the
"cheapest farm labor in the United States is to be had in this section." 30 Though
located outside of South Texas, the Houston Chamber of Commerce tried to take
advantage of proximity to the labor pool of South Texas by sending pamphlets to
New England textile companies claiming that "unorganizable Mexican labor in
inexhaustible numbers can be secured in Texas for new textile mills." 31
The outbreak of World War I provided additional momentum for the farm
boom. The war in Europe increased the demand for agricultural goods. Land
values soared, more land was put under the plow, and total output grew.
Importantly for the farmers of South Texas, this wartime economic boom did not
extend to Mexico, which continued to suffer under severe economic conditions
due to the continued instability of the Revolution, so the waves of immigration
did not slow down. All of these things led to profits thought impossible before
the war. 32
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The years after the end of World War I witnessed the collapse of the
worldwide agricultural economy, as the artificially high prices of the war years
plummeted, dragging credit-dependent farmers (and even entire nations) into
bankruptcy. Such was not the case in South Texas, however. A number of small
operations went out of business as market prices dropped, but the region's
economy as a whole continued to grow throughout the post-war years as outside
capital poured into the farm regions, the amount of cultivated land increased, and
output grew. The Winter Garden, especially, grew rapidly in the years after the
war, becoming one of the primary off-season sources of produce at the same time
that similar operations developed in California and Florida. After 1919, as the
nation as a whole entered into the beginning of a long agricultural depression, the
Winter Garden became one of the most important farming regions in the country.
Spinach and onions were the primary crops, but appreciable amounts of
cabbage and tomatoes also came from the Winter Garden. Onions had been
produced before the 1920s, but spinach did not become prominent until 1920.
What began as an experiment- four acres grown near Crystal City (Zavala
County) in the winter of 1917-1918, yielding 3 carlots- rapidly grew. By 1920
200 acres of spinach had been planted in Dimmit and Zavala counties combined,
shipping 148 carlots. By 1929, Zavala County had more than eight thousand
acres of spinach under cultivation, making it the largest spinach-producing area in
the world. More than three thousand carlots shipped from Crystal City alone in
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1929, while similar growth occurred in the nearby counties of Dimmit and Webb.
These three counties combined produced more than half of the national spinach
crop during the boom years of the 1920s. Similarly, the Winter Garden became
one of the largest producers of Bermuda onions in the United States, shipping
three-quarters of the state's carlots in 1929, when Texas led the nation in
Bermuda onion production. 33 Not surprisingly, the area irrigated grew just as
rapidly during these years. In 1919 Zavala County had 1642 acres irrigated and
Dimmit contained 5397 acres. A decade later Zavala increased to 13,126 acres,
while Dimmit had 13,694 acres under irrigation. 34
This spinach boom brought even more outside investment and led to the
consolidation of the spinach holdings into the hands of the large shippers who
controlled the irrigation companies and the national marketing of Winter Garden
spinach. 35 One example of this consolidation was Fred Vahlsing, a New York
grocer. Seeking a way to provide fresh produce year-round, and witnessing the
enormous production coming out of the Winter Garden, V ahlsing purchased land
in the area. By the end of the 1930s, long after the bottom had fallen out of the
spinach market due to the Great Depression, Vahlsing controlled 10,000 acres,
employed 3,000 employees, operated packing sheds and an ice plant, and shipped
produce to 127 cities in the United States. 36 While Vahlsing was surely more
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successful than the vast majority of newcomer farmers who appeared in the
Winter Garden and the rest of South Texas during these years, he provides a
perfect illustration of the way in which outside influence came to bear on the
region and the enomtous growth that occurred in the agricultural economy with
the introduction of this new capital.
While the rest of South Texas did not witness such rapid growth in such a
short period of time as the Winter Garden, the scale of growth was no less
impressive during the 1910s and 1920s. As a whole, the total value of farms in
the state of Texas rose from $1,843,208,395 in 1910 to $3,700,173,319 in 1920
(during the tail end of the war agricultural bubble) to $3,045,270,798 in 1925. 37
Only California matched the level of statewide growth in farm values. Crop
values, however, outpaced any other state in the nation, rising to $900,472,787 in
1919 before falling back to $756,105,985 in 1924. During the same years
California peaked at $282,579,083. 38 Some of the growth came from the growing
cotton fields of central and east Texas, but moving down to the county level
shows that much of this growth occurred in South Texas. Cameron County
witnessed growth in total farm value from $7,894,738 in 1910 to $29,430,868 in
1925, multiplying four-fold in only fifteen years. 39 Immediately adjacent to
Cameron, Hidalgo County underwent equally explosive growth, increasing from
$9,926,121 in 1910 to $36,930,822 in 1925.
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Crop values in South Texas did not rise quite as dramatically as total farm
value, but the growth still dwarfed what was happening in the rest of the nation.
Cameron County crop values rose from $1,773,036 in 1919 to $4,908,117 in
1924, while Hidalgo increased from $2,424,467 in 1919 to $6,440,219 in 1924.
Nueces County (Corpus Christi) grew from $4,142,022 to $8,189,511 between
1919 and 1924, while Willacy County, located just north of Cameron, saw its crop
value rise from $34,771 in 1919 to $785,235 in 1924. 40 Total carlot shipments
also increased drastically as a number of new crops flourished throughout South
Texas. The spinach boom in the Winter Garden was matched by a citrus boom in
the Lower Rio Grande Valley and a cotton boom in the Coastal Bend area near
. . 41
Corpus Chnst1.
Clearly, then, agricultural growth in South Texas was spectacular,
transforming the region in a short period of time into one of the most productive
farming areas in the nation. Like similar changes in the same years in California
and Florida, this growth flowed not only out of the increased capital and
transportation facilities that came with the expansion of the national railroad
network and the growth of national and international markets for agricultural
goods, but also out of the construction of a system of industrialized agriculture
that took advantage of the seemingly endless supply of cheap labor to create
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massive agribusiness complexes. The result was what Carey McWilliams called
"factories in the field. " 42
South Texas became one of the most important centers for the growth of
agribusiness. At the heart of industrial farming was the creation of a racial/ethnic
division of labor that mandated limited job opportunities. In the context of South
Texas, that meant that white and Chicano (as well as the much less numerous
African American) workers had prescribed positions within the workforce.
Mexicans and Mexican Americans could not advance above the status of
sharecropper or wage laborer. At the same time, however, there also existed a
sort of glass floor that effectively barred many Anglos from these lower status
sharecropper and wage labor positions, creating a flip side of the "wages of
whiteness" that priced them out of any positions below tenant farmer. 43 Farmers
throughout South Texas refused to lease to Anglos on halves, offering them only
the terms of thirds and fourths which required the capital to fund most of the crop.
Employers described wage labor as "Mexican work" that was beneath whites. 44
These strictures helped create a rigidly segmented job market similar to the Jim
Crow South. Unlike their brethren in the South, however, South Texas growers
could rely on continued migration from Mexico to replenish and expand their
labor supply. This segmented, ever-expanding labor supply helped to maintain a
wage scale in South Texas lower than anywhere else in the nation.

42

McWilliams, Factories in the Field.
David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working
Class (New York: Verso, 1991).
44
Neil Foley, "Mexicans, Mechanization, and the Growth of Corporate Cotton Culture in South
Texas," 292; Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton
Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 6-7, 35-41, 70; Paul Taylor, An
American-Mexican Frontier, 131; Paul Taylor, "Dimmit County," 340.
43

114

Another aspect of this regime of agricultural management was the use of a
reserve army of labor built on the segmented labor market Corporate farms'
ability to attract an overabundance of workers allowed them to keep wages down
by resorting to the constant threat of hiring replacements. When the harvest
ended, workers disappeared from the immediate vicinity of the farms, erasing the
year-long reciprocal duties that carne with tenant farming and sharecropping in
the older agricultural areas of the Southeast While farmers depended on surplus
labor, however, many also maintained an important, if ever-shrinking, number of
sharecroppers who remained throughout the year. "The primary purpose of
maintaining Mexican sharecroppers on halves is to immobilize them so that ample
labor will be on hand through the year and a large nucleus to start the picking
season," wrote Paul Taylor. "Thus farmers, in the manner of many industrial
employers, maintain individual labor reserves."

45

Often kept in place by debt

peonage, these sharecroppers served as an unpaid labor force throughout the year.
By the onset of the Great Depression, however, the number of sharecroppers and
tenants dwindled to the point of irrelevance as the migrant work force grew
throughout the South Texas agricultural regions.
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The methods by which agricultural interests recruited these armies of
labor differed little from the recruitment procedures of northern factories.
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Testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations highlighted the typical
method:
There are so called employment agencies in Laredo and other border cities
who get "orders" from farmers throughout Texas ... and it is these agents
of the said employment concerns that get these Mexicans just as they cross
the Rio Grande and ship them off to their destination, many times
misrepresenting things to them and causing great hardships to these
Mexicans and their families. The employment agencies at the border
generally work under an agreed combine with others of the same class in
San Antonio, and the concerns at San Antonio see to it that the
"consignment" goes through to destination without leaving the cars if
possible. When they have to be transferred from the I.G. and N. to other
railroad stations they are marched straight across the city of San Antonio
up Commerce or Houston Street, and it is no uncommon sight to see as
many as a hundred or more marching together. These employment
agencies are generally paid by the farmer $1 a head when delivered at
their destination. . . . When put to work at destination or upon their first
pay day they are informed so much had been charged to each and every
one of them for transportation and employment fees, which said amounts
are deducted from their eamings. 47
Even as agriculturalists banded together into growers associations, they continued
to rely on labor contractors to draw workers from across South Texas and across
the border in Mexico. There were others, however, who relied on less formal
means to draw labor. Onion growers in the Winter Garden, for instance, attracted
some of their harvest workers by distributing advertisements among migrant
cotton workers as they moved from the Lower Rio Grande Valley to West Texas.,
which was not as reliable as contractors but cut out the need to pay recruitment
fees to a middleman. 48
Growers recruited workers from two primary areas. First, they looked to
the cities and towns of South Texas, which, as Paul Taylor argued, acted as "fluid
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reservoirs of agricultural labors" from which residents could quickly move to and
from farming regions on short notice, "stimulated by the character of the labor
demand, which not only fluctuates seasonally but shifts every few days from field
to field." 49 Even in the larger towns and cities such as San Antonio, Laredo,
Corpus Christi, and Brownsville, an important segment of the population survived
on irregular, seasonal agricultural labor. Importantly, there was no recruitment
from other states into Texas, which enjoyed a labor surplus that made outside
recruitment from anywhere but Mexico unnecessary.
The second important area of recruitment, then, was Mexico. While
border enforcement and the laws governing who could cross the border for what
purposes changed during the decades from 1910 to the Great Depression, the
methods of procuring labor from Mexico remained remarkably unchanged.
Contractors sent representatives to the border towns and transported workers
north. According to Paul Taylor, "Some farmers of Nueces County and other
parts of Texas have been accustomed to send dependable Mexicans to Mexico to
recruit others, even if necessary giving them money to pay immigration fees ....
In Nueces County, for example, one farmer was describing the practice to me,

when another, aware of its illegality, interrupted him." 50
For many farmers, however, this system left too much power in the hands
of the labors contractors. In 1923, growers and farmers' associations forced the
state to create the Texas Labor Bureau as a free employment agency in order to, in
the words of the Bureau itself, "protect the poor people against these
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unscrupulous" contractors. 5 1 The Labor Commissioner declared two years after
the establishment of the Bureau, "Before the establishment of this service many
pickers picked in South Texas and there remained, many in Central Texas moved
no further, but now many start in the South and wind up in West Texas." 52 While
the Labor Bureau did little more than direct workers during the cotton harvests
throughout the state, it pointed toward a more active role for the state in the
structuring of the agricultural labor market that would become increasingly
important in the coming decades.
These methods of labor contracting, both public and private, helped create
an intrastate migrant labor stream that served two primary purposes. First, it
acted as a necessary method of achieving subsistence for farm laborers who could
not survive on the wages from a single harvest. Second, it maintained low wages
by keeping workers constantly in motion and unable to bargain for higher pay
before a new harvest began and they had to move. The largest and best organized
migrant stream moved north and west following the cotton harvests from the
Lower Rio Grande Valley through the Corpus Christi area, then up into Central
and East Texas, with some moving as far as West Texas in the late fall. At its
beginning, approximately twenty-five thousand migrant workers picked cotton in
the Valley in the early summer, to be joined by another twenty-five thousand in
Nueces and San Patricio counties, helping Nueces produce more cotton than any
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other county in the nation by 1930.

53

In the fields of Central Texas the army of

migrant pickers grew to approximately two hundred thousand, with some then
traveling as far as Amarillo in the Panhandle before returning south at the end of
the season. 54
Cotton picking only lasted through the summer and fall, and since the
wages earned during cotton season were often not enough for the year, almost all
of these migrants also had to work in the fields for the rest of the year. For those
from the Lower Rio Grande Valley, that often meant working in citrus or produce.
For those from San Antonio, it could mean seasonal labor in the pecan shelling
industry or one of the other semi-industrial enterprises that shut down during
harvest season. A typical year for a farm worker from the Winter Garden
involved the following, as described by a rancher and farm owner from Carrizo
Springs: "They plant onions here beginning in November. Then they work in
spinach, onions, cauliflower. That runs to about May. Then after a month or two,
they start to pick cotton around Brownsville and work north with the cotton until
about November when they return horne. " 55 One unintended but predictable
consequence of this migrant stream was the creation of a much larger interstate
migrant stream that began in South Texas but extended well beyond the borders
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of the state, which would become one of the major concerns of farmers'
associations and politicians during the 1920s and after. 56
The increased availability of farm machinery in the 191 Os and 1920s also
affected the growth of agribusiness and labor relations. Louis Bailey, a cotton
tenant farmer in Agua Dulce, near Corpus Christi, claimed that the "Bolshevik
ideas of the Mexicans that the white can pay them anything are going to ruin
them. We are going to substitute machinery for them. The country is full of labor
now." He then later added that the "cotton pickers are bringing the machine on
themselves." 57 Likewise, a large landowner in Nueces County told Taylor, "But I
keep a plow going to keep Mexicans in a frame of mind to do it at a reasonable
price," before making clear the reason for wielding the threat of mechanization:
"Not that we want to beat the Mexicans out- but if we have machines, the pickers
would be satisfied with $1 instead of $1.25 a hundred pounds." 58 Some even cast
their decision not to employ machinery as a sort of charity: if mechanical pickers
operated in the cotton fields of Nueces County or if mechanical onion
transplanters operated in the Winter Garden or Willacy County, farmers would no
longer be able to "make work" for Mexicans. 59 To be sure, all mechanization was
not used to undercut the bargaining power of labor, but it was an essential part of
the calculations made in determining whether or not to introduce machinery.
The Taft Ranch near Corpus Christi became the archetype of the modem
southwestern agricultural enterprise. Organized along the same lines as any
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corporation, Taft land was divided into six 1,000 acre farms. Each "operated as a
self-contained unit that consisted of a white superintendent, Anglo or Mexican
foremen, and Mexican laborers." 60 According to historian Neil Foley, on the Taft
Ranch and the farms that followed its lead, "King Cotton was subject to a board
of directors and his retainers were now mostly Mexican wage laborers." 61 Similar
to the mining companies of the Mountain West and the railroad company towns
of the Midwest and Northeast, the Taft Ranch established a sort of closed society
where all monetary circulation went through the corporation. Company stores,
company housing, company gins, and other facilities tied workers (both migrant
and non-migrant) to the Taft Ranch by refusing to allow them to do their business
elsewhere. 62 Here we see not only the intersection of seemingly backward forms
of peonage with the modem corporate system in the creation of this closed
system, but more importantly, a vertically and horizontally integrating corporation
that looked very similar to the steel companies of the late nineteenth century or
the automobile manufacturers of the twentieth century. Thus, a thoroughly
modem agribusiness regime was born in South Texas that relied on a racial
division of labor, the creation of a reserve army of labor, and the use of
mechanization as a contingent aspect of the production process. The Taft Ranch,
as result, expanded its operations beyond the cultivation of cotton and into
ginning, cottonseed-oil production, and marketing that foreshadowed the massive
growth of agribusiness throughout the Southwest during the first half of the

°

6

Foley, "Mexicans, Mechanization, and the Growth of Corporate Cotton Culture in South
Texas," 289.
61
Ibid., 290.
62
Ibid., 287.

121
twentieth century as the trans-Mississippi West outpaced the more traditional
agricultural areas of the Southeast.

***
It was not long before agricultural and industrial interests in other parts of
the nation took notice of the spectacular growth in South Texas, especially its
seeming! y endless supplies of Mexican and Mexican American workers. By 1912
Arizona cotton growers began advertising for labor in South Texas newspapers.
When cotton prices sky-rocketed during World War I, these same cotton growers
sent labor agents to El Paso and San Antonio to recruit larger numbers of pickers,
reserving special trains to transport workers free of charge to Arizona. 63
Likewise, railroad companies had long looked to South Texas and the US-Mexico
border region for much of their work force.
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By the time of World War I,

however, northern and Midwestern business interests looked jealously at the labor
supply built up in South Texas. Throughout the last years of the 191 Os and the
1920s, these agricultural and industrial interests successfully drew many Mexican
and Mexican American migrants out of South Texas, while also copying the
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often-illegal recruitment practices of Lone Star farmers by recruiting workers in
Northern Mexico, bypassing South Texas altogether. 65
The process of recruiting followed by these interests was, not surprisingly,
similar to that practiced by the growers of South Texas. Private labor contractors
and labor agencies dominated the procurement process, serving as middlemen
between the workers of South Texas and Northern Mexico and prospective
employers far distant from the border. Some recruitment occurred in informal
settings such as Milam Park (also known as La Plaza del Zacate), which served as
a central gathering spot on the western edge of downtown San Antonio. Labor
agents walked through the crowds offering jobs, cash advances, and a number of
other enticements for agricultural, industrial, and railroad interests around the
nation who viewed San Antonio as "a virtual Ellis Island for the tens of thousands
of newcomers from Mexico in search of work and new opportunities," according
to historian Zaragoza Vargas. 66 Similarly, a border corrido from these years
proclaimed that the city "has much work for the nation; employing everyone that
has no fixed home." 67
Frank Cortez operated the largest employment agency in the area. His
office was in a funeral parlor he owned on El Paso Street on San Antonio's West
Side. Between March and May of each year he would recruit thousands of
workers to go north to the sugar beet fields operated by the Michigan Beet
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Growers' Employment Committee, for which he received a one-dollar per head
recruitment fee. While some of these workers came from San Antonio, as many
as two-thirds paid their way from places like Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Crystal
City, and south of the border, hoping to be sent north toward greater opportunity
and away from the agricultural boom of South Texas that refused to trickle down
to the workers. San Antonio became, in the words of Carey McWilliams, "the
hunting ground of labor contractors; the capitol of Mexico that lies within the
United States." 68
When recruiting season began, workers began to line up around Cortez's
funeral home as early as four o'clock in the morning. The line of hopeful
migrants quickly wrapped around the block. Once each applicant entered the
office several hours after arriving at the recruitment center, they were interviewed
and given physical examinations. Those rejected for medical causes (usually for
either tuberculosis or venereal disease) would seek employment through another
labor agency or become a "free-wheeler" who traveled north independently.
Those accepted for transport by Cortez had to wait around the El Paso Street area
until they left for Michigan, which could be as long as a few months after they
first walked into Cortez's funeral parlor. 69
Once the day came to proceed out of San Antonio, the workers were
loaded onto flat-bed pick-up trucks. Often forty or more packed the backs of
these trucks as they roared north, forced to stand for the entire trip because there
was no room to sit or lie down. Employment agencies and the employers who
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contracted the labor paid the truck drivers to make the trips as quickly and
inconspicuously as possible. Thus, not only did they often refuse to stop for any
reason, but they also drove at unsafe speeds (especially given their cargo loads)
and took more hazardous, secondary routes to avoid undue attention from law
enforcement. According to Carey McWilliams, the drivers, "as a rule," were "a
domineering and dictatorial lot; as arrogant as ship captains on a slave galley." 70
Their passengers surely agreed. Telesforo Mandujano, who traveled on one of
these trucks from San Antonio to Ohio, recalled that the truck stopped only once
or twice en route, forcing the passengers to use coffee cans as urinals. One man
even tied himself to a stake on the bed of the truck so he would not fall out of the
truck if he fell asleep. 71 Salome Ravago, who endured a trip from San Antonio to
Michigan, remembered a trip that required five days and four nights with only
partially functional brakes. "The workers finally forced the driver, at the point of
a gun, to stop and buy brake fluid with money which they lent him," recalled
Ravago. 72 Workers took these risks, Carey McWilliams argued, because
"employment in sugar beets in Michigan" was "preferable to field work in
Texas."73
During the 1920s, growers from a number of different parts of the United
States experimented with labor recruited from South Texas. In 1925, cotton
growers in the Mississippi Delta imported hundreds of Mexicans and Mexican
Americans in an attempt to replicate the Taft Ranch model of cotton culture.
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Within a few weeks more than one-fifth had contracted malaria, abruptly ending
the experiment (though it is worth mentioning these same growers tried again in
the 1930s with more success).

74

Despite a number of similar instances of

experimentation, however, the Upper Midwest was, far and away, the primary
destination for workers recruited in South Texas. More specifically, the massive
sugar beet combines in Michigan and nearby states remained the most prominent
importers of labor.
Before looking at the specifics of what these migrant laborers did once
they reached the beet fields, it is worth examining the structure of the sugar beet
industry. Carey McWilliams argued that "the sugar-beet industry has been
created out of public funds and today is being subsidized to the extent of
$350,000,000 a year by the American public. It is this subsidy which, in part,
makes possible the perpetuation of rural sweatshops and what has been aptly
characterized as industrialized slavery." 75 Born out of tariff protections against
Caribbean sugar beginning in the late nineteenth century, sugar beet corporations
emerged as massive, vertically-integrated agricultural enterprises little different
from the other industrial corporations of the time. In the Midwest the Michigan
Sugar Company and the American Beet Sugar Company dominated the
production and processing of beets, while the Great Western Sugar Company held
a virtual monopoly over the industry in Colorado. 76 These corporations owned
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the processing factories, but owned little if any land. Instead, they used their
financial muscle to control every aspect of production through a complex, multilayered system of contracting that left every aspect of the process under the direct
control of the corporation. They sold seed to the landowners, who had little
choice but to grow sugar beets, and contracted to purchase the entire crop at predetermined prices. In Colorado, the Great Western Sugar Company even loaned
money to banks that was then used to finance growers, while in the Midwest the
corporations tended to finance growers directly. The companies also handled all
recruitment for non-local labor, which was the vast majority of the sugar beet
workforce throughout the boom years of the 1920s. Thus, in the words of Paul
Taylor, the "influence of the manufacturing side of the sugar-beet industry
permeates all aspects of beet culture." 77
It was the corporations, not the growers, then, who contracted through
Frank Cortez and others like him. And like a mirror image of the campaigns
advertising opportunities for wealth in South Texas that appeared throughout the
Midwest in the 191 Os and 1920s, the sugar beet companies placed advertisements
in a number of Spanish-language publications advertising the opportunities
available in the sugar beet fields. The Columbia Sugar Company of Michigan ran
ads in San Antonio's La Prensa, arguably the most important Spanish-language
newspaper in the United States during those years, promising ample land and,
most importantly, a respectful atmosphere free of the anti-Mexican prejudice of
Texas. As Kathleen Mapes has argued, "the recruiters depicted work in
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77
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Michigan's sugar beet fields not simply as a way to make money but as a different
kind of life than most Mexicans could expect in a Jim Crow Texas."78
Prior to the 1920s, sugar beet growers had relied on European immigrants
as their primary labor force. In both Colorado and the Midwest, GermanRussians made up the majority of the workforce during the first fifteen years of
the century. During World War I, however, immigration from Europe halted at
the same time that the market for beet sugar expanded. As a result, the sugar
corporations increased production while searching for a new source of laborers.
By 1918, Mexicans and Mexican Americans had become the primary labor force
in the beet fields, and by 1927 they made up at least three-quarters of the migrant
work force. 79 At the same time, the beet fields became one of the most important
economic opportunities for Mexicans and Mexican Americans trapped within the
self-reinforcing cycle of migrant farm work in Texas. A study of migratory farm
workers from Crystal City in the 1930s showed that sixty percent of surveyed
families worked seasonally in the sugar beet fields before returning south at the
end of the season. Even though beet labor only lasted a few months each year, it
was the most important source of income for farm workers in the Winter Garden,
even more important than the local spinach harvests. 80 "Many Mexicans leave for

78

Kathleen Mapes, '"A Special Class of Labor': Mexican (lm)Migrants, Immigration Debate, and
Industrial Agriculture in the Rural Midwest," Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the
Americas 1:2 (2004), 78. See also Vargas, Proletarians of the North, 13-14.
79
Mapes, "A Special Class of Labor," 71.
80
Selden Menefee, Mexican Migratory Workers of South Texas (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1941), xiii-xiv.

128
the beets," one border corrido declared, "providing them with nice cars and
beautiful women."

81

Beet wages could be considered high only by the low standards of field
work in Texas. In 1923, the Beet Growers Association, that worked with the
Great Western Sugar Company in Colorado, admitted as much in a letter to its
members. It reported that Colorado beet growers required 7,700 field workers
from Texas for the upcoming harvest. The association warned that beet growers
in Michigan would recruit more than six thousand from Texas. More threatening,
however, was the interest of steel companies in Mexicans and Mexican
Americans in South Texas: "They pay 40c to 50c per hour, offer steady work for a
year, free transportation, if labor works 90 days, opportunity for promotion, etc.
This is an especially hard line of competition for agents recruiting field laborers ..
. . Employers from all states are looking to Texas to supply additional common
labor that they need." 82 Clearly, the sugar beet growers and corporations
understood the condition of farm laborers in Texas and they knew their own
position within the national economy and wage structure. Their profits depended
on the continued existence of workers in South Texas willing to work for low
wages, and the specter of competition from industrial employers lurked as a threat
to this labor supply.
When the migrant workers finally arrived in the beet zones they often
found that they had to deal with a different set of problems than those they had
encountered in the fields and towns of Texas. First, the sugar corporations
81
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instructed labor contractors to transport recruits north before the work began so
that there was a guaranteed force available at the start of the season. Workers
who arrived in April or May had to wait without pay until late May or early June
before the first operations began. 83 The first of the season's three pay days did
not come until July, so the workers had to rely on advances or credit from local
stores while they waited. 84 Later in the 1920s, payments declined to two times
per season, pushing workers even further into debt. In addition, many of the
sugar companies withheld a few dollars from each pay period until the end of the
season in order to ensure that workers did not leave before the harvest ended in
search of higher wages. They did not offer the hold-back money to workers until
the harvest had already ended and many of the workers had to leave for
employment elsewhere. 85 Many contracts contained clauses that voided any
responsibilities of the company or landowner if the crop failed, leaving the
contracted workers stranded in remote beet fields more than a thousand miles
from the point of recruitment. 86 George Edson, a Labor Department investigator,
reported that, because of these policies, "at the end of the beet growing season,
they find that through charges of transportation, commission, supplies and
accommodation and certain other deductions, they have no pay left." 87
Wages were, in fact, even lower than they appeared to be because
employers and contractors paid male heads of household for labor done by entire
83
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families. Corporations knowingly determined acreage allotments according to
number of workers in each unit, including children, but sought to avoid leaving
any proof of child labor in the actual contracts. In the fields, however, the
corporations and the landowners welcomed child labor. A study in Michigan in
1920 determined that among beet worker families, twenty percent of six year olds,
sixty percent of eight year olds, and roughly one hundred percent of ten year olds
worked in the fields with the rest of their family. A study taken in the Wisconsin
beet fields four years later found that 52% of field workers were under the age of
fifteen, while only 21% were older then twenty-one. Thus, unacknowledged child
labor, purposefully hidden by the nature of the contracts, actually performed the
majority of beet labor. 88
Once they entered the fields, migrant workers faced an arduous series of
tasks that lasted from late May until the end of the harvest in November. First
came blocking and thinning during May and June. Workers removed unneeded
plants from each row with a hoe. Long-handled hoes had been used before the
introduction of Mexican and Mexican American workers. During the 1920s,
however, bolstered by declarations from agricultural experts at nearby land grant
colleges, the corporations instituted the short -handled hoe. While more accurate
and less likely to damage the crops than the long-handled variety, it required
workers to stoop in order to reach the plants. As Dennis Valdes noted, "the
simultaneous introduction of the short-handled hoe and Mexicano workers linked
the two in the popular and academic mind." 89 The short-handled hoe remained
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the standard implement until blocking by machine became possible in the late
1920s. In the meantime, however, these stumpy implements caused ruptured
discs, torn back ligaments, and arthritis of the spine. 90
The pre-harvest operations finished by early August, so workers faced
another period without work before the harvest began in late September or
October, again falling back on advances and credit to subsist. Some were able to
find temporary work elsewhere, ranging from agricultural employment to railroad
work as they waited for the harvest to begin. By the time the arduous task of
topping came around, the season changed and much of the work had to be done in
the rain and cold. Walking through the fields with large knives used to slice the
top off of the beets, accidents were frequent, with missing fingers and accidental
gashes on arms and legs commonplace among beet workers. 91
At the end of the six-month season, male adults earned, on average, $160
in the Midwestern beet fields in the late 1920s. While that represented a
substantial improvement over the wages available in the fields of Texas, these
wages had declined from those earned by the European workers a decade earlier.
While the agricultural bubble of the war years certainly played some part in
higher wages during those years, that does not explain the disparity between
earnings in the late 1920s and the $280 average for European adult males in 1920.
Clearly, then, the spectacular growth of the sugar beet industry, just like
agriculture in South Texas, depended on a depressed wage scale that was made
possible by the miniscule pay available in the region south of San Antonio, as
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well as the practices of family recruitment and child labor. Still, argued Carey
McWilliams, beet migrants returned back to Texas "as they left, with scarcely any
money." 92
Not all of these recruited workers returned to Texas at the end of the beet
season, however. Labor Department Investigator George Edson found that ninety
percent of Mexicans who had been in the United States for less than a year
returned to Mexico or Texas at the end of the beet harvest, beginning the annual
agricultural cycle all over again with the winter harvests in South Texas. After
two or three years in the United States, however, only thirty-five did so. Fifteen
percent remained in the countryside near the beet fields, while fully fifty percent
moved to nearby urban areas. 93 While his numbers seem rather high considering
the thousands of migrant farm workers who returned to South Texas every winter,
they point toward the growth of a permanent Mexican and Mexican American
population, especially in the Midwest, as some migrant workers shifted away
from the border states.
The ultimate goal for those who remained in the Upper Midwest,
especially those who moved to urban centers like Chicago and Detroit, was to
secure some form of industrial labor. Eventually, "[f]arm work was viewed as a
last resort, casual labor performed only by greenhorns or by Mexicans who
constituted the permanent labor migration force from Texas."
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automotive plants of Detroit. And as had been the case with the sugar beet
corporations, northern industrial interests welcomed the Mexican and Mexican
American workers as a valued supplement to the reserve army of labor collecting
in the cities of the Upper Midwest.
Some industrial corporations recruited workers directly from South Texas,
following the same general operating procedures as the sugar beet growers.
Labor agents from steel mills competed with all of the other contractors
circulating among the prospective migrants gathered in Milam Park in San
Antonio, while Buick recruited some workers directly from Texas for its Flint
assembly plant. 95 Bethlehem Steel also recruited a number of workers directly
from Texas, but under an unusual arrangement. The postwar depression slowed
operations across the nation, but when the steel industry resumed its predepression levels in 1923, Bethlehem Steel looked to South Texas as a logical
source for labor. Between April6 and May 30, 1923,912 men, 29 women, and 7
children, all Mexican nationals, traveled to Pennsylvania under contract. The
Mexican Consul-General in San Antonio signed the contract, providing the
migrants with the implicit protection of the Mexican government. Both the
company and the imported workers seemed to sour on the arrangement in the next
few years, however. By 1929, only six years after the first thousand recruits
arrived from Mexico, less than four hundred Mexicans remained in Bethlehem,
and they eventually left during the Great Depression. Like the efforts to recruit
Mexican and Mexican American field workers to the Mississippi Delta, this
attempt to bring workers out of the US-Mexico border region and into
95
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northeastern steel mills failed, though it did little to diminish the hopes of some
that this malleable labor pool could be successfully exploited by northern
.mdustry. 96

More often, however, Mexicans and Mexican Americans sought
employment in northern industry of their own accord, traveling away from the
border region in search of more opportunity and less discrimination, following the
same hopeful path as African Americans leaving the South during the same
years.

97

Whether they entered the cities after working in the beet fields or they

traveled there solely for urban employment, all saw the industrial cities as a
substantive improvement over the lives they could lead in Mexico or South Texas.
One migrant to Chicago described Mexicans' broadening geographical range:
In the early days before Dfaz was deposed and there was work enough in

Mexico for all, one heard only of the states of Texas and California. The
few Mexicans who left Mexico went there and wrote back from there.
After a while we heard of New Mexico and Arizona, but beyond that there
was no more United States to us. I remember distinctly with what great
surprise we received a letter in our pueblo from a Mexican who had gone
to Pennsylvania. "Oh, where can that be! That must be very, very far
away. It must be farther than New York, close to England." It was not
until years after the war that we heard of St. Louis, then of Chicago and
Illinois. Things were very good, I heard, so I came here direct from
Laredo. 98
Many migrants to Chicago and Detroit followed the same path, bypassing
employment in the border states and instead traveling directly to the industrial
North. The result, according to labor economist Paul Taylor, was that "Mexicans
have entered the heart of industrial America. They are now the latest and lowliest
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newcomers in the long succession of migrating nationalities that have furnished
the labor to build and maintain the basic industries of the United States." 99 When
George Edson studied the presence of Mexican and Mexican Americans in the
North in 1927, he found that 30,827 held industrial employment in the industrial
belt stretching from St. Paul, Minnesota, to the steel mills of Pennsylvania. 100
Despite improved wages, however, insecurity was still one of the primary
realities in the lives of Mexican and Mexican American industrial workers. Many
Mexicans and Mexican Americans found themselves bumping up against the
same glass ceiling that confronted African Americans entering industrial
employment. Relegated to the most dangerous jobs, laid off at the first sign of
market instability, and often made victims of the seasonal nature of most
industrial production, many of these newly arrived migrants found themselves
pushed back into a life of transiency. As they shifted between cities like Chicago,
Gary, and Detroit, they found themselves secluded in crowded, dirty
neighborhoods between industrial districts. 101 When industrial labor could not be
found, some had to return to the fields for the relative security of sugar beet
harvesting. As Kathleen Mapes argues, "for many the path from rural fields to
urban centers proved to be more circular than linear."
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Thus, industrial

migration often created a parallel migration stream more compact geographically
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and slightly more stable than the interstate agricultural migrant stream, but one
still rife with issues of instability and insecurity. 103
The Montano family followed this unstable path between agricultural and
industrial labor. All fifteen members of the family entered the United States at
Laredo in 1920, and exhausted much of their money in paying the head tax. They
first went to San Antonio, where four men in the family secured jobs at a dairy
farm outside the city. After seeing a billboard advertising sugar beet employment
in Michigan, the family went to a farm near Saginaw, where every member of the
family participated in planting and harvesting. During the late stages of hoeing,
four family members went to Saginaw and secured employment in the General
Motors Central Foundry. As the steel industry slid into recession in 1921,
however, three of the four lost their jobs. The family remained in the beet fields
until 1924, when Ventura, his wife Maria, and their daughter went to Detroit,
where Ventura worked in the massive Ford River Rouge plant. His job lasted
until 1928, when a lay-off forced the Montanos to return to the beet fields, no
more financially stable than they had been when they first trekked north. 104
Labor economist Paul Taylor uncovered a number of similar stories
among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Chicago. One man recalled leaving
Mexico in 1918 and traveling first to San Antonio, where he became a cement
worker. As cotton harvest time approached, work slowed down in San Antonio,
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so he entered the cotton migrant stream, hoping to earn more money there than in
the city. He left Texas in 1920, arriving in Chicago during the winter. A month
and a half after arriving he secured employment in a steel mill. But, he
complained, "it was not steady and they took advantage of the hard times to bring
down the wages of the men. I worked about half the time and was laid off the
other half." 105 Another man had worked in Texas cotton, the beet fields of
Colorado and Minnesota, and steel mills in Erie, Pennsylvania and St. Louis,
before arriving in the stockyard district of Chicago. Another left the Texas cotton
fields for railroad labor in Nebraska, Kansas, and Montana. He then took work as
a shepherd in Montana, before traveling to Chicago and Gary for industrial
employment. 106
Taylor also recalled the path followed by another family from Mexico.
They entered the United States at Laredo in 1920 and proceeded north to the San
Antonio area, first finding work clearing land and grubbing brush near the city.
Next they proceeded north to Belton (between Austin and Waco) to work in a
cotton-seed-oil factory where an uncle had previously worked. With insufficient
work available there, the entire family then continued north to Fort Worth, where
they contracted to work in sugar beets near Billings, Montana. The next year they
worked in the beet fields near Casper, Wyoming, stayed in Denver for the winter,
and then worked the beet fields in Colorado. By 1927, the family had a total of
$15 and an old car, which they took to Raton, New Mexico, where they stayed for
a year while working the coal mines. They then left for the Texas cotton harvest
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in the fall of 1928, and then went south to the Winter Garden to transplant onions,
where they remained after the outbreak of the Great Depression. "The
wanderings of individual Mexicans over a period of years may thus appear more
or less erratic," wrote Taylor, "but they usually follow one or another of the
seasonal swirls." 107
While these agricultural and industrial migrations lacked true stability,
they did greatly alter the demographic reality of the Mexican and Mexican
American populations in the United States. While the vast majority of the
population still resided in the border states, there were now large, vibrant
communities spread far beyond the traditional Mexican American homeland. The
Mexican population in Michigan was ten times larger in 1920 than it had been in
1910. During the same years, the Mexican population was ten tines larger in
Wyoming; nine times larger in both Nebraska and Idaho; five times greater in
New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois; and four times greater in Iowa. 108 In
addition to this increasing migration into the Midwest, there was also an
important movement of migrants moving from Texas toward California and the
rest of the Southwest. 109
Looked at together, these permanent and seasonal migrations created a
Tejano Diaspora that spread Tejano and Mexican culture throughout the nation.
At the same time they created linkages between these disparate communities that
helped nurture and stabilize an increasingly unstable population. These varied
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points along the Tejano Diaspora were not, in the words of anthropologist Roger
Rouse, "spatially demarcated communities," nor were those who traveled between
these places "capable of maintaining an involvement in only one of them." 110
Instead, they represented the construction of a complex, if haphazard, culture and
community that stretched from the northern Mexico to the Upper Midwest and
provided a measure of stability within the insecure migrant stream that helped
shape much of Mexican and Mexican American life in the United States during
the two decades before the Great Depression. 111

***
Describing the agricultural growth that began in the 1910s and 1920s,
Carey McWilliams wrote, "Texas is currently in the midst of a revolution in its
agricultural economy of such magnitude as to be, in the words of one qualified
observer, 'beyond the imagination and comprehension of the average man. '" 112
In South Texas, this meant that a region previously deemed too arid and isolated
for large-scale agriculture became one of the wealthiest farming areas in the
nation. While this growth occurred at the same time that the expanded railroad
network, refrigerated rail cars, and other technological and infrastructural
improvements helped create a national market for agricultural goods, these
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developments in South Texas could not have occurred without the availability of
large numbers of Mexican and Mexican American workers to prepare the land
and harvest the crops.
As this economic growth continued, however, the growers of South Texas
could not ignore the expansion of the migrant stream that they had unintentionally
helped to create. Even as their own production and profits grew, the growers of
South Texas feared that the increased northward migration of Mexicans and
Mexican Americans threatened to bring the agricultural boom to a halt.
Accordingly, farming interests worked throughout the 1910s and 1920s to limit
the potential mobility of migrant farm workers in an effort to secure their ongoing
agricultural revolution.
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Chapter 4: Securing the Revolution: Political Restructuring and the Attempted
Immobilization of Labor in South Texas
"Greed and avarice have caused employers to overlook the niceties of human rights and
social justice. They need seasonal labor to harvest valuable crops, the cheaper the better.
Complacent immigration officials, a misguided public opinion, a paternalistic feudal
attitude towards labor have all contributed to their exploitation."
Carlos Castaneda 1

Elias Garza, a native of Cuernavaca, Morelos, entered the United States at
Laredo in 1912 with his Texas-born wife and children. This was his third trip
north of the border. In the decade before his entry at Laredo, Garza had worked
on the railroads in Kansas, and, in California, handled dynamite in a stone quarry,
skinned hogs in a packing plant, and performed maintenance work at a railroad
station. He returned to Mexico after his second trip to the United States, but
"things were bad there, for that was in 1912, and the disorders of the revolution
had already started." 2 Thus, Garza crossed the border a third time with his family.
In San Antonio, they contracted to pick cotton in the Rio Grande Valley along
with several other Mexican immigrants. When they arrived at the farm, the
planter pointed Elias and his family toward an old shack that had previously
housed chickens. Garza demanded better accommodations, but the farmer refused
and told them to leave. As they began to depart, the sheriff arrested Garza and his
wife and took them to the county jail. There the farmer claimed that Garza had
skipped out on him without reimbursing his transportation costs from San
Antonio. "He charged me twice the cost of the transportation," recalled Garza,
"and though I tried first not to pay him, and then to pay him what it cost, I
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couldn't do anything. The authorities would only pay attention to him, and as
they were in league with him they told me that if I didn't pay him they would take
my wife and my little children to work. Then I paid them." 3 After this legallysanctioned shakedown, Garza and his family continued to Dallas, El Paso,
Arizona, and eventually Los Angeles, tracing a path similar to hundreds of
thousands of other Mexicans who entered the United States during these years and
unwittingly became vital elements in the growth of the Southwestern economy
and the formation of a distinct South Texas model of labor relations.
This chapter examines the ways in which growers and politicians in South
Texas attempted to guarantee the continuation of their farm boom. Through the
construction of overlapping systems of political, spatial, and economic
domination, the political and economic elites of South Texas constructed an
adequate, if imperfect, system that assured the persistence of a low-paid surplus
labor force and a growing agricultural economy. The political takeover of the
farming interests, the strengthening of social segregation, and construction of a
more systematic web of labor controls combined with the growth of irrigation
capacity and railroad facilities to spur on the farm boom throughout the 191 Os and
1920s.

***
As agricultural profits grew and land consolidation continued apace in
South Texas, local political change came in its wake. 4 The paternalistic political
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machines that had faded during the late nineteenth century in other parts of South
Texas remained in control in the ranching areas after the tum of the century. Jim
Wells, the archetype of the South Texas political boss, maintained his hold on the
Lower Valley into the twentieth century. The newcomer farmers, however,
viewed the operations of the machines as insidiously anti-republican. They
wanted local government to promote the interests of farmers. Throughout the
191 Os, political battles raged between old-timers and newcomers over Mexican
voting. The newcomers claimed that the machines bought Mexican votes and that
only by eliminating this corruption could republican government come to the
Lower Valley. Alba Heywood, a land speculator in the San Benito area of
Cameron County, described this anti-machine feeling: "I do not think that the
Mexican ignorance and the Mexican corruption that they talk so much about is
our menace. I think our menace is the intelligence and shrewdness and corruption
of the American men who lead them. And I don't believe in spraying the leaves
to cure citrus canker and don't believe in cutting off the limb .... I think citrus
canker, and we have political citrus canker, should be gone after as they go after
citrus canker, and cut the tap root. Mine is the tap root theory." 5 The machines,
eager to maintain their own control, did what they could to proceed as they
always had, offering paternalistic protection to Mexicans and Mexican Americans
while trying to hold off the political insurgencies erupting around them.
These battles were fought in two different ways. The first method,
borrowed by the newcomers from the tactics of the Jim Crow South, was the
5
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white primary. Maverick and Dimmit Counties, both located in the Winter
Garden region southwest of San Antonio, instituted these exclusionary tactics in
1913 and 1914, respectively. The Carrizo Springs Javelin (Dimmit County)
editorialized that "in times past the handling of the Mexican vote has not been
such as would reflect any credit upon the people of the county," before asking
rhetorically, "Are you a white man standing with white men, or are you- well,
something else?"6 After the White Man's Primary Association succeeded in
disfranchising Mexicans Americans in Dimmit, the Javelin waxed poetic: "the
White Men's Primary, by eliminating one of the most unscrupulous elements of
local politics, will do much to give Dimmit County civic righteousness, and the
people want it." 7 By denying the vote to Mexican Americans, attacking the
weakest link in the structure of political control created by the machines, these
newcomers forced the machines into a defensive position from which they could
not recover. Mexican American voting rights were sacrificed at the altar of
"progressive" political reform that put the control of county government in the
hands of the new farming elite.
The second method, used by both sides, was the creation of new counties.
From 1911 to 1921, the seven counties of the Lower Rio Grande Valley
underwent a form of political mitosis to create a total of thirteen counties.
Population growth had nothing to do with this subdivision -instead, new counties
were created to avoid conflict between the two groups. The first two counties
carved out of the original seven were Brooks and Jim Hogg, both established in
6
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1911. Brooks broke away from Starr County, a border ranching county which
was firmly under the control of Jim Wells' ally, Manuel Guerra. Likewise, Jim
Hogg was created out of Zapata County, a machine stronghold and ranching
county. White farmers controlled the politics of both new counties from the
beginning. 8
A second wave of county subdivisions began almost immediately.
Different than Brooks and Jim Hogg, however, these new counties were defensive
bulwarks created by ranching interests to maintain some control and leave
counties that had become increasingly farmer dominated. Willacy (1911), Jim
Wells (1911), Kleberg (1913), and Kenedy (1921) Counties emerged out of old
ranching areas of Cameron, Hidalgo, and Nueces Counties. 9 In these new
counties, the old machine practices continued, creating what were essentially
isolated enclaves within a rapidly changing economic, social, and political
environment.
In the realm of statewide politics, William Hobby's entry into the
Governor's Mansion in 1917 as a mid-term replacement for the impeached James
Ferguson gave the farm interests a strong ally in Austin. Hobby was a late
convert to the Progressive wing of the state Democratic Party, but he emerged as
a fervent opponent of the old political machines and a staunch ally of
prohibitionists. Both sides prepared themselves for a clash in the 1918 elections,
as Hobby ran against Ferguson for control of the state's Democratic Party.
Ferguson's electoral hopes depended on the South Texas machines and the
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strongly anti-prohibition Germans in the Hill Country north of San Antonio.
Coming in the midst of World War I and the continued violence spawned by the
Mexican Revolution, the Progressive forces united behind Hobby attacked their
opponents as lackeys of the Kaiser and Mexican bandit leaders who sought to
destroy republican government in Texas through insidious liquor-dealing and
vote-buying. In this context, the interests of the state Progressive establishment
coincided perfectly with farming elements in South Texas. Hand in hand, they
launched a campaign of intimidation during the 1918 elections that sought to
eliminate voting by Mexican Americans and thus destroy any remaining
strongholds of machine power.
Not surprisingly, the Texas Rangers took a prominent role in these events.
When Hobby took office in 1917 he appointed James Harley, a former state
representative firmly within the Progressive camp, as his Adjutant General. In
January 1918 Harley created the Loyalty Ranger Force under the command of
Captain W.M, Hanson. 10 Three men appointed from each county in Texas made
up the Loyalty Rangers, whose purpose, according to Harley, was to "act as a
Secret Service Department for the State, County, and Municipal officers in the
execution of all State laws, especially House Bill No. 15, better known as the
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'Hobby Loyalty Act.' Through the assistance of the Loyalty Secret Service
Department this office has been advised as to Mexican revolutionary activities
carried on, principally outside of San Antonio, and in the border counties in
Mexico and this State." 11 In fact, Loyalty Rangers served as a political bludgeon
against enemies of Hobby and his wing of the state Democratic Party, especially
in the Rangers' traditional stomping grounds of South Texas. At the same time,
Harley revoked all Special Ranger commissions granted by James Ferguson and
replaced the entire force with his own appointees. By the time of the 1918
elections more than five hundred Hobby supporters received patronage positions
within the Ranger Force, making any notion that the Rangers were an apolitical
law enforcement body laughable. The group had merely switched patrons.
Rather than the political bosses and their machines, the Rangers bowed to new
masters: the farmers of South Texas and their elite allies in the rest of the state. 12
On primary day, July 27, 1918, Loyalty, Special, and regular Rangers
swarmed around polling places across South Texas, making no secret of their
efforts to dissuade Mexican Americans from voting. In Corpus Christi, Rangers
threatened Chicanos with prison if they voted, while they functioned as menacing
observers who tried to dissuade voters in Duval County from supporting local
boss Archie Parr in his reelection bid for the state senate. 13 Their strategy worked
in the statewide elections, as Hobby won the nomination easily, outpolling
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Ferguson two-to-one in South Texas (which Ferguson won two-to-one two years
earlier). Parr, however, thwarted these efforts in typical South Texas-style and
managed to win the nomination in spite of the Rangers and opposition from
Hobby, who rightly viewed Parr as a Ferguson partisan. His opponent, D.W.
Glasscock, held a lead of 1,200 votes with all precincts but those in Duval County
counted. Since Duval had fewer than one thousand registered voters, Hobby and
the Progressives cried foul when Duval officials reported that Parr won the county
by 1,280 votes (1 ,303 to 23).
Legal wrangling ensued, but the courts ruled in favor of Parr, undoubtedly
due to pressure from Jim Wells. Glasscock responded with a write-in campaign,
which had more of a chance of victory than running as a Republican in South
Texas, hoping to reverse these results in the November general election. Openly
working for Parr's opponent, Harley sent the Rangers to interrogate "all
questionable voters." Seven days before the general election Hobby explicitly
ordered his adjutant general to position Rangers throughout South Texas as a
warning to try to dissuade the usual vote-getting practices of Parr and the
machines. Rangers openly threatened Mexican American voters. In Alice, very
near Parr's home in San Diego, the number of votes dropped from three hundred
in the primary to sixty-five in the general election. 14 But it was all to no avail.
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Despite the show of force and ham-handed attempts to block voting, Parr defeated
Glasscock and retained his senate seat. 15
Despite this setback, the 1918 elections marked an important turning
point. Not only did Hobby and the Progressives maintain control of the
Governor's Mansion, but they helped further damage the machines through their
blatantly partisan use of the Rangers. While Hobby remained nominally allied
with Jim Wells in Cameron County and the Guerra family in Starr County, he and
his allies made no secret of their desire to change the nature of politics in South
Texas toward a system more responsive to farmers' interests. Parr may have been
their primary enemy, but all of the political bosses remained vulnerable as long as
their political longevity relied on buying votes from the Mexican American
majority. With the Rangers now firmly on the side of the farming interests, the
machines found themselves caught between the new political ascendancy and
their former constituents, whose memories of the genocidal violence of 19151916 had yet to fade, and who remained angry that nothing had been done to
protect their voting rights. While the machines had already been on the decline,
their deterioration accelerated in the aftermath of the 1918 elections and the
conspicuous silence from the likes of Jim Wells and his associates. 16 Only in
isolated areas, such as Duval and Starr counties, did the machines maintain this
support during the agricultural boom years of the 1920s.
The last gasp of the old machines in the farming counties came in 1928
with the so-called "Hidalgo County Rebellion." Hidalgo County sheriff and
15
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former Texas Ranger, A.Y. Baker, maintained tenuous control of the county into
the late 1920s. Newcomer farmers created a rival faction called the Good
Government League to oust Baker's allies in the 1928 elections. They especially
coveted the position of county judge, the most powerful position in local South
Texas government during these years. The machine counted the votes, however,
and when the final tally went in favor of the GGL candidate, Baker threw out the
ballot box from Weslaco, a town firmly in the control of newcomers since its
founding in 1921. After complaints about these irregularities, the US Congress
investigated the episode and found evidence of illegal activities. When the case
went to trial, Baker was found guilty of falsifying election results, but before
sentencing he disappeared, never to be seen again. It is still not known what
happened to Baker, but his disappearance symbolized the definitive end of the
machine era. 17
As the machines faded, most overt sentiment in favor of Mexican
American voting rights disappeared. Interviewed several years later, Asherton
farmer Littleton Richardson explained that the political bosses "used to give the
Mexicans whiskey and free meals for thirty days before election. As a result they
got no work done during that time. So to put a stop to the whole thing they
organized the white man's primary." 18 Since these newcomers hated Mexican
American voting and interruptions in their workforce with equal ferocity, they
responded in what they deemed the only way to make sure that neither happened
again. In 1923 the state legislature, bowing to pressure from East Texas interests
17
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looking to shore up protections against African American voters and South Texas
interests eager to do the same with Mexican Americans, made the white primary
statewide. Mexican American voters were not entirely eliminated by this
legislation, but when combined in the years to come with poll taxes and other
similar measures, it did effectively cripple voting strength throughout the region
for decades to come even as Mexican American majorities expanded.
There were exceptions, of course. The Taft Ranch, for instance, continued
to operate in the exact same manner as the disgraced machines had. Managers
and foremen instructed their workers not to "make up their minds on politics until
they had heard from the management." 19 The company paid all poll taxes for its
employees, then recovered the money by garnishing wages. They herded workers
to the polls on election day, and dictated for whom they would vote. Thus
Mexican American voting aroused little anger when it benefited agribusiness
interests, especially in areas where farmers still sought to wrest control over
opposing political factions. As farming interests took unquestioned control,
however, they simply phased out the tactics they learned from the machines and
pushed Mexicans and Mexican Americans out of the political realm while still
relying on them in the economic realm.
In many counties, good government leagues simply created a new form of
political machine, built wholly on the principle of exclusion rather than the
delicate parasitic relationships that underlay the power of the older political
bosses. Clothing disfranchisement in the rhetoric of progressivism, these new
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machines depicted themselves as redeemers of the political system who would
return control back to the rightful leaders. Beneath these empty exaltations of
civic righteousness, however, lay the same threats of violence that had always
remained just below the surface in South Texas, made especially resonant by the
memories of genocidal war less than a generation earlier. South Texas Anglos
seemed to agree with a resident of Dimmit County interviewed by Paul Taylor:
'There isn't much probability of the Mexicans taking enough interest to vote. If
they did, first some plan would be devised by law to keep them from voting.
Second, if that could not be done there might be calamity from a physical
standpoint and there might be some dead Mexicans." 20 Relying on legal
maneuvering and the specter of violence, these new political elites constructed
local and regional political dynasties that remained largely unchallenged until the
1970s, when democracy finally came to South Texas.
Along with these changes in the political order came an even more
important restructuring of the social system that mirrored the enforced political
powerlessness of the Chicano majority. When farming interests captured political
control of an area, they immediately set about implementing a system of
segregation that went beyond the residential segregation that had long been a fact
of life in the region. According to David Montejano, segregation "was not merely
a natural unfolding of previous foundations or legacies - not just an immigration
of more prejudiced Anglos or an assimilation of the old. This was a new society,
with new class groups and class relations, with the capacity to generate an
20
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'indigenous' rationale for the ordering of people." 21 "Outside the social order but
a necessary part of it," continued Montejano, "Mexicans were attached to the new
agricultural society through the construction of separate and subordinate
institutions that rigidly defined their position as farm laborers." 22
A rigid, seemingly unquestioned tautology justified this social separation.
The powerlessness of Mexicans and Mexican Americans, though often achieved
through violence, became the justification for their banishment from full
citizenship within the farm society. Conversely, their supposed unfitness for full
citizenship validated their political and economic powerlessness. Clearly,
economic considerations, manifested in racialist feeling as a further subconscious
rationalization, determined the hierarchical structure of this new agricultural
society. Beyond simple racism, then, the farmers of South Texas created a system
they deemed utilitarian in its stark simplicity that guaranteed a reliable, cheap
workforce whose basic rights remained an abstraction to be ignored whenever
convenient.
The general attitudes expressed by Anglo residents of South Texas during
these years exhibited just this kind of earnest belief in the rationality of their
system, with some even going so far as to celebrate the perfection of this recently
constructed arrangement. G.A. Tallmadge, a farmer near Corpus Christi
originally from Milwaukee, scolded labor economist Paul Taylor for what he
deemed to be the scholar's lack of enthusiasm for what he observed in South
Texas: "Don't come down here from the north and describe the poverty of the
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Mexicans at the back door of the white man's high civilization. Don't forget that
he's an independent individual. There never lived a person in such freedom." 23
Tallmadge continued his admonishment, complaining that Taylor and others
should not "get to pitying the Mexican and depreciating the white people holding
him in subjection. He wouldn't have it any other way. The white man will cuss
the Mexican, and then in the evening, on the cattle ranches, he's down by the fire
with him, with the frying pan, and eating tortillas with his coffee. There never
was a grander companionship between men." 24
Likewise, John Stone, an onion grower in Carrizo Springs, viewed the
wages he offered as charitable: "We have to have the Mexicans as cheap labor.
We carry them when things are tight; they won't save. They owe me about $500
now, and I will lose about half of it. I can't afford to pay them high wages, and
then carry them when times are tight. I wish they would save for themselves, but
it isn't in their nature to do it." 25 Any more money, claimed Stone, would ruin the
workers. Not willing to leave it at that, however, Stone continued:
The Mexican is getting paid two bits too much; he gets from $1.50 to
$2.00 a day. He should get about $1. When he has a dollar in his pocket
he won't work. You get more onions transplanted at 5 cents a row than
you do at 10 cents. It's just the nature of the Mexican. He needs about $8
a week if he has a family, for clothes, shoes, and food. What a Mexican
should be paid is just enough to live on, with maybe a dollar or two to
spend. That's all he deserves. If he is paid any more he won't work so
much; or when we need him, he's able to wait around until we have to
raise the price above what's legitimate. 26
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Stone's attitude was typical of the other newcomer farmers who viewed
interethnic relations through the lens of economics, deciding that what was best
for their bottom line necessarily had to be best for everyone. 27 In such an
atmosphere, it is no surprise that a Nueces County tenant farmer proudly declared,
"I have only hit three Mexicans in eight years and I consider that a pretty good
record." 28 Nor that a Dimmit County farmer stated, "We feel toward the
Mexicans just like toward the nigger, but not so much." 29
As farm towns sprouted throughout the region in the late 1910s and 1920s,
segregation followed in the immediate aftermath of the town's founding. While
most public accommodations in these towns practiced some form of segregation,
it was school segregation that was most telling of the nature of this society. 30 As
David Montejano argued, "Segregated schools were a straightforward reflection
of the racial divisions of the farm towns." 31 Some towns built schools solely for
use by Mexicans and Mexican Americans, while others secluded students in
different classrooms within the same building, but the basic pattern remained the
27
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same throughout the region.

32

Segregation's defenders supported school

separation in the same terms as they did labor relations. They claimed that
separation was good for Mexicans because it kept them from directly competing
with Anglos, while also stressing that it protected Anglo children from intimate
contact with Mexican children.
John Stone summarized these general feelings in his interview with Paul
Taylor: "Reasons for separation? They're low morally, and many of their
children aren't clean; either they would be left behind by the faster progress of the
white children, or the white children would be held back. The Mexicans could go
to the white schools if they knew enough and insisted; they're Caucasians. But
they are satisfied; they know that the white children would make it pretty hard for
the Mexican children and would probably get the best of them." 33 Similarly,
when Paul Taylor asked an Anglo tenant farmer why the nearest school refused to
admit Mexicans, he roared back, "Because a damned greaser is not fit to sit side
of a white girl. Anybody who wants to get in trouble around here can just try to
put them in the same school. A man would rather his daughter was dead than that
she should marry a Mexican. The Mexicans are too dirty and filthy. If they
separate in school the children learn the difference and they won't mix with the
Mexicans. Of course, if they contend for it, we will either have to take them into
the school or else build them another." 34
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In addition to these predictable defenses of segregation, however, some
supporters made no pretense of hiding the fact that they used separation as a way
to further subsidize Anglo schools. Similar to African American schools in the
Southeast, funds received from the state for Mexican schools went almost entirely
into the white educational system. A school superintendent in Nueces County
stated unapologetically that "Mexicans in this district draw about $6,000 state aid,
and we spend on them about $2,000. This is true everywhere in Texas. We also
have an $18,000 property tax and that all goes to the white school." 35 A Winter
Garden farmer, likewise, readily admitted that the "school board uses the money it
gets from the state for the Mexican scholastics on the white school. If they didn't
have to they wouldn't have any school for the Mexicans. When you say anything
to them about it, their attitude is 'oh well, they're Mexicans."' 36
Another important aspect of the educational system in these farming towns
was the lack of any attempt to enforce compulsory attendance laws. While this
could be seen as a result of the general apathy toward the educational needs of the
Mexican American population, it had much more to do with issues of labor
availability. To be sure, the entire state of Texas tended to ignore compulsory
attendance laws, but in rural South Texas local governments made no pretense of
enforcing these laws that had the potential to take child labor out of the fields? 7
Paul Taylor estimated that at no time during the year did more than twenty-five
percent of Mexican children between the ages of seven and seventeen attend
35
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school in Dimmit County, while the average attendance rate was much lower than
that. 38 Among those Mexican and Mexican American children who did attend
school regularly, they often found themselves on vacation weeks earlier than
white students so that they could work in the fields. The "Mexican schools" in
Nueces County, for instance, finished their school year a month early so that
students could be put to work chopping cotton. 39 Thus, these segregated schools
acted as little more than places to warehouse potential field laborers during the
off-season. When added to the fact that many of these children had to travel with
the rest of their families on the migrant trail for months, it can hardly be
surprising that most Mexican and Mexican American children did not make it as
far as the fifth grade. Far from accidental, this system developed as an intentional
aspect of the ethnic/labor relations regime established by farmers who felt that
"education they get in the schools here spoils them, and makes them trifling; they
become peddlers, or bootleggers, or seek some easy of making a living." 40
Freedom from hard work, apparently, was a right earned only by the farmowners.
The larger towns and cities of South Texas did not have a system of
segregation quite as rigid as the farm towns, but conditions in places like San
Antonio, Laredo, Eagle Pass, Corpus Christi, and Brownsville largely mirrored
what was happening in the small towns of the Winter Garden, the Lower Rio
Grande Valley, and the other farming areas. Still, many in these farm towns
pointed to San Antonio and the other large towns as places where Mexicans and
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Anglos associated too freely, such as the farmer in Carrizo Springs who stated
disapprovingly that "in San Antonio and Laredo and some other places they do
vote and go to the same schools. But not here."

41

Likewise, a school board

member in Dimmit County explained, "Politics is the reason for mixing of
Americans and Mexicans in San Antonio and Laredo. There they can't offend the
Mexicans."42 Despite these estimations of the overly egalitarian atmosphere of
San Antonio, however, a rigid pattern of residential segregation accomplished the
same kind of social separation. Restrictive covenants and other similar measures
forced most Mexicans and Mexican Americans into the city's increasingly overcrowded West Side. With residential segregation accomplished, city leaders
merely had to draw school district lines in such a way that created de facto, if not
.
.
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The results of this residential segregation in San Antonio, however, could
be dire. The lack of proper sanitation facilities such as running water and sewage
lines in much of San Antonio's West Side slum created an acute public health
crisis that continued to fester under the noses of the city's Anglo leadership.
Tuberculosis rates among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the city dwarfed
those among Anglos and African Americans, which themselves were high by
national standards. A local publication described the neighborhoods of the West
Side as mired in "(p]rimitive conditions that beggar description ... Living
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conditions actually below those of the cattle in some of San Antonio's modem
dairies are used as human habitations in many instances, and whole sections are
so lacking in sanitary provisions as to form an actual health menace." 44 As the
population grew throughout these years, the newcomers found themselves stacked
on top of new neighbors, trapped within a comer of a city that refused to allow
their physical expansion into the North or South Side. Ramshackle, dilapidated
housing littered this bounded section of town, leaving the population susceptible
to natural disaster. In the midst of the farm boom south of the city, the residents
of the West Side found themselves victims of a massive flood that swept through
the central and western portions of the city on the night of September 9, 1921.
As Mike Davis argued in his study of ecological catastrophe in Los
Angeles, concepts such as "average rainfall" are abstractions that mean nothing in
a climate like San Antonio and South Texas. Instead, "high-intensity, lowfrequency events ('disasters') are the ordinary agents of landscape and ecological
change." 45 More specifically, South Texas has always shifted back and forth
between drought and flood, with little time spent in an intermediate position
between the two. Not surprisingly, the West Side of San Antonio was the area of
the city most prone to flooding. When exacerbated by the lack of sturdy housing
or reliable sewage and water services, the potential for catastrophe was constant,
even if ignored. While the San Antonio River and its many tributaries usually
maintained low flow levels, when floods did occur they could become raging
44
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torrents that, before flood control came during the 1930s, ripped through districts
adjacent to the river and its network of creeks.
Beginning on Wednesday, September 9, 1921, heavy rain pounded the
Hill Country north of San Antonio, dramatically raising the water level in Olmos
Creek and the San Antonio River. The rain continued unabated until Friday night,
when in a matter of a few hours almost eight inches of rain fell on the city and the
area to its immediate north. This torrent of water roared into the San Antonio
River, bursting its banks that night. Water from the river and swollen creeks
combined with the water already running in the streets of downtown and the West
Side to create a fast-moving, twenty-foot-high, half-mile-wide surge of water that
destroyed hundreds of homes and killed an unknown number of people. 46 When
the water finally receded, a zone two miles long and a half-mile wide had been
destroyed, with buildings swept away and human and animal corpses buried
among the massive piles of debris. 47 According to the New York Times, the path
of destruction included the "heart of the business section ... as well as the thickly
populated west side, where today thousands of Mexicans are homeless and the
dead not yet counted." 48 Poorly-constructed hovels and rickety tenements had no
chance of holding up against the flood waters, turning the segregated barrio of the
West Side into a temporary flood basin that assured heavy loss of life.
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Ninth Ward of New Orleans or the hillside slums surrounding Caracas, Rio de
Janeiro, and Mexico City, the Chicano West Side remained under the constant
threat of natural disaster. 5° Political elites ignored these hazards, however,
because the area's population was deemed racially and economically
inconsequential. 51
These same rains trailed death behind them outside of San Antonio as
well. In Williamson and Milam counties, north of Austin, more than a hundred
died when the San Gabriel River burst its banks and flooded surrounding lowlying areas. Almost all of the dead were Mexican and Mexican American migrant
farm workers forced to live in temporary housing in the lowlands along the rivers
and tributaries in the region. In the crossroads town of Thorndale sixty-five
bodies were recovered, all of them Mexican or Mexican American. On a single
farm near Elm Grove twenty-nine Mexican farm workers died. Only two Anglos
died in these Central Texas floods. 52 Similar to their brethren in San Antonio,
these Mexican and Mexican American farm workers had, in the words of Mike
Antonio is exaggerated. The loss of life is less than fifty .... The city is able to care for itself and
does not need outside help." "Outside Aid Not Needed, San Antonio Mayor Wires," New York
Times (September 12, 1921). Another questionable decision made by the city government was the
installation of wooden blocks coated in asphalt on many of the busiest streets downtown shortly
before the 1921 flood. The streets of Philadelphia used the same materials, but in a city as floodprone as San Antonio it was just a matter of time before the blocks, much lighter than normal
paving stones, floated away to serve as projectiles to batter people and buildings caught within the
flood waters.
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Davis, "little choice but to live with disaster." 53 Such was the logical conclusion
of the practice of segregation in South Texas.

***
The political domination wielded by farm interests allowed them to
institute and enforce the residential and educational segregation that both reflected
and maintained the caste-like social separation between Chicanos and Anglos in
South Texas. But their financial and political success bred anxiety. As farm
workers became more mobile and extended their seasonal migrations well beyond
the state borders of Texas, farm owners and their allies in South Texas worried
that their low-wage surplus labor pool could disappear, drawn away by promises
of higher wages elsewhere. In the midst of spectacular growth in their own farm
profits, they worried that sugar beet corporations, northern manufacturing
concerns, the enhanced availability of cheap automobiles, and a number of other
factors had begun to sow the seeds of the collapse of agriculture in South Texas.
Whether these concerns emerged out of paranoia, greed, or legitimate concerns
over the sustainability of the growth of the boom years, South Texas
agriculturalists looked to immobilize these workers to make sure that harvest
surpluses never disappeared and that wages stayed low. Throughout the 19l0s
and 1920s, farmers and politicians experimented with a number of methods to
achieve these goals, leading them to create a wide array of measures designed to
undercut and erase the free labor rights of Mexican and Mexican farm workers.
As David Montejano has argued, "This desire for cheap but temporary
labor, however, entailed an internal tension. Temporary wage labor meant that
53
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laborers had to be mobile. Mobility for the laborer, in tum, meant that Mexicans
could work for the highest bidder for their labor." 54 Farmers did not want to live
up to the reciprocal requirements of traditional patron-client relationships, so they
devised labor controls that sought to undercut the migratory reality of agricultural
labor while maintaining by any means necessary the low wages that made
agriculture in South Texas so profitable. What emerged, according to Montejano,
was an "inchoate web of labor controls in rural Texas: a varied county response to
the Mexican labor problem and the absence of an inter-county organization which
could co-ordinate the movement of Mexican labor. This labor repression in Texas
consisted of a set of ineffective and inefficient labor controls." 55
The level of sophistication of these measures varied, with methods
reminiscent of slavery existing side-by-side with much more subtle, legallysanctioned schemes of guaranteeing seasonal labor surpluses without the messy
problems that came along with bondage. Peonage remained the most basic
method of controlling labor, and its use continued throughout the farm boom of
the 1910s and 1920s. It obviously carried a number of liabilities with it, but with
unquestioned political and economic dominance within their home counties, many
farmers viewed forms of bondage as a simple way to guarantee overabundant
labor, even if it lacked the elegance of the schemes used elsewhere. Some local
variants of this pattern included whipping or other forms of physical abuse. 56
Such was the treatment described, and seemingly justified, by a Dimrnit County
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resident to Paul Taylor: "The old frontiersmen think nothing of killing a Mexican .
. . . They used to say, 'kill them off on payday and get some more Mexicans. "'57
Likewise, workers who tried to leave farms in Gonzales County (between San
Antonio and Austin) before the harvest ended found themselves chained to a post
and guarded by men with shotguns. 58
Others, however, maintained the threat of violence without actually
resorting to physical coercion. The conspicuous presence of heavily armed
guards was ubiquitous throughout rural Texas, as well as in the centers of
recruitment like San Antonio and Laredo. Contractors and farmers feared the
enticement of their workers en route to the farms, leading them to borrow tactics
from the armed guards of southern prison farms or the overseers of the slave
plantations. 59 One emigrant from J alisco described these measures as practiced in
Nueces County:
We were supposed to be paid $1.50 a hundred pounds for picking cotton,
but we received only $4 or $5 a week in cash. We were paid partly in
money and partly in credit at the ranch store, and the prices at the store
were high. Some of my friends left, and caused much disgust to the
farmer. So they gathered the rest of us in the garage and posted the
mayordomo at the door with a rifle. Then the owner came with a pistol
and threatened to kill any man who left. 60
While this man eventually left the N ueces County farm, he later took a job as a
sharecropper on halves at another cotton farm in the same county, but was driven
from his tract before picking without any pay after a disagreement with the
owner's wife. Rather than fall victim to these practices again, he simply returned
57
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to Mexico. 61 More subtle than these methods in Nueces County, but seemingly
also less successful, were the practices described by a former labor scout for
farmers near Laredo: "We used to take their shoes and hats and put them in
another house, but they got away from us anyway in 1919, and we used to even
guard each door of the houses they slept in on a big farm. We used to put wives
separate from the husbands, but the men left their wives to come north." 62
In many areas, however, a more subtle, if no less coercive, system of labor
controls emerged that drew on the connivance of political and law enforcement
officials ignoring blatant violations of a number of laws. One early example of
this occurred with the construction of a dam on the Medina River, forty miles
west of San Antonio, for irrigation purposes at the very beginning of the farm
boom in 1911 and 1912. 63 The Alamo Cement Company of San Antonio
recruited workers from Mexico in direct violation of the alien contract labor law
for both the production of cement and the construction of the dam for the Medina
Dam and Irrigation Company. According to a labor contractor who later
contacted the Department of Justice to report illegal activities by his competitors,
the labor agency hired by Alamo Cement and the Medina Company "had no
difficulty getting the men across, because he tipped the guards who were named
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'Frenchy' and Benavides" at Laredo. 64 Despite this testimony, but not
surprisingly, there was no prosecution for violation of contract labor law. 65
In addition, however, the Department of Justice received complaints of
violations of anti-peonage statutes at the Medina Dam shortly after they first
investigated the immigration issues. The Mexican Consul General at San
Antonio, Manuel Esteva, reported instances of peonage at the Medina site. The

Carrizo Springs Javelin registered its typical acerbic denunciation of any attempt
to protect Mexicans:
The Mexican consul at San Antonio is registering a large kick on the
treatment he alleges his unfortunate countrymen receive from the large
contractors of labor, and we understand that he has appealed to the state
department for redress. He states that the Mexicans are held in a state of
peonage, and are maltreated in other ways. The Medina dam contractors
are among the people complained of. In this immediate section it is a hard
job to get the hombres to do the work they are paid for, much less get
them to do work they are not paid for. We might file a complaint with the
consul to see if that situation might not be relieved also. 66
These reports from the Consul General went to the assistant U.S. Attorney in San
Antonio, Charles Cresson, who ignored the case and reported to Justice
Department Special Agents that there was no merit in the peonage cases. 67 In
addition to his position as assistant U.S. Attorney, however, Cresson was also the
Second Vice President of, chief counsel for, and stockholder in the Medina Dam
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and Irrigation Company. 68 By the time the Justice Department even discovered
these conflicts of interest the construction of the dam ended and Cresson was free
to enjoy the profits flowing out of the irrigation works made possible by his
shielding of the company from possible prosecution. In such a situation, it was
hard, if not impossible, to determine where farm enterprises ended and the
supposed guarantors of political order began. Cresson and the Medina Dam were
just one of many examples of that peculiar brand of Lone Star "democracy" that
endured beyond the farm boom of the early twentieth century to still infect the
state to this day with endless examples of shady transactions, insider trading, and
unsavory deal-making. 69
A related method of labor control relied on timely and racially-determined
enforcement of vagrancy laws, again reminiscent of labor practices in the cotton
belt of the Southeast.

70

The best example of this system operated in Willacy

County, just north of Cameron County in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. In what
came to be known as the "Raymondville Peonage Cases" the outlines of a plan
emerged in which farmers and the top officials of the county government
conspired to immobilize farm workers. The farmers contracted laborers under
terms that changed once they arrived in Willacy County. Those who refused to
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work, similar to the case of Elias Garza at the beginning of this chapter, were
arrested for vagrancy and charged twice the cost of their transportation. Those
arrested were then forced to work off their debt by picking cotton, under armed
guard, for the farmer who originally recruited them. Willacy County officials
supplemented this labor supply by also arresting any farm laborers unfortunate
enough to be caught traveling through the county during harvest season. In
addition, there was also a "pass system" during the harvest that forbade any farm
worker from leaving the county without the permission of the farm-owners. Not
surprisingly, vagrancy charges and convict labor followed violation of the pass
law for anyone unlucky enough to get caught up within this machinery of
peonage. Thus, the cotton farmers of Willacy County had a virtually free work
force that was legally-sanctioned through the connivance of county law
enforcement. Almost all of these "vagrants" were Mexicans or Mexican
Americans, but a few Anglos found themselves caught within this web. In fact,
the prosecutions that eventually ended this system arose out of two Anglos
arrested for vagrancy and put to work in the fields. 71
The prosecutions of the Willacy County peonage cases sent chills
throughout South Texas. Reactions often echoed the feeling that growers "have
to watch out for the peonage law now, so it almost requires a lawyer to keep out
of the laws." 72 Another respondent, quick to forget the nature of the prosecutions,
complained, "We feel we need some sort of law to protect us. The Mexican ought
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to have to live up to his contract; it wouldn't hurt labor." 73 Another man
complained that famters "ought to be able to make them work out their debt. The
peonage cases were extreme. There was a labor shortage in 1926. They don't
generally do that."

74

Beyond this collective hand-wringing, however, angry

farmers found the time to beat one of the primary witnesses for the prosecution
outside his home in Raymondville, and then throw a party for the sheriff of
Willacy County upon his release from prison. 75
Taken together, these methods of immobilizing labor certainly
inconvenienced and probably intimidated many workers, but they did little to stop
worker mobility. As the Willacy County system hummed along during the boom
years of the 1920s, tens of thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans left
Texas for employment elsewhere. For those unfortunate enough to find
themselves caught within the web of labor control, however, the system probably
did not seem as porous as it does in hindsight. Even if the system failed in some
respects, it accomplished the ultimate goal of maintaining a region-wide surplus
labor pool without allowing wages to rise.
In addition to measures that targeted the workers themselves, there was
also a parallel set of strictures meant to protect farmers in South Texas from
contractors and labor agents seeking to entice workers away with promises of
higher wages. Like the methods for stripping workers of their rights to free labor,
anti-enticement schemes varied from simple to complex, from covering single
farms to operating statewide. At the local level, anti-enticement efforts often
73
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resulted in simple threats to labor contractors, sometimes of the verbal variety. 76
In most cases, these measures were informal just as often as not, enforced by
individual farmers or farmers' associations rather than by means of law
enforcement (though we have already seen how difficult it can be to differentiate
between the two). 77
By the mid-1920s, however, the increased attention paid to South Texas
labor by northern agricultural and manufacturing interests, combined with
demands to maintain the growth in the agricultural economy, created intense
pressures to protect these farmers against the poaching of labor agents. 78 One
example of these conflicts unfolded between 1926 and 1929 in the Winter
Garden. Farming developed later around the town of Catarina than in the rest of
the region. Its late settlement and development meant that its population was
almost entirely made up of recent arrivals from the North. When production
around Catarina reached substantial levels around 1926, these farmers drew much
of their labor from nearby towns, primarily Asherton and its longer-settled
population, through Mexican American labor contractors. The farmers of
Asherton complained, "Part of the trouble is due to the northern people with
money and big acreages who don't know how to handle the Mexicans like the
southerners. They offer them too high wages. The Mexicans are not cheap labor
76
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any more." 79 Another complained that the "northerners who settled here were
somewhat shocked at the $1 and $1.25 a day wages. The Mexicans are worth
only about $1.25, but the Mexican contractors are shrewd, and they steam them
up to pay more." 80 To stop the exodus of their workers to the distant fields twelve
miles away in Catarina, the Asherton growers turned to the state judiciary. "We
got an injunction from Judge Mullally in Laredo against Mexican contractors of
Catarina who were paid big bonuses to come and get our labor," explained an
Asherton resident, before incorrectly asserting, "There's a law in Texas against
taking labor out of a community where there's a shortage there." 81 Examining
this episode, Paul Taylor noted, "This reliance on some device hampering to one's
competitor and to the movement of labor is characteristic in south Texas." 82
While northerners in their midst certainly alarmed the farmers of South
Texas, much more frightening for them were the northern agricultural and
industrial concerns who transported their workers far beyond the borders of the
state, with the sugar beet corporations as public enemy number one. 83 Growers
and politicians in Texas were unanimous in arguing loudly that the increased
poaching of labor by northern interests and their labor contractors threatened the
continued expansion, even the very existence, of the agricultural economy of
South Texas. The Texas Farm Placement Service, looking back on these years,
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declared that blame for this situation lay with labor contractors: "He had no
regard for seasonal needs of Texas farmers. If he could persuade the migrants to
start for the Michigan beet fields or elsewhere, so much the worse for Texas
farmers if the labor supply was short. The emigrant agent very soon became one
of the most serious problems in Texas labor." 84 Others put the blame on the
northern interests who employed both the contractors and the workers, such as a
Texas farmer who testified before the House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization in 1926: "Whenever the beet growers of the various States of the
Union come to south Texas for laborers to harvest their crops, they are taking
them away from us, leaving us in an even worse condition than before, when they
could find a supply of labor in eastern cities for their beet fields." 85
In the 1920s these fears of contractors run-amok combined with strong
efforts to limit immigration into the United States, raising fears that the workers
sent north could no longer be replaced by new immigrants if outside political
forces decided to close the border. The Texas Labor Commissioner pointed
toward Mexico as the only source of respite for Texas farmers, arguing, "The
tendency on the part of farm labor to leave agricultural pursuits for wage
opportunities afforded in commercial and industrial centers is fast approaching a
tragedy and farmers complain they are unable to meet competitive wage scales
offered in the urban labor markets. This can only be remedied and is being
remedied by hiring Mexican labor whose standard of living is far below the
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American worker." 86 Therefore, with their immigrant workforce now threatened,
Texas farmers and politicians looked to outlaw the contracting of labor for
employment in other states. 87
These efforts culminated in the Emigrant Labor Agency Law of 1929. 88
Supported by the American Federation of Labor, the South Texas Chamber of
Commerce, the Winter Garden Chamber of Commerce, and a number of other
groups interested in keeping Mexican and Mexican American workers in Texas,
the law was introduced by A.P. Johnson, the state representative from Carrizo
Springs. 89 The original version of the law charged a $7,500 occupation tax to any
contractor wishing to send workers out of Texas, thereby criminalizing all nonlicensed contracting. In addition, county taxes and the required posting of a
$5,000 return bond for each worker in the counties of recruitment added
additional substantial financial obstacles. 90 A federal court soon struck down the
$7,500 fee after Michigan sugar beet corporations petitioned, but the legislature
quickly replaced it with a $1,000 occupation tax. 91
The proponents of this law believed that Texas and its farmers had a
natural right to Mexican workers that superseded the needs or rights of the rest of
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the nation. 92 In an illuminating statement, the Emigrant Labor Agency Law's
chief sponsor, A.P. Johnson, justified the bill on the grounds of these supposed
rights, while also clearly pointing to the threat of the eventual end of emigration
from Mexico: "It is the same situation as where you have had a stream of water
running through your ranch. If someone turns its source off you want to put up a
dam to hold what you have got.'m Similarly, a Nueces County farmer declared,
"We got a law passed to keep the Mexicans in Texas and out of the beets. The
border states need a temporary passport from Mexicans; put a boundary on
Texas."94 In theory, then, Texas farmers had insulated themselves for the time
being from both out-of-state labor migrations and the looming threat of
immigration restrictions on Mexicans.
In practice, however, the Emigrant Labor Agency Law was not the

insurmountable obstacle hoped for by its proponents. According to J.R.
Steelman, the Director of Mediation for the U.S. Department of Labor under
Franklin Roosevelt,
[The Emigrant Labor Agency Law] is circumvented in several ways,
chiefly by the "grapevine." In this the labor agents merely stop in at gas
stations and pool rooms and spread the word that much work at fine wages
is to be had in such and such a place. It is amazingly effective. Agents
are also posted at highway junctions to "direct the flow" to the cotton
areas needing labor. Signs are put up along the highways. Newspaper
advertisements are extensively used, and bring some results. 95
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In addition, the law included a loophole that exempted "private" contractors,
meaning those who worked for only one client, from the law. Thus, labor agents
like Frank Cortez avoided paying occupational taxes and return bonds because
they only worked for a single employer, even though that corporation might
provide thousands of workers to dozens of growers. 96 Finally, in the words of
Carey McWilliams, the "principal consequence of this law was to make of out-ofstate recruitment a kind of illegal, underground conspiracy." 97 The law had the
effect of making the already harrowing passage north even more dangerous for
the workers themselves, as contractors now sought more than ever to hide their
activities from state authorities. In the end, the law was "harassing, but it presents
no insuperable barrier to sugar beet or other companies' shipping thousand of
laborers out of Texas," according to Paul Taylor. 98 The best indication of the
ineffectiveness of the law came in 1940, however, when T. Y. Collins, an official
of the Texas Bureau of Labor, announced that the state had yet to collect any
occupational taxes from labor contractors. 99
More importantly, however, the Emigrant Agency Law made clear the
racial assumptions underlying Texas labor law. As David Montejano has argued,
"The political situation for the Mexicans in Texas ... appeared quite ominous.
With 85% of the State's migratory labor force composed of Mexicans, the thrust
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of these labor laws was unequivocally clear; they were in essence a set of racial
labor controls." 100
The Emigrant Agency Law, despite its sieve-like enforcement capacity,
was the logical conclusion of the political and agricultural developments of the
1910s and 1920s. It served as both a reflection of and integral element in the
construction of the caste system of South Texas. The self-reinforcing collusion of
farmer and politician placed the state firmly behind growers' interests in every
regard, and the wellbeing of both groups depended on the construction of a
system that stripped political power from Mexicans and Mexican Americans as a
means to immobilize and exploit them. The Emigrant Agency Law serves as the
ultimate symbol of the dominance of farming interests in the political, social, and
economic realms.
More importantly, it symbolized the political ascendance of a South Texas
model of labor relations that combined a racially-segmented job market with a
clear denial of the basic rights of choice and mobility for Mexicans and Mexican
Americans. While the rural South featured many of the same strictures - antienticement laws and racial job market segmentation most obviously- the constant
flow of migrants from Mexico set South Texas apart. Not only could South Texas
growers replenish their labor supplies almost at will, but they were able to erase
the need for tenants and sharecroppers. Their workforce came from the migrant
stream of Mexicans and Mexican Americans that stretched from northern Mexico
to the US Midwest. Despite the shortcomings of the web of labor controls, its
ability to immobilize workers seasonally even as new ~igrants continued to come
100
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from Mexico helped create a unique model of labor relations dependent on
foreign workers and the denial of basic labor rights.
Anti-enticement laws, however, only dealt with interstate migration of
Mexicans and Mexican Americans. South Texas growers also feared losing their
access to workers coming from Mexico. This threat proved to be much more
complicated and forced the growers and politicians of Texas to side with their
mortal enemies in the sugar beet industry as both groups took to the hustings to
denounce immigration restriction.
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Chapter 5: Nativism, Nationalism, and the Evolution of
Immigration/Emigration Policy on Both Sides of the Rio Grande
"If things are good here in the United States we come to work, if they are better in

Panama, or Colombia, or Peru, tomorrow or the next day we will go down there. We
are here only for a short time. When things get well in Mexico we go there not only
because the work is good but also because that is our home and final resting place."
Anonymous Track Laborer'
On New Year's Eve, 1918, Harlingen land speculator F.Z. Bishop wrote
a letter to Senator Morris Sheppard (D-TX), co-author of the 18 1h Amendment
and national standard-bearer of the prohibitionists. Bishop had no liquor-related
concerns, however. He wrote, instead, to demand the Senator's help in securing
labor from Mexico. "There is a greater demand than ever before for common
Mexican labor in the Lower Rio Grande Valley," he claimed. Mexicans
represented "the only class of labor that can be secured to prepare raw land for
cultivation." Unfortunately, wrote Bishop, "it seems that the present restrictions
governing Mexican immigration, instead of being removed altogether, as in our
opinion they should be, are about to be made more severe." The culprits were
clear: "Organized labor in this country has used its influence to prevent
common labor from moving freely into the border counties of Texas, although
in those counties organized labor is not very strong, and further, it is commonly
known that organized labor would not be affected to the slightest degree by
unrestricted movement of Mexican farm labor into this country." Bishop
pleaded that the Senator eliminate all restrictions against Mexican entry into the
United States because, "We, as well as others who are developing this country,
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are facing a serious shortage of common farm labor, which is retarding the
development of the resources of the Valley ." 2
Bishop objected to federal efforts in the 1910s and 1920s to establish a
comprehensive immigration code that began to systematize and limit who could
and should enter the United States. These new laws replaced the patchwork
immigration and border control regulations established during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
the Foran Act of 1886, and a series of additional laws in the early 1900s deemed
Asians, foreign contract laborers, anarchists, prostitutes, the diseased, and
anyone "likely to become a public charge" unfit for entry. 3 While these ad hoc
laws did little to standardize US immigration regulation, they created a
momentum for restrictionism that sought to maintain the logic of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and to extend its spirit to other undesirables.
These new laws also necessitated the creation of an apparatus of
regulation. In addition to the older processing centers such as Ellis Island and
Angel Island on each coast, the Immigration Service also established a series of
new border stations along the land borders with Mexico and Canada. The
newly created Border Patrol guarded the border region beyond the actual ports
of entry and augmented the enforcement capacity of the Immigration Service.
Finally, the introduction of documents such as passports and visas verified
citizenship and helped to further systematize and regularize the entry process.
2
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Meanwhile, agriculturalists across the nation continued to clamor for
more laborers while this architecture of immigration restriction rose all around
them. Their demands collided with the growth of militant nativism that focused
on the specter of a flood of illiterate common laborers descending upon the
United States. 4 Between 1917 and the beginning of the Great Depression, when
political nativism and the South Texas farm boom both reached their respective
high-water marks, each side waged unrelenting battle to ensure that their
conception of proper immigration controls would regulate who could and
should enter the United States.

***
The first step toward a new, systematic immigration code came with the
Immigration Act of 1917. The law doubled the head tax for entry to eight
dollars per person and added a literacy test (in their native language) for heads
of household, while maintaining all of the older restrictions. 5 Along the USMexico border, many applicants immediately withdrew their applications.
Presumably, many of these simply entered as undocumented migrants across the
largely unguarded southern border. 6 Not surprisingly, the growers of South
Texas, in the process ofbuilding their agricultural empires in 1917, angrily
decried the legislation. Picking up their old refrain that they had an inherent
right to Mexican labor, the growers fretted that the immigration restrictions
would ruin them. The Department of Labor, the Immigration Service,
4
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Congressmen, and Senators received an almost endless stream of letters and
telegrams from farmers and others in Texas who demanded an end to
immigration restrictions. 7 A mine manager in Central Texas, for instance, wrote
to Senator Charles Culberson of Texas that it was "the 'hewers of wood and
carriers of water' class of Mexicans that we are after." In other words, he and
other employers wanted precisely the sort of immigrants the head tax and
literacy test were meant to exclude. "Lots of these Mexicans are in Mexico
today and want to return to Texas but can not," he complained. "All labor in
every line is very short, and scarce, high prices are being paid, and you cannot
get the labor because the labor is just simply not there." 8 Similar urgent pleas
for help came from all over Texas, as Chambers of Commerce, often
rechristened as Councils of Defense, begged for more labor from Mexico. 9
This pressure quickly had its intended result. Eighteen days after the
immigration act went into effect on May 5, the Secretary of Labor bowed to
these insistent calls for increased immigration on May 23, 1917. He issued a
departmental order that suspended the literacy test, head tax, and contract labor
exclusion for Mexican agricultural workers due to "an emergent condition,
7
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caused by the war."

10

By July 1918 these exemptions to the immigration law

also covered workers leaving Mexico for work on the railroads, in any mining
enterprise, or construction work in any of the four border states, despite the
concerns of the Director-General of the Immigration Service that the decision
"to permit industries other than agricultural to avail themselves of such supply
of common labor as can be obtained in Mexico (the even approximate amount
of which is altogether problematical) is quite likely so to deplete the supply
available to the agricultural interests as to interfere materially in the direct
production of the foodstuffs." 11
A few years later the Secretary of Labor gave further reason for these
exemptions in a letter to Samuel Gompers. Explaining the necessity of his
actions, he wrote:
You are aware of the strong pressure that has been brought to bear upon
the Government to reverse its settled policy as regards Asiatic labor, and
to let down the barriers raised by legislation, for the purpose of
permitting the wholesale importation of such labor under the plea of
war-time necessity. The Department is of the belief that the action taken
by it to meet the real emergency that existed, through the utilization of
the labor of Mexico, the Bahamas and Jamaica (as well as that of our
own possession, Porto Rico), has been to a large extent the means of
relieving the pressure mentioned. 12
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In other words, Secretary Wilson justified his decision as the lesser evil that
would placate the agriculturalists without allowing the reintroduction of Chinese
immigration, the old bogeyman of craft unionists.
Employers hoping to take advantage of these exceptions filed an
application with either the Immigration Service or the United State Employment
Service stating the number of workers needed, the "class of work," wages
offered, and place of employment. 13 Upon acceptance of the application, the
US Employment Service admitted the laborers from Mexico, photographed each
of them for identification purposes, and turned them over to the employer. The
Labor Department made it clear that these exemptions, and the workers
admitted under them, were only temporary. As a means of ensuring that these
immigrants did not remain in the United State permanently under these
exemptions, the Department administered a hold-back scheme whereby
employers withheld twenty-five cents for each day of employment up to a
maximum of one hundred dollars, after which the employer withheld one dollar
each month for the duration of the immigrant's time in the United States.
Employers then sent this money via postal money orders to the Inspector in
Charge at the immigrant's place of entry, who deposited the money in a postal
savings bank in the name of the immigrant. The exempted laborer received
these withheld wages from the bank when they left the country. 14 Any worker
who did not return to Mexico at the end of this employment forfeited these
13
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earned wages. These hold-backs also allowed the Immigration Service to
maintain approximate knowledge of the location of each contracted worker
through the money orders.
During the first year of this program of exemptions, 9,401 Mexicans
entered the United States to work, but farmers complained that this system still
damaged their interests.

15

They sought the removal of all restrictions on

immigration from Mexico, complaining that the temporary admission system
established by the Department of Labor was too time-consuming and
bureaucratic. At the head of the forces seeking to compel the Department of
Labor to drop all regulations was Herbert Hoover, then head of the United
States Food Administration, who waged a persistent campaign to convince
Woodrow Wilson and the Department of Labor to ignore the Immigration Act
of 1917 when it came to the entry of Mexicans. In June 1918 he complained to
Felix Frankfurter, then Assistant to the Secretary of Labor, "There are several
restrictions in force which are handicapping the movement of Mexican labor
north across the border." 16 He called for an end to the hold-back scheme,
because it "is bad, as it is deducted from his wage and further, we do not want
him to retum." 17 Expanding on this point, Hoover grumbled, "There also exists
a clause providing that he must return in six months and, although this period is
possible of extension, the restriction should be waived so that there is no limit
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on his stay in the states."

18

The required photographs also aroused Hoover's ire,

as he claimed that Mexicans "have a primitive suspicion of the camera" causing
many to abandon hopes to immigrate because of their fear of photography.
Finally, he called for an end to the requirement that "farmers must meet and
contract with the laborer at the border. We hope to overcome this by having
special representatives make these contacts at Brownsville, Eagle Pass, Laredo,
and El Paso." 19 In conclusion, Hoover declared, "We need every bit of this
labor that we can get and we need it badly and ... we will need it for years to
come." 20
One week later the Secretary of Labor replied to Hoover's entreaty.
Referring to Hoover's complaint that the entry of Mexican workers should be
permanent, Secretary Wilson reminded Hoover that "this Department is
confronted with provisions of law which absolutely exclude from permanent
entry to the United States a vast majority of the ordinary laborers that live in the
Republic of Mexico."

21

He deflected the rest of Hoover's objections in the

same manner:
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Most of these laborers are illiterate; the law does not permit an illiterate
alien to enter permanently. In the nature of things they must come into
the United States at the present time under contract or in pursuance of
some kind of an agreement or arrangement to be placed at employment they could not get here otherwise, for most of them are poverty stricken;
and the law mandatorily excludes from permanent admission what is
described therein as "a contract laborer". The law assesses a head tax of
$8.00 each on aliens entering this country for permanent residence; and
many of these persons would not know where to tum to raise that
amount. It is necessary also to adopt a certain not too cumbersome
method of identification and of keeping account of their movements
after admission - one that can be relied upon to locate the men after the
need for their services no longer exists and enable the Department to put
them back into Mexico if they do not return of their own volition. 22
While he assured Hoover that his department would "do everything within its
power and its authority under the law to further the production and conservation
of foodstuffs," Secretary Wilson closed his letter with a subtle rebuke to Hoover
and his agricultural allies: "The Mexican border, it is the consensus of opinion
of the Departments, is the weakest point in our line of defense so far as
espionage, the carrying and securing of military information, and similar
patterns are concemed." 23 In other words, even though he declared exemptions
to the Immigration Act of 1917 within a few days of its enactment as a wartime
emergency measure, he clearly agreed with the nativist contention that the
government needed to throw up obstacles to impede permanent migration to the
United States, even if he couched it in the all-too-familiar language of national
defense and protection from subversion.
A chorus of other voices joined with Hoover, however, and increased the

pressure on the Department of Labor and the Immigration Service to completely
22
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ignore the Immigration Act of 1917. Many of these supplicants demurred that
their calls for Mexican labor were "written with as much, or more patriotism, as
it is for personal interests," asking only that the government remove "an
obstacle which hampers one of the greatest needs of our Country today." 24
Telegrams from across Texas poured in, pleading "as a 'win the war' measure
that all restrictions against Mexican labor be lifted except health regulations." 25
More florid was the entreaty from the owner of the Landa Flour Mill in New
Braunfels (30 miles north of San Antonio) who complained, "We would
certainly be stultifying ourselves after heeding the instructions from the
President and the Food Administration to cultivate every available inch of land,
and being blessed with these splendid rains which will realize the dreams of this
drought stricken country for large and abundant crops, if all of this should
perish just at a time when most needed, simply through lack of physical help. " 26
The only responsible thing for the government to do, he wrote, was to end all
immigration restrictions on Mexicans, "the only hope and main stay of this
country as far as labor is concerned." He declared that securing this labor was
"one of the most important and vital war measures for the relief of this part of
the country." 27
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When World War I ended in November 19l8, however, the reason for
the Mexican exemptions disappeared. 28 The next month, on December 15,
1918, Secretary Wilson ended the exemptions. Importations continued until
January 15, 1919, while all agricultural workers already in the United States
were permitted to stay until the end of the next growing season. 29 Not
surprisingly, the looming reinstitution of the head tax and literacy test prompted
a storm of protest from agricultural interests around the nation. Sugar beet
corporations screamed that they had expanded their operations during the war
years at the "urgent request of the Food Administration," and they demanded
that the Secretary of Labor continue the exemptions to reward them for their
profit patriotism. 30 Texas growers echoed the same sentiments. Despite these
protests, however, the Department of Labor allowed the exemptions to lapse in
early 1919. Thus, beginning in 1919, Mexicans and their prospective employers
either had to abide by the letter of recent immigration law or ignore it and
assume that enforcement would be lax.

***
While the end of World War I led agriculturalists across the nation to
plead for an end to the specific immigration regulations that they found
28
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inconvenient, the aftermath of the war also witnessed a dramatic increase in
aggressive nationalism that culminated in the passage of far more restrictive
legislation in the 1920s that drastically expanded the ability of the federal
government to exclude new immigrants. The momentum that allowed for the
passage of the literacy test in the Immigration Act of 1917 only grew, as both
political parties clamored to appease the interests of nativists eager to stop the
increasing entries of immigrants they deemed degenerate and overly swarthy.
While Mexico and the rest of the Western Hemisphere remained exempt from
the most exclusionary elements of these new laws, the Immigration Acts of
1921 and 1924 did have profound effects on Mexican immigration as they
helped to cast movement across the southern border of the United States as the
quintessential act of illegal migration.
The reasons for this upsurge in nativism, according to John Higham,
"lay in the objective circumstance of 1920. That year, as part of a general
adjustment to peacetime conditions, two factors which time and again in
American history had encouraged anti-foreign outbreaks vividly reappeared.
One was economic depression, the other a fresh wave of immigration." 31 In
addition, the aftermath of World War I created a worldwide trend toward
exclusion that arose in reaction to the massive refugee populations created by
the devastation of the war. 32 As historian Mae N gai has argued, "the
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international system that emerged with World War I gave primacy to the
territorial integrity of the nation-state, which raised the borders between
nations," with the consequence that issues of citizenship, always at the root of
any claim for inherent rights, became cemented more firmly and ineluctably to
the nation-state.

33

Stricter exclusionary immigration measures severely limited

the rights which any non-citizen could claim within any nation-state. For
Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States, whose rights and
citizenship had long been ignored, these trends did not portend a positive future.
As Congress and the nativists formulated the legislation to bring these
exclusionary ideals into reality, the tenuous nature of Mexican existence within
the United States was again illustrated as the economic downturn of 1920-1921
led to a deportation drive that sought to expel those immigrants who overstayed
their exemptions as well as any others deemed "a menace to the peace of the
community."

34

A few hundred thousand left the United States, many of their

own accord as unemployment sky-rocketed, but many others found themselves
involuntarily deported.

35

Especially vulnerable were Mexicans in places like

Chicago and Detroit as the Immigration Bureau launched a nationwide sweep of
urban areas in 1921, deporting any Mexicans who could not provide proof of
permanent residence in the United States. 36 Not only did this deportation
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campaign serve as a preview of the massive repatriation campaigns of the Great
Depression, but it also served as proof for some that Mexican immigration was
substantively different than from other nations because it could be reversed and
pushed back south of the border just as easily as it had first begun. The belief
that Mexicans were both economically necessary and easily discarded had much
to do with the exclusion of Mexico from the immigration quotas in 1921, 1924,
and after.
There were certainly individuals and groups who wanted Mexico and the
rest of the Western Hemisphere placed under quota restrictions, but they often
found themselves on the defensive against powerful agribusiness interests who
vigorously lobbied to limit the severity of proposed legislation. Sugar beet
corporations, South Texas growers, and others dependent on the labor of
Mexicans argued that quotas would not only decimate their workforce, but were
entirely unnecessary in the context of Mexican immigration. On many counts,
the restrictionists and anti-restrictionists shared the same beliefs in the racial
degeneracy of Mexicans, but their conclusions as to its meaning differed. In the
words of historian David Gutierrez, "Arguing in all seriousness that Mexicans
had an ingrained homing instinct like that of migratory birds, western lobbyists
repeatedly assured congressional committees that Mexican workers came to the
United States seeking only to earn a stake before they ultimately returned to
Mexico." 37 John Nance Garner, congressman from South Texas, became one of
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the primary spokesmen for this viewpoint. He constantly reiterated the homing
pigeon analogy and pointed to the circular nature of the interstate migrant
. 38
stream as an 1'11 ustrat10n.

The anti-restrictionist argument rested on the assumption that Mexicans
were not really immigrants at all, but rather temporary sojourners who lacked
the desire or the capacity to enter into US society. They ridiculed the
restrictionist fears that Mexicans would degrade the nation's racial stock, and
instead argued that Mexicans represented the only foreign labor force that did
not represent a social threat. George Clement of the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce argued, "If we cannot get the Mexican to supply ... casual labor, we
have but one place to tum- the Porto Rican negro or as he is commonly known,
'the Portuguese nigger."' Appropriating the language of the nativists, Clements
continued, "I do not think I need to stress the biological problem, particularly in
California and the border states where so many of our people are dark skinned.
[The Puerto Rican] is an American citizen, and once coming to us becomes a
real social problem as well as adding to our American negro problem which is
all ready sufficiently serious enough to have become a national question."
Finally, he asked rhetorically, "Is there any wonder we want to keep our
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Mexican labor?"39 Mexican immigration, according to Clements, kept the
Southwest from repeating the racial problems of the Southeast by carefully
seeking a workforce that supposedly left as suddenly as it appeared.
The anti-restrictionists sought a labor policy rather than an immigration
policy with regards to Mexico. 40 Despite the rising tide of nativism, then, they
shielded their own economic needs from the looming threat of quota restrictions
by turning the nativists' arguments against them, depicting Mexicans as an
inferior group, but one that would remain eternally peripheral to the social and
economic life of the United States. While the argument was far from over in the
early 1920s, for the time being Mexicans remained exempted from quota
restrictions. Still, as Sarah Deutsch has argued, their legal status became that of
the "permanently marginal laborer" whose continued tolerance by Anglos in the
United States required endless work without any efforts at social
improvement. 41 Were these Mexicans to test the limits of their marginality, the
anti-restrictionists explained, rapid deportation would solve the problem. For
proof they pointed to the deportation campaigns of 1920-1921.
As a result, the 1921 and 1924 laws did not specifically limit
immigration from Mexico. Instead, lawmakers focused on Asia and the sources
of the so-called "new immigration" in Europe. They devised quota systems that
drastically reduced the number of admissible immigrants from Eastern and
Southern Europe and outlawed further immigration from Asia (with the
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temporary exception of the Philippines, still a possession of the United States). 42
The literacy test remained in place and the head tax and visa fee increased to
eighteen dollars, so the obstacles constructed across the US-Mexico border by
the Immigration Act of 1917 only grew with the 1921 and 1924 laws. Thus,
while Mexico and the rest of the Western Hemisphere avoided the nativists'
numerical wrath in the early 1920s, these laws exacerbated the issue of illegal
immigration along the nation's southern boundary introduced by the
Immigration Act of 1917.
The 1924law proved especially important in encouraging unauthorized
entry, racializing the image of the illegal alien, and fashioning the law
enforcement reaction to these supposed threats to national sovereignty. As
Manuel Garnio stated in his landmark study of Mexican immigration to the
United States,
The main and immediate reasons for illegal entrance of Mexicans into
the United States, as we could observe personally, and from the
interviewing of a great many Mexican immigrants as well as smugglers,
contractors, employers, etc., are as follows: 1. Difficulties presented by
the immigration laws, of which, as a rule, the Mexican immigrants are
completely ignorant, and which, among other requirements, stipulate
literacy, a condition which many immigrants cannot fulfill. 2. Loss of
time and expense entailed while waiting on the Mexican side during the
unwinding of the long and complicated red tape. 3. The sum paid to the
smuggler is generally smaller than the eighteen dollars needed to cover
the consular visa and the head tax. 4. Individuals whose labor has been
previously contracted for in Mexico cannot legally enter the United
States, so they enter illegally. 43
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Unlike earlier immigrants from Mexico, these new arrivals found themselves
confronted with a new set of obstacles to entry that were often easier avoided
than overcome. As demand for laborers in agriculture and industry grew in the
1920s, the number of illegal entries from Mexico increased apace. "The
immigration laws during the 1920s did not assign numerical quotas to
Mexicans," Mae Ngai has argued, "but the enforcement provisions of restriction
-notably visa requirements and border-control policies- profoundly affected
Mexicans, making them the single largest group of illegal aliens by the late
1920s."44 The vagaries of immigration legislation, then, made the Mexican
immigrant the "prototypical illegal alien." 45
Within these formulations of illegal entry, the newly formed Border
Patrol emerged as the symbolic protectors of the nation from a lawless border
region. Many of the early Border Patrolmen were recruited from the Texas
Rangers, and carried many of the same attitudes about Mexicans that motivated
the Rangers during their decades of trouble-making along the border, earning
the new Border Patrol the hated epithet "rinche" in the folklore and oral
tradition of the border region. 46 A Border Patrol Supervisor reported that it
"took considerable indoctrinating to convince some of the inspectors they were
not chasing outlaws, and we never did get it out of the heads of all of them, for
we had to discharge several for being too rough." 47 They acted as both the
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enforcement mechanism for these laws and the looming specter of violence and
deportation that hovered over illegal entrants as they crossed the border, sought
employment, and attempted to bargain for the improvement of any aspect of
their employment or living conditions.
As a result, according to Mae Ngai, "as numerical restriction assumed
primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspects- inspection procedures,
deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and irregular categories of
immigration- created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants." 48 The
increase in deportations to Mexico during the 1920s created by these changing
laws became proof for many that Mexicans were the most flagrant and
potentially dangerous violators of the law. The unintended consequences of
these laws and their effects on population movements across the US-Mexico
border created the image of a typical unauthorized alien that shrouded the
Mexican and Mexican American populations with the taint of illegality and
illegitimacy. Thus, as Mae Ngai argued, "walking (or wading) across the border
emerged as the quintessential act of illegal immigration, the outermost point in a
relativist ordering of illegal immigration." 49

***
The Immigration Act of 1924 was far from the end of the fight over
quota restrictions, however. Nativists realized that their system still excluded
the Western Hemisphere from the quota system. They worked tirelessly
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throughout the remainder of the 1920s to complete their regime of restriction. 50
The same basic outlines of the debates over the original quota laws continued
during the second half of the 1920s. Restrictionists increased their attack on the
racial suitability of Mexicans, while anti-restrictionists pleaded economic
necessity as they also continued their argument that Mexicans possessed an
inherent homing instinct that made their eventual expulsion possible. Now that
immigration policy for Europe and Asia had been decided, however, the
intensity of the argument only grew as one side sought to patch the largest hole
in the quota laws, while the other fought to maintain the labor source they
deemed necessary for continued growth and low wages.
The leader of the restrictionist forces in Congress, and therefore the
nemesis of southwestern growers, was Congressman John Box of East Texas. 5 1
Restricting immigration from the Western Hemisphere, especially Mexico,
obsessed Box during his twelve year tenure in the House of Representatives
from 1919-1931. From his seat on the Immigration and Naturalization
Committee, Box tried to secure the passage of a bill that would extend the quota
to the entire Western Hemisphere, first submitting a bill to the committee
shortly after the passage of the 1924 quota law. In 1926, at the urging of Box,
the committee held hearings on the matter, and both sides of the quota debate
arrived in Washington ready for battle.

50

Higham, Strangers in the Land, 325.
Box's district was an old cotton-raising region struggling to compete with the cotton growers
of South Texas and their Mexican workforce, so restrictionist sentiment was much higher in that
region than elsewhere in the state.
51

199
The growers came to the hearings claiming to have already suffered
labor shortages due to the effects of the 1924 law. They declared that any
further tightening of the regulations would ruin the nation's agricultural
economy. The majority of their arguments rested on the same basis as they had
a few years earlier. As a Los Angeles Times writer described, "Mexican labor
ebbs and flows over the border as it is needed here," bringing with it a
"minimum of social complexities."52 But during the 1926 hearings the antirestrictionists, made up primarily of southwestern agribusiness and Midwestern
sugar beet corporations, attempted to assuage some of the restrictionists' fears
by calling for the creation of a guest worker program that would only admit
Mexican workers on a temporary basis. While they had complained incessantly
throughout the World War I exemption program, growers clearly feared that the
growth in political nativism threatened immigration from Mexico. They pointed
to the temporary migration programs established by the racial-purity-obsessed
Germans as a potential model, under which thousands of migrants from Poland
and Lithuania came to work in the sugar beet fields. 53
, Congressman Box and the rest of the restrictionist forces, however,
rejected both the usefulness and legality of such a guest worker program. In
addition to the fact that Box did not think that these temporary migrations would
be as benign as their supporters claimed, he also believed that guest worker
programs violated the spirit of free labor, creating a system no different from
peonage. Thus, the Congressman vehemently rejected the logic of the anti-
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restrictionists' proposal. If the system operated as it should, it would have
created a system that Box deemed unconstitutional, and if temporary entry
became permanent settlement then all of the restrictionists' efforts would have
come to naught. 54
Countering these arguments based on economic necessity, the
restrictionists focused on the racial status of Mexicans. In a study partially
funded by the Department of Labor and published by the House Immigration
and Naturalization Committee, Princeton University Economist Robert Foerster
laid out the case for exclusion on eugenic grounds. He described Mexicans as
"men of few wants, apathetic, without ambition, not concerned with the
future." 55 Further, "no effective democracy resting on universal suffrage can
come quickly in a country whose population is still so retrograde as the Mexican
in the essential prerequisites of democracy." 56 The core of Foerster's
contention, however, lay in his belief that "our control over the future race stock
of the United States will apparently never be greater than it is today," and only
through careful legislative action could the nation avoid the potential damage
done by continued immigration from Latin America. 57 He complained that the
1924 immigration law gave preference "emphatically to immigration from the
brown and black stocks." 58 Further, he continued, "If hereafter every immigrant
from countries and islands lying to the south of the United States were to be
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replaced by an immigrant from approved parts of Europe, nothing but gain
would result for the United States." 59 If these estimations of the capacity of
Mexican immigrants were incorrect, Foerster stated that if "Latin American
stocks have a race value for our civilization substantially above what has been
indicated in this report and that mixture of our stocks with those other stocks,
contrary to the present stage of knowledge, should result in good, there would
still be ample time and opportunity to admit those stocks."60 Until such
usefulness and capacity could be proven, however, Foerster called
unequivocally for the restriction of immigration from Mexico and the rest of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
While these restrictionist arguments certainly enjoyed a wide audience,
the pressure from growers' interests remained too strong for Box's bill to make
it out of committee. Chairman Albert Johnson shared Box's qualms about a
guest work program, which he believed was "a sort of peonage system," but
also believed that some sort of seasonal admissions system had to accompany
any quota arrangement for the Western Hemisphere. 61 Caught in the middle of
these conflicting interests and proposals, the Box bill quietly died in 1926, but
not without drawing more attention to the issue and making John Box the
poster-boy for Mexican immigration restriction.
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Over the next two years mail flooded into Box's office. 62 Some of these
writers opposed the restriction efforts, such as the president of the Navasota
Cooperage Company (in East Texas, north of Houston) who wrote that "you are
very badly in error and evidently are being urged by labor Unions and those that
have not the interest of the farmers and industries at heart. . . . The people in
general, especially the farming class which constitutes a large majority of the
voters have their eyes on their congressmen and Senators more than ever before
and when election time comes around they are going to be remembered. And it
will be well for you and your colleagues to look after the interests of Texans
instead of so many lobbyists." 63 Florence Griswold of the Pan-American Round
Table of San Antonio also scolded Box, writing, "We feel that the Congressmen
of Texas should appreciate the Mexican laborer has always been an asset and
has never proved a menace, and this cannot be said always of the Europeans." 64
These letters opposing restriction efforts were a tiny minority of the mail
received by Box, however.
The vast majority of these letters supported Box's efforts, though the
reasons for supporting restriction varied widely. Some echoed the arguments
made by Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. W.F.
Cottingham, the business manager of the Kleberg and Nueces County District
62
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Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America, wrote that "a great majority of
Mexican Aliens that are allowed to come into Texas to work on the farm soon
find their way into cities and towns where they can get shorter hours and better
wages and soon forget there is a farm in Texas."
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He also claimed that urban

business interests were the real culprits, not agriculturalists, because they sought
more Mexican immigrants as a way to rid themselves of unions and "maintain
themselves as overlords of this vast domain."

66

Similarly, William Black of the

Single Tax League of Texas wrote that continued immigration from Mexico
would only complicate the already difficult land situation in the state, leading to
further consolidation of landholding and a concomitant increase in wage labor
. 67
an d sharecroppmg.

Many more writers supported Box's efforts for racial reasons. Morrison
Swift, radical turned eugenicist, enthusiastically supported the Box bill. "If
every alien were shut out the American population would naturally increase to
supply the labor demand," he wrote. "Manual labor would become as worthy
and dignified as teaching, clerking, and banking, and the impossible problem of
assimilating furnace-baked fossil foreigners who cannot be changed would
disappear. Thereafter we should breed brains in strong physiques instead of
brainlessness in bulk." 68 C.M. Goethe, ardent eugenicist and president of the
California-based Immigration Study Commission, claimed that the "high power
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Mexican white" did not immigrate to the United States. 69 Immigrants came
only from what he termed "low Amerind stocks," and they represented a drastic
threat to the United States because "Mexican Amerind fecundity under
American sanitation would speed the exhaustion of our food supply." 70 Along
the same lines, a man from Houston, who claimed to have lived in Mexico for
many years, wrote, "I would think that a safe estimate would be that at least
95% have blood diseases." 71
The remainder of the letters simply listed varied, often bizarre,
complaints against Mexicans. A San Antonio man complained that "this city is
... lousy with them in cotton time." 72 An Eagle Pass man claimed that
Mexicans "do not stop at the border but go to every state in the Union." 73 A
writer from El Paso declared, "California objected to the Chinese years ago for
no different reasons than is up now as regards the Mexican, yet a law was
passed barring them out, and they are still barred out and rightly, yet an
American born China-Boy for instance is as true an American as one could find
and he wants to be all of that and more." 74 In what seems to have been an
attempted joke, a San Antonio man sneeringly wrote, "The only redeeming
feature the Mex. has they want [to] rape our white women." 75 Finally, a Corpus
Christi man wrote ominously, .. Every one of them in the US should be deported
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... All this would be easier than a Civil War to work out the survival of the
fittest. It will come as surely as your name is Box." 76
The same avalanche of letters arrived at the offices of Chairman Albert
Johnson and the other congressmen on the Immigration and Naturalization
Committee as pressure continued to build to apply quota restrictions to Mexico
and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. As a result, in 1928 the House
Immigration and Naturalization Committee and the Senate Immigration
Committee held a new series of hearings on the Box bill and its Senate
counterpart, introduced by William Harris of Georgia. These bills called for the
quotas enacted in 1924 to apply to the entire Western Hemisphere. Under that
formula, which calculated annua1limits as two percent of the foreign-born
population in the United States in 1890, Mexico would have received 1,500
quota slots. 77 As in 1926, both sides came to Washington ready for a fight.
The arguments remained roughly the same, with the restrictionists
relying on eugenics while the anti-restrictionists claimed economic necessity to
ward off quota restrictions. The restrictionist efforts appeared to be gaining
momentum, with the Department of Labor firmly supporting their position
under the leadership of Secretary James Davis, once described by the journal
Eugenics as "an exponent of restriction along scientific lines." 78 On the other
side, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior supported the antirestrictionists. George C. Kreutzer, the director of reclamation economics in the
Department of the Interior, testified that his department had invested $38
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million in irrigation projects in regions dependent on Mexican labor. He
warned the restrictionists that the "return of the government's investment in
these projects and the prosperity of related industries are dependent on favorable
economic conditions continuing." 79
The most powerful and influential assistance for the anti-restrictionists,
however, came from the Department of State. Secretary Frank Kellogg
complained, 'This Government has questions of a most important and acute
nature pending with Mexico and certain other countries of Latin America." 80
He argued that immigration restriction unnecessarily jeopardized these
negotiations and threatened to derail a number of international agreements. In
an appearance before the Senate Immigration Committee he explained that
Mexico was the only Western Hemisphere nation that presented immigration
problems, and those were overstated by restrictionists. He contended that
Mexicans only came to the United States seasonally, then returned to Mexico,
echoing the homing-pigeon analogy long used by anti-restrictionists. 81
On the strength of Kellogg's testimony and the considerable remaining
clout of agricultural interests, the quota bills again died in committee. In
response to the nativists, however, the State Department quickly acted to tighten
visa controls to limit legal migration from Mexico through administrative
means. 82 Beginning in Aprill928, Kellogg ordered consuls in Mexico "to
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exercise greater care in issuing immigration visas and to refuse visas to all
applicants not entitled to them under the law." 83 These administrative changes
resulted in a sharp decline in visas, and therefore in legal entries from Mexico.
Similar to the 1924 law, this action did not restrict the number of Mexicans who
could enter the United States, but it did complicate legal entry and drove many
more to avoid the bureaucratic hoops altogether and simply enter without legal
sanction. As historian Mark Reisler argued, "In instituting such a policy, the
Hoover administration not only terminated the political controversy over
Mexican immigration but also undertook a novel form of administrative
immigration restriction that was to become a standard policy applicable to all
nations throughout the depression." 84
Similar to the problems with census enumeration, these immigration
laws and regulations (both proposed and actual) exhibited a confused (if not
nonexistent) understanding of the difference between Mexican as a nationality
and Mexican as a race/ethnicity. These laws relied on the notion that Mexican
identity existed within a vacuum, remaining essentially unchanged by migration
into the United States. Any difference between notions of citizenship and
ethnicity/race disappeared, replaced by the static notion that, similar to the
justifications used for the continued exclusion of Chinese immigrants, Mexicans
remained inexorably alien to American civilization. They remained a
population tied to the land as "hewers of wood and carriers of water." Despite
the differences in opinion between the restrictionists and anti-restrictionists,
83
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however, they shared this simplistic characterization of a fixed identity which
individual Mexicans could not overcome, regardless of their citizenship. 85
While this idea fit quite nicely into the arguments put forward by
agriculturalists that Mexicans existed as little more than beasts of burden that
could be pushed south of the border at will, it also gave restrictionists one other
method to exclude Mexicans from entry into the United States. As their
legislative efforts failed, some looked to the courts to accomplish their goals.
Their hopes rested on an effort to have an 1897 Circuit Court decision
overturned. In 1896, Ricardo Rodriguez, an illiterate immigrant who had been
in the United States for more than a decade, filed an application for
naturalization before a federal judge in San Antonio. Two local lawyers
challenged Rodriguez's right to citizenship, arguing that all Mexicans were
ineligible because they fell between the qualifications for citizenship, which
mentioned only Anglos and Africans. Their argument rested on the idea that, in
addition to the fact that Mexicans were not mentioned in naturalization law,
Mexicans were Indians and Indians remained ineligible for citizenship. 86 The
lawyers' goal was to disqualify Mexicans from voting, but their challenge also
raised the specter of overturning the naturalization and citizenship rights of all
Mexicans and Mexican Americans.
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A year later, the judge rendered his verdict in In re Ricardo Rodriguez. 87
Drawing on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and
case law, the judge rejected the notion that Rodriguez, and all other Mexicans,
did not qualify for citizenship. Treaty obligations, then, staved off the loss of
citizenship, but this logic also cemented the notion of a static Mexican identity
into case law. The judge closed by lamenting Rodriguez's lack of education or
knowledge of the US political system, but stated, "Congress has not seen fit to
require of applicants for naturalization an educational qualification, and courts
should be careful to avoid judicial legislation. In the judgment of the court, the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications for citizenship, and his
application will therefore be granted. " 88
For restrictionists, however, In re Rodriguez remained a focus for future
activity, especially as their legislative efforts foundered under pressure from
growers and the State Department. They hoped to initiate a new test case that
would overturn the precedent of the 1897 decision. 89 Despite efforts to goad the
Department of Labor into launching this test case, however, the restrictionist
effort failed on the judicial front during the 1920s, in theory protecting the right
of naturalization for Mexicans. Shortly after the restrictionist efforts met their
final defeats in the late 1920s, however, the Great Depression hit and led to
deportation drives and administrative changes that achieved many of the goals
of the restrictionists by barring the entry of many while also making the legal
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and social status of Mexicans and Mexican Americans within the United States
even more precarious than before. 90

***
The post-revolutionary Mexican government, while trying to consolidate
its own control throughout the tumultuous years of the Carranza, Obregon, and
Calles presidencies, also kept a close eye on increasing emigration to the United
States. While politicians in Mexico City declared that emigration threatened to
destroy the revolution, they also sought to use the returned emigrants as
potential modernizers who would bring back the knowledge of modem,
industrial production to the towns and villages of Mexico. In addition to these
sometimes contradictory goals, the Mexican government also focused on
protecting the rights of Mexicans within the United States through the consular
service. 91 While this system of emigration "controls" collapsed under the
weight of the Great Depression, during the 1920s it not only helped blunt some
of the worst treatment afforded Mexicans in the United States, but it also served
as an interesting test case of the adaptability of the postrevolutionary Mexican
government in responding to the growing emigration waves created by
conditions on both sides of the border.
The nationalistic nature of the postrevolutionary governments almost
required them to denounce emigration as antithetical to national success, and
throughout the 1920s presidents and others condemned outward migration,
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especially when it led to permanent settlement in the United States. Speaking
before the Mexican Congress in 1925, President Calles declared that emigration
was "a bane to the republic." 92 Emigrant Mexicans "were wickedly exploited
and incapable of protecting themselves," having left the turmoil of revolutionary
Mexico for what Calles described as an even worse fate. 93 Thus, he called on
the nation to encourage emigrants to return and to discourage future
emigrations. Similarly, the Mexico City newspaper, El Pueblo, published a
circular sent by the Secretarfa de Gobernaci6n to the Governors of several states
warning, "It may well be that in this importation of Mexicans the only object is
to flood the State with laborers so that the various industries can reduce wages
on the ground that there is an abundance of labor, because they have for some
time been trying to make such a reduction." 94
Still, the federal government clearly realized that attempts to stop
emigration would be futile, as the continuing turmoil in Mexico and economic
growth in the US created a motivation for migration too powerful to legislate
away. The Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores evinced this realization in the
early days of the Carranza government in 1917, admitting, "Since it is not
possible for the government to prevent emigration, it must take every measure
to reduce the hardships of our fellow citizens while they reside abroad." 95 At
the same time that Calles stood in front of the Congress and described
emigration to the United States as a blight on Mexico, he also established
92
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migration offices in Torreon and Saltillo, cities through which most emigrants
departing from central Mexico passed, to serve as informational resources on
US immigration law and how to contact consuls in case of trouble. The
government restricted northbound railroad traffic to points other than Torreon
and Saltillo, hoping to assure that as many emigrants as possible received the
information. 96
Unable to stop the outward flow, the government worked to empower
consuls within the United States to protect emigrants from exploitation and
discrimination. These efforts involved a number of different tasks for the
consular service. One example of consular activity was the co-signing of
contracts by the Consul General in San Antonio for Mexicans sent to work for
Bethlehem Steel. More often, they sent notices to local, state and federal
officials, reporting instances of racially-motivated discrimination against
Mexican citizens and Mexican Americans. 97
One of the best examples of these efforts to protect Mexican emigrants
in the United States occurred during the economic recession and repatriation
drives of the early 1920s. While the US Immigration Service, aided by local
and state efforts, rounded up thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans
who lacked proof of permanent residence, President Obregon and the Secretarfa
de Relaciones Exteriores established a repatriation department to coordinate
voluntary returns, promising "free return transportation to the Mexican interior
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and subsistence. "
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During the life of the program from 1921-1923 more than

150,000 emigrants returned to Mexico. 99 To help attract these emigrants back
to Mexico, the government also established a series of small agricultural
colonies in northern Mexico as a tentative step toward more thorough agrarian
reform. While these colonies were not as large or numerous as they would
become when the Mexican government revived the idea during the Great
Depression as a complementary element of the massive agrarian reform efforts
of the Cardenas presidency, these colonization activities in the early 1920s
represented an important effort to aid emigrants. 100
In addition to protecting emigrants while in the United States, the
Mexican government also sought to use this large presence abroad as a way to
further modernization within Mexico. Describing these years of the postrevolutionary consolidation, Alan Knight argued that the Mexican government
sought a radical restructuring of society:
Like their later Cuban counterparts, the Mexican revolutionaries set out
to create a new man (and, with rather less emphasis, a new woman),
who, imbued with a new morality, would be sober, industrious, literate,
and patriotic. However, while Guevara's new man was supposed to
reject material in favor of moral incentives, the Mexican new man was
to be a creature of the market, individualist in manner, eager for gain,
and ready for productive work under capitalist auspices. That, at any
rate, was the prevailing notion of the 1920s; by the mid-1930s, when the
magic of the market had lost some of its luster, the emphasis had shifted,
and the "socialist" education of those years approximated even more
closely the collectivist model of 1960s Cuba. Either way, however, the
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aim was to impose a superior morality on a wayward people, to extirpate
endemic vices, to inculcate new virtues. 101
The emigrants formed an essential aspect of this national project to create a
"new man" after returning from the belly of the modem capitalist beast.
The Mexican government and much of the new revolutionary elite
hoped that time north of the border would inculcate in the Mexican people,
especially the villagers and campesinos that represented the vast majority of the
population, a new willingness to accept the work ethic and new methods of the
US industrial economy. According to anthropologist Manuel Gamio, one of the
most important proponents of this idea of constructive emigration, "Although
the immigrant often undergoes suffering and injustice and meets many
difficulties, he undoubtedly benefits economically by the change. He learns the
discipline of modem labor. He specializes. He becomes familiar with industrial
and agriculture machinery. He learns about scientific intensive agriculture ....
He becomes a laborer of the modem type, much more efficient than before." 102
As George Sanchez has argued, Gamio and others believed that "the
provincialism exhibited by villagers in Mexico had given way to national rather
than regional pride. In the United States, workers learned new skills and a work
discipline that Mexican leaders believed was desperately needed for Mexico's
own development. Mexican nationals who had experienced life in the United
States were believed to be potentially more productive and refined than the
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typical mestizo villager."

103

These ideals rested on the ill-defined ideology of

indigenismo, described by George Sanchez as "a construct thoroughly the
product of non-Indians, which sought to exalt the native Indian of Mexico while
destroying his culture and land base." 104 For Gamio, the solution was to
incorporate certain aspects of the indigenous tradition of Mexico into the
postrevolutionary state, while sending many of the indigenous and mestizo
north to strip them of their traditional modes of life and thought.
These efforts required a delicate balancing act on the part of the
Mexican government. While they quietly wanted emigrants to venture north,
they believed that permanent migration represented a complete loss to the
nation. As a result, the government campaigned and propagandized furiously
throughout the 1920s to encourage the emigrants to return home for the good of
the nation and the revolution. Gamio argued that "permanent immigration is
harmful to both countries, especially if it takes place on a large scale; and even
if it does carry with it temporary economic benefits, in the long run it can cause
great harm. For the United States this might be expected to make itself felt in
labor struggles and perhaps in racial conflicts, whereas for Mexico it would
mean the loss of its best working population, for it is exactly these that
emigrate." 105 Thus, only when the emigrant returned to Mexico could the
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changes that occurred in the United States be put to the use of the
106
.
postrevo1uttonary state.

As a result, the Mexican government continued offering to repatriate
Mexicans in the United States even after the recession of the early 1920s ended.
Even Jose Vasconcelos, the Mexican scholar forced into exile during the Calles
years, urged emigrants to eventually return home in a 1928 speech in Chicago:
"We are but the children of Israel who are passing our way through Egypt here
in the United States doing the onerous labors, swallowing our pride, bracing up
under the indignities heaped upon us here. If we expect to return and escape all
this, as all good Mexicans ought to, then we should show interest in the affairs
of our country from this Egypt of ours." 107 In this context, repatriation became,
in the words of Arthur Corwin, "one of the most sacred obligations of defensive
nationalism." 108
One further complicating factor in this ideal of temporary emigration
was the ongoing attempt to restrict Mexican immigration within the United
States, which was followed closely by Mexicans emigrants and government
officials. While the Mexican government encouraged measures like the
Immigration Act of 1917 because they regularized immigration and continued
to outlaw contract labor migration that the Mexican state had long abhorred,
Mexico City reacted strongly to the threat of quota exclusions. While some of
106
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these reactions probably arose from feelings that the United States was
denigrating Mexico and the Mexican people by trying to reduce their numbers
crossing the border, there was also a fear that Mexico would lose the use of the
United States as a laboratory of economic and social modernization. During the
Congressional debates in Washington over whether to apply quotas to the
Western Hemisphere, President Obregon announced that his government would
drastically reduce entries from the United States if Mexico was placed under a
quota. 109 While this probably had very little effect on the immigration laws of
1921 and 1924, pressure from the Mexican government and the US State
Department clearly did have an effect on the Box bill and the numerous other
efforts to legislate a quota for Mexico after 1924.
Throughout the 1920s, then, as the United States moved to construct a
labor policy masquerading as an immigration policy for the Mexican border, the
Mexican government sought to maintain a delicate balance. They officially
discouraged emigration at the same time that they sought to use returned
emigrants as the building blocks of the new postrevolutionary nation, while also
trying to ameliorate the most extreme cases of discrimination and exploitation
against Mexicans in the United States through the efforts of the consular
service. These carefully laid plans collapsed on both sides of the border with
the onset of the Great Depression, but not before the basic course of
immigration/emigration policy for both nations had been established. For
decades, each nation drew upon the confused, sometimes contradictory, actions
109
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and ideas of the 1920s to construct the regulations governing who could and
could not cross the border separating the United States and Mexico. Rather than
a departure from the past, then, the Great Depression repatriations, the Bracero
Program, and the Border Industrialization Program, to name a few examples,
were extensions of the binational governmental activism of the 1920s that
sought to control issues of entry and labor within a growing, increasingly
institutionalized, migration stream.

***
The economic growth in South Texas fueled a series of battles over the
place of Mexican and Mexican American workers in US society. The efforts to
seasonally immobilize Mexican migrant laborers, anti-enticement measures, and
immigration restriction debates were all aspects of this debate over the place of
the Mexican worker within a regional and national context. Looked at together,
each of these aspects of the agricultural growth of the 1920s represented unique
but intimately related elements of a system built on the backs of Mexicans and
Mexican Americans. Further, each of these efforts focused essentially on the
issues of the possibility and desirability of Chicano rights and citizenship,
though always through the lens of economic calculation justified by the idea
that Mexicans remained in the United States as the "hewers of wood and
carriers of water." By the end of the 1920s, in spite of the efforts by the
Mexican government to mitigate some of the worst treatment suffered by
Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States, these changes helped
create a distinctly separate-but-unequal social sphere for Chicanos within South
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Texas and the rest of the United States. The Border Patrol and calls for
immigration restriction augmented the already formidable power wielded by
farmers and politicians in maintaining a de facto system of segregation and
labor market segmentation that created a distinct caste system that endured for
decades to come.
Some relief would eventually come, but not during the Great
Depression, to which I tum next.
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Chapter 6: "Pest Hole of Low Paid Labor": The Politics of Depression in South
Texai
"[W]e fail to see why the welfare of unskilled Mexican field labor should be promoted at
the expense of American growers and tax-payers."
W.R. Gwathmey, Secretary, Texas Citrus League 2
In May 1938 Manuel Juarez left San Antonio's largest and lowest paid
industry. He abandoned his seasonal job as a pecan sheller on the West Side of
San Antonio to travel to the cotton fields near Corpus Christi after hearing rumors
that the coming harvest would be a substantial one. A widower, he packed his. six
children into his 1926 Ford Model T and arrived in Nueces County along with
thousands of other Mexican families who had heard the same claims of plentiful
work. Juarez and his family were sorely disappointed when they were unable to
secure daily employment. In the forty-five days that they remained in the Corpus
Christi area, they secured only three days in the fields and earned only ten dollars.
They decided to leave in mid-July when they heard that the harvests in Lamesa in
West Texas offered more regular employment. After a 650 mile, eight day trip,
they found conditions at Lamesa just as bad as Corpus Christi, and in their sixtyfive days there the Juarez family earned only eighteen dollars. They were able to
eat only by pooling their money with other families in the same situation. Finally,
in October, Manuel borrowed money for gasoline to return home, but his car died
fifteen miles short of San Antonio. He hitchhiked into the city and persuaded a
friend to tow his car into town, where he sold it for five dollars in cash and five

dollars in credit from a local grocery store. He used the money to rent a tiny
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shack in the heart of San Antonio's West Side barrio for him and his six children.
When he tried to go back to work at the pecan shelling plant he had left in May,
he discovered that all shelling operations had shut down because of a strike by the
Mexican and Mexican American pecan shellers he had left behind months
before. 3 Juarez and his family disappear from the historical record at this point
and vanish into the overcrowded, disease-ridden barrio of San Antonio's West
Side.
The Great Depression did not create these problems but it deepened
hardships and intensified conflicts that people like the Juarez family had long
suffered. The rising agricultural prices of the 1920s disappeared in South Texas
as crop prices went into free fall throughout the nation. Farmers responded by
cutting already miniscule wages. The interstate migrant stream grew, as more and
more of the unemployed turned to farmwork for survival and as New Deal crop
reduction programs and the Dust Bowl sent former farmowners and sharecroppers
west from Arkansas, Oklahoma, and East Texas into the circuit of agricultural
migration. Manuel Juarez found himself competing for lower-paying jobs as he
tried to follow the well-worn path of agricultural migration that had supported
many of his neighbors in San Antonio's West Side (as well as a number of other
similar barrios throughout South Texas) in earlier times. South Texas jobs did not
dry up during the Great Depression; rather local growers benefited from the influx
of poverty-stricken migrants. Unlike much of the rest of the country, however,
the city of San Antonio and the state of Texas made little if any attempt to
3
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alleviate these problems through direct relief or work relief programs, even after
the New Deal brought federal money pouring into local governments around the
nation.
This chapter examines the stresses placed by the Great Depression on the
system of agricultural and semi-industrial growth that had developed in South
Texas in the years between the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and the
beginning of the Great Depression. The seemingly endless influx of new
immigrants from Mexico stopped, but the economic crisis of the 1930s helped
maintain the labor market segmentation and web of labor controls that had
developed earlier. The advent of the New Deal did little to alleviate these
problems, as relief money and attempted legislative regulation either did not apply
to the working conditions of South Texas or were fashioned into policies that
aided farm-owners and business interests. By the end of the Great Depression,
even more asymmetrical power relations had developed in South Texas as the
loose strictures employed during the 1920s closed in more tightly around the
citizenship (and human) rights of Mexicans and Mexican Americans.

4

***
4

This chapter, as well as Chapters 7 and 8, differ from those that preceded it in focusing almost
exclusively on the situation within South Texas, focusing less on how these people and practices
moved outside of the region. In fact, San Antonio, especially the West Side barrio, serves as the
primary focus. The conditions of the Great Depression and the wide availability of archival
material on San Antonio during the Depression, rather than any conscious decision to restrict the
focus of this chapter, dictated such a shift. While the interstate migrant stream continued to flow
out of South Texas, and while movement continued across the Texas-Mexico border, the
Depression years fostered immobility (social more than spatial) as one of its primary
characteristics. This situation was certainly influenced in part by the passage of laws such as the
Emigrant Agency Law which circumscribed the mobility of Mexican and Mexican American
workers, but it also owed much to the objective economic and political realities of the Great
Depression. Thus, the narrower focus of this chapter developed out of the conditions endured by
the Mexican and Mexican American populations of South Texas which saw their horizons
narrowed as the economic strife of the 1930s proscribed many avenues of their social and
economic lives.
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"Poverty and disease were so pervasive in the 1920s that San Antonians
were slow to recognize the Depression as a qualitative change," according to
historian Julia Kirk Blackwelder. 5 While the residents of the West Side may not
have noticed an immediate change at the beginning of the Great Depression, a
number of progressive journalists, public health advocates, and other like-minded
individuals descended on the slums of San Antonio throughout the 1930s to report
on the appalling living and health conditions in the densely-populated barrio west
of downtown. Journalist Tad Eckam described the city's slums as a "blighted
demimonde." 6 Father Carmelo Tranchese, an Italian Jesuit who assumed the helm
of the Guadalupe Parish in the heart of the West Side in 1932, claimed, "I am
familiar with the slums of San Francisco, New York, London, Paris, and Naples,
but those of San Antonio are the worst of all." 7 "[T]he West Side is one of the
foulest slum districts in the world" wrote Audrey Granneberg in Survey Graphic.
"Floorless shacks renting at $2 to $8 per month are crowded together in crazy
fashion on nearly every lot. They are mostly without plumbing, sewage
connections or electric lights. Open, shallow wells are often situated only a few
feet away from unsanitary privies. Streets and sidewalks are unpaved and become
slimy mudholes in rainy weather." 8
The Chicago-based American Public Welfare Association conducted a
public welfare survey of San Antonio in 1939 and 1940 that revealed the
5
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seemingly intractable problems facing the residents of the West Side. It reported
that "there has been mass unemployment, between 15,000 and 20,000
unemployed persons, for over a decade in San Antonio." 9 Especially hard-hit
were the Mexican and Mexican American populations. 10 In 1931 Mexico's
Secretariat of Foreign Relations estimated that 19% of San Antonio's Mexican
residents were unemployed, while other towns in South Texas faced even worse
conditions: 20% unemployment among Mexicans in Brownsville, 28% in
McAllen, and 30% in Corpus Christi. 11 In addition, according to the authors of
the public welfare survey, "The migrant laborer who has residence in San Antonio
plays no small part in the unemployment picture, for his itinerant work at low
wages means a period of complete unemployment at no wages. San Antonio has
for years been a reservoir for a migratory labor supply which is used in many
different sections of Texas, both south and north of the city, as well as northern
states." 12
As Manuel Juarez and his family found, living on migrant agricultural
labor wages became even more difficult as agricultural prices plummeted, causing
farmers to lower the already depressed wages for seasonal farm labor. According
to Linda and Theo Majka, the national agricultural wage index, with 1927 as the
baseline of 100, dropped to 46 in 1933, the nadir of the Depression, and only
9
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recovered to 65 in 1939 when the looming war in Europe helped raise agricultural
prices throughout the nation. 13 The same pattern held in South Texas. Rates for
cotton pickers in the Corpus Christi area, the most productive cotton region in the
country at the beginning of the Depression, dropped from seventy-five cents to a
dollar per hundred pounds in 1930, to sixty to eighty cents per hundred in 1931,
before bottoming out at thirty to thirty-five cents per hundred in 1932. 14
Likewise, onion harvesters in Dimmitt County in the Winter Garden earned about
sixty cents a day in November 1938, while spinach work near Laredo typically
paid a relatively princely sum of $2.50 to $4.00 per week in December 1938. 15
A WP A study of migrant workers from Crystal City in the Winter Garden
revealed many of the continuities of migrant agricultural labor that persisted into
the 1930s. The three hundred families studied throughout 1938 followed a path
similar to the migrant laborers of the 1920s, beginning each harvest season in
South Texas, moving north for cotton picking, then leaving the state for sugar
beet work. The vast majority of Crystal City migrants worked the local spinach
harvest from November to March, though they earned a tiny fraction of their
yearly income from the winter-long spinach work. Ninety-five percent of these
families then left the Winter Garden for work elsewhere. One-third worked
briefly in the onion fields of Willacy and W-ebb Counties, while the rest
proceeded straight to the cotton harvests in Nueces County. Beet work then
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finished the agricultural year, after which the families returned to their home
bases in Crystal City. Most of these migrants' earnings came from the sugar beet
work. The vegetable and cotton harvests provided little more than money to
cover the trips to and from the beet fields. According to the WP A researcher,
"These four crops dovetailed with one another so neatly that in only one month of
the year, April, did total family unemployment rise above 4 percent." 16 Almost as
an aside, however, the researcher noted, "In spite of this regularity of
employment, however, wages were so low that many of the Crystal City families
were in need at the time of the survey." 17
Surprisingly, the industrial work centered in the West Side of San Antonio
often offered wages even lower than agricultural work. Cigar and garment
factories paid no more than four to six cents an hour to their predominantly
Mexican and Mexican American female workforce throughout the Depression. 18
Pecan shelling, the largest industry in San Antonio, paid even less. 19 "[W]ages
plummeted to one cent per pound for pieces and one and one-half cents for halves
at the depth of the depression," reported the former secretary of one of the pecan
shellers' unions. "On that basis even the 'champions' could earn no more than
$1.50 per week; some of the less skilled received only sixteen cents for a week's
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labor."

20

The WPA study of Crystal City migrant laborers, performed during the

same year as a study of pecan shellers in San Antonio, found that the "average
annual income of the Crystal City Mexicans was about twice that of the urban
Mexican group studied in San Antonio." 21
The bank failures that proved so damaging to the US economy as a whole
also affected Mexicans and Mexican Americans in South Texas. While most
earned wages too miniscule to deposit anything in a bank, some had been able to
build up some savings during the boom years of the 1920s. The Mexican
consular service noted throughout the depression that "the accumulated savings
by Mexican workers during long years of arduous labor have been almost totally
lost" because of bank failures. 22 While the consular service, understandably,
focused primarily on Mexican businessmen on both sides of the border with
savings in Texas banks, they also took notice of the problems of emigrant
laborers' financiallosses. 23 The San Antonio consulate, for instance, reported that
most of the affected Mexican nationals in that city were laborers. 24 The situation
became so dire that the Consul General in San Antonio, Enrique Santibafiez,
asked the mayor of San Antonio to declare a moratorium on evictions of Mexican
tenants unable to pay their rent. The mayor refused the request, however, because
20
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such an action "would be bad publicity ... [for] San Antonio [which] ranked as
[one of the two] American cities holding their own in these strenuous times." 25 It
is not clear what the mayor actually meant by this last statement, but he
apparently remained unaware or unconcerned about the national notoriety already
attracted by the living conditions in the shacks whose rent payments he refused to
postpone. 26
Chronic unemployment, depressed wages, residential segregation, and the
conditions of depression-era migrant labor only exacerbated the problems that
residents of the West Side of San Antonio and other barrios throughout South
Texas had endured in previous decades. 27 As the author of the public welfare
survey stated, chronic unemployment and low wages in combination with
residential segregation created "low standards of living, and ultimately ill health,
poor housing ... and their related social problems." 28 The infant mortality rate in
San Antonio was 96.3 per 100,000, more than twice the national average. San
Antonio also boasted the highest tuberculosis death rate in the nation, at 159 per
100,000 population. 29 That rate more than doubled the state rate of 76 per
100,000. More revealing, however, is the disease rate in San Antonio by
ethnicity. The Anglo tuberculosis death rate was 52.8 per 100,000 -less than the
state as a whole. Chicanos, on the other hand, died from tuberculosis at a rate of
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302.7 per 100,000. 30 The crowded and unsanitary living conditions also aided the
spread of diseases like measles and whooping cough, leading the American Public
Welfare Association to declare, "The teaching of isolation procedures is futile
where isolation cannot be achieved in any way. Here again the need for more
adequate relief and higher economic standards is only too apparent." 31
While relief programs could not have solved these problems, their
presence presumably would have ameliorated the worst features of
unemployment, low wages, and the problems that flowed out of chronic poverty
and overcrowding. During the years before Franklin Roosevelt assumed the
presidency in March 1933, the Hoover administration did little to provide federal
relief funds. The creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
allowed for some distribution of relief funds to states and localities, but much of
this money went to railroads and other corporations. The advent of the Roosevelt
administration opened the possibility of large amounts of federal relief money for
states and municipalities through a variety of organs such as the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration, and a
number of other programs that distributed direct and work relief. The New Deal
also offered the first official labor protections through the National Industrial
Recovery Act in 1933 (the right to organize), the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act in 1935 (banned unfair labor practices and established a federallymandated process of collective bargaining), and the Fair Labor Standards Act in
1938 (40 hour week, minimum wage, and ban on child labor for most non-family
30
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employment). While these programs held out the promise of a rudimentary social
welfare net and basic employment rights where none had previously existed, they
also excluded a large percentage of the population. Legislators excluded all
agricultural workers from these protections in order to pass these laws over
objections from Southeastern and Southwestern conservatives.
The migrant farm workers of South Texas, therefore, fell outside of these
workers' rights reforms, but they also had a difficult time receiving federal relief
funds. The Works Progress Administration distributed surplus commodities and
clothing to those in need, but it required anyone receiving these goods to have
lived in the state for at least a year and in the county where he or she applied for
relief for six months. 32 In order to survive, migrant workers in Texas had to leave
the state each year and had to move frequently from county to county, so they fell
between the cracks of basic federal relief efforts.
Just as damaging to these migrant workers was the passage and
implementation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and its plow-up
scheme to raise agricultural prices by removing surplus product, especially cotton,
from a glutted market.

33

Farmers were supposed to distribute a portion of their

compensation for reducing their crop to tenants and sharecroppers, though most
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simply rid themselves of the suddenly superfluous farm hands.

34

Farm laborers

lacked even that unenforced protection, and now found themselves part of a
swollen migrant stream competing for even fewer jobs in the fields. The very
nature of this problem makes it impossible to quantify the losses suffered by farm
laborers due to AAA, but, again, the fate of Manuel Juarez and his attempts to
gain employment in the cotton fields shed some light on the difficulties created by
the New Deal for farmworkers in South Texas.
In addition, many of these federal relief programs distributed funds to the
states, not directly to the intended recipients. The small-government,
conservative ideology that dominated the Texas state government guaranteed an
almost complete lack of cooperation with the federal government in allocating
New Deal funds. The small amount of federal money that ever made it through
Austin and filtered down to the local level was often consumed by graft. As a
result, after a number of New Deal programs had proven disruptive to the
agricultural laborers of South Texas, those due for relief from other New Deal
programs had a difficult time collecting any.
Individuals or families seeking direct relief or work relief fared no better
in their dealings with the state government than they had with federal relief
programs. The state of Texas, for example, spent only 3 '12 cents per person per
year on public health, or roughly the same spent on the health of livestock. 35 The
Texas Constitution, then and now the outdated constitution written during
34
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Reconstruction, forbade the establishment of a statewide system of relief. 36 Since
much federal relief to the states required the state to put up matching funds, there
were a series of stand-offs between the Roosevelt administration and the
government in Austin over federal money. The federal government often sent the
funds anyway after trying to force the state to use some of its own money, but
only after long delays in which relief payments stopped for those who relied on
them. 37
Municipal governments throughout South Texas did even less. San
Antonio provided the best example of how city and county officials remained
either unable or unwilling to match federal efforts to provide relief in the face of
almost complete abdication of these duties by the state government in Austin.
From January to September 1931, Detroit spent $6.59 per capita for relief, Los
Angeles spent $3.40, Chicago spent $2.41, Denver spent $0.79, El Paso spent
$0.29, and San Antonio spent only $0.15 per capita. 38 Among cities of similar
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size, only Memphis spent less on relief per capita than San Antonio between 1937
and 1939. 39
When the Great Depression began, a political machine that had maintained
control of the city almost continuously since the late 19th century evinced no sign
that it would change its habits of graft and apathetic leadership.40 While the
machine had never provided any semblance of credible governance, the massive
population increase during the 191 Os and 1920s, especially on the West Side,
caught the city government completely unaware. Rather than using public funds
to improve the sanitation or infrastructure in an already overburdened city, the
increased tax base that came with a growing population merely provided more
opportunities for graft. 41 The city Health Department served as the ultimate
symbol of San Antonio's machine rule. A writer for Collier's magazine asked
two "prominent men" what was the most shameful aspect of the machine-run
municipal government. Both pointed to the Health Department. "Generally,"
according to the author, "a health department is designed to promote the public
welfare. In San Antonio it is used as an agency through which collectors shake
down that poor, miserable class of females who make their livings as members of
the world's oldest profession."42 As San Antonio's population descended further
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into economic ruin during the Great Depression, all other aspects of the city
government reflected the same level of callous disregard and calculated greed.
Machine politicians simply appointed their successors during these years.
Mayor John Tobin died in 1928, but supposedly made a deathbed request that
District Attorney C.M. Chambers succeed him. Three years later Chambers died
and another deathbed request made City Attorney C.K. Quin the heir apparent; he
remained in office until 1939. 43 While the mayor's seat stayed within this tight
circle of machine loyalists, the power behind the throne was Charlie Bellinger,
political boss of the African American East Side. 44 Despite Jim Crow segregation
in public accommodations, San Antonio's non-partisan municipal elections
eliminated the white primary that had excluded African Americans from voting in
much of the rest of Texas. While African Americans made up less than ten
percent of the city's population, they accounted for a large percentage of poll tax
payments, and made up a quarter of the voters in all county and municipal
elections.
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While this system did not actually provide the African American

community with any real authority in city and county governance, it did lead the
city to provide basic services to the East Side that it denied to the West Side
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barrio: paved streets, electricity, water, and sewage connections, and a number of
other public facilities. 46
In addition to the thousands of votes regularly in Bellinger's pocket, the
machine also turned to old-fashioned vote-buying outside of its East Side
stronghold. According to Emma Tenayuca, a West Side native who emerged as a
central figure in attempts to organize Chicano workers in the late 1930s, "I
remember as a youngster attending a political rally with my father. Sandwiches
were distributed and inside the sandwich was a five dollar bill."47 In 1938 the
nature of this corruption became even clearer when a reformist newspaper, The
Bexar Facts, printed a series of affidavits of ineligible voters who admitted to
receiving poll tax receipts from machine officials. 48 A few months later a grand
jury indicted Mayor Quin and two of his top aides for spending city money to pay
bribes to four hundred individuals for "working around the polls."49 Not
surprisingly, such a city government demonstrated little concern for establishing a
system of local relief, preferring to spend municipal funds to maintain its grasp on
power.
As a result, "No major city in the United States fought the Depression with
fewer weapons than did San Antonio," as Julia Kirk Blackwelder put it.
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While

machine leaders continued to plow municipal funds into vote-buying, gambling,
and prostitution, they refused to appropriate any funds for basic relief, mirroring
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the inaction of the state government. Despite having the largest relief load in the
state, Quin and other machine officials continued to argue that private charities
should handle all relief activities. 5 1 Throughout the depression, the federal
government remained the primary, if not the only, source of relief funds for the
city and county. The WPA and the National Youth Administration employed
thousands, while the FERA supplied surplus farm products to the poor.
According to the public welfare survey in 1940, "The federal government with
only minor assistance provided relief and service for 94.6 percent of the total
number of cases assisted in Bexar County. Private agencies cared in some
manner for 4.9 percent of the remainder, and the county government for one-half
of one percent." 52
Much of this federal aid relied on local officials to distribute it, however,
leading to a familiar pattern of graft and strong-arm tactics through which relief
became a means of bludgeoning the poor as much as aiding them. A San Antonio
Express article from August 7, 1937, announced, "Approximately 1,000 Bexar

County families formerly on relief here will head for the Rio Grande Valley to
pick cotton or find other means of sustenance Monday, H.K. McBath, district
administrator of the Texas Relief Commission, declared Friday." 53 McBath also
added, "I see no reason for the Federal Government to feed people able to work
when work is available. We are not only cutting them off the rolls, but we have
cut WPA 'referrals' to virtually nothing." 54 As he indicated, WPAjob placements
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remained few and far between in San Antonio. In 1939 more than two thousand
people certified for WPA employment found themselves without federal
employment each month. 55 In spite of the federal money meant to provide relief
funds for the San Antonio area, then, public relief agencies remained more
concerned about funneling potential farm laborers to the fields of the Rio Grande
Valley and guaranteeing a plentiful labor force for local manufacturing concerns.
In the hands of local administrators, public works programs became little more
than updated versions of tried-and-true labor practices in South Texas, with the
shotgun-wielding overseer now replaced by the bureaucrat as the guarantor of
surplus labor in the cotton and vegetable fields. What the New Deal variant of
this tradition lacked in potential for violence it made up for with economic
leverage.
A clue to where this federal money actually ended up can be found in an
investigation launched by the Texas Senate into the operations of the Bexar
County Board of Welfare and Employment. The number of salaried employees
on the County Board fluctuated between 250 and 450 depending on time of the
year, and clearly served as a patronage agency that did little more than provide
do-nothing jobs for friends of the city machine and allies of the administration in
Austin. The board secretary testified that $140,000 had been spent on relief
during September 1933, but $35,000 of this went for administrative salaries. By
comparison, Tarrant County (Fort Worth) spent $1,300 per month for relief
administration. The secretary also admitted that salaried workers bought food
from the relief commissaries at wholesale prices, while immediate family
55
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members of city and county officials received relief payments. The total number
on relief was 50,000, or approximately one-fourth to one-fifth of the total
population, though it is impossible to know how many of these received relief due
to political ties rather than need. 56
The investigation that discovered this financial malfeasance had not been
launched to provide better service for relief recipients, however. It was part of a
patronage battle between different factions in the state Democratic Party
maneuvering for some advantage in the upcoming 1934 gubernatorial election.
County relief boards provided one of the easiest sources of political patronage, so
enemies of the Miriam Ferguson administration sought to discredit Bexar County
relief officials so that they could insert their own operatives. Once installed in the
relief offices, they could then strong-arm relief recipients into voting for selected
candidates. 57
Despite the continual flow of federal money into machine coffers,
however, the seemingly constant revelations of corruption led to the creation of
strong countervailing pressures during the depression to bring an end to machine
rule. There had been a number of reform movements in San Antonio since
machine government first latched onto the city in the 191h century, but one of the
most thoroughgoing and successful, if only briefly, arose in reaction to the
conditions perpetuated by the machine during the Depression years. This reform
movement was led by Maury Maverick, the scion of an old San Antonio family
whose name became short-hand for nonconformist rebelliousness in the
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Nineteenth Century, and was briefly able to bring a form of modern municipal
government to San Antonio.
Maverick won a seat in Congress in 1934 by defeating the mayor of San
Antonio, machine stalwart C.K. Quin, in the Democratic primary. 58 There were a
number of factors in Maverick's victory over the machine, but the most important
seem to be his ability to attract large numbers of West Side residents away from
the machine, and even more importantly, his use of the white primary to
disqualify African American voters. 59 From his seat in the House of
Representatives, Maverick rapidly became one of the most ardent advocates of the
New Deal, becoming the central figure in a group of liberal Congressmen,
predictably dubbed the "Mavericks," who routinely agitated to expand social
welfare legislation beyond the timid measures taken during FDR's first term. 60
While Maverick's attention remained primarily focused on national issues (a fact
which his enemies would successfully use against him), he did succeed in steering
a number of public works projects to San Antonio, primarily through the WPA
and NY A. He also worked to secure money for slum clearance and public
housing construction to remedy some of the worst public health problems,
especially on the West Side.
58

See Stuart L. Weiss, "Maury Maverick and the Liberal Bloc," Journal ofAmerican History 57:4
(March 1971 ), 880-895. For a serviceable chronology of Maverick's congressional career, see
Ronnie C. Davis, Sr., "Maury Maverick, Sr.: The Rise and Fall of a National Congressman," M.A.
Thesis, St. Mary's University, 1966.
59
Blackwelder, Women of the Depression, 19; Doyle, "Maury Maverick and Racial Politics,"
194-224. Doyle does an especially good job of examining the apparent paradox between
Maverick's liberal politics and outspoken support of federal anti-lynching legislation, and his lack
of support among African Americans in San Antonio. While Maverick himself felt that African
American voters betrayed him by staying loyal to the machine, Doyle shows that the situation was
much more complicated, with a number of fissures developing within the East Side political
arparatus throughout the 1930s.
6
For a contemporary view of Maverick and his allies in Congress, see Stanley High, "The NeoNew Dealers," Saturday Evening Post (May 22, 1937), 10-11, 105-109.

240
Maverick retained his seat in the 1936 election, but faced a determined
challenge from the city machine in 1938. Paul Kilday, the brother of Police Chief
Owen Kilday, ran a fierce campaign to "eliminate from Congress one who has
overwhelmingly shown himself to be the friend and ally of Communism." 61 An
official of the Department of Labor, surveying the San Antonio scene in 1938,
wrote, "Unfortunately this city is ruled by the most corrupt ring in the country. It
has marked for slaughter at the next election Congressman Maury Maverick, a
man I do not know, but he must be on the right side." 62 In July 1938, Kilday won
the primary by a vote of 24,929 to 24,383 for Maverick. Kilday won the Anglo
North Side and the African American East Side decisively, while Maverick
carried the Latino West Side and the working-class-Anglo South Side. Amidst
evidence of vote-buying and other illegal electoral maneuvers by the machine,
Kilday replaced Maverick in Washington. 63 While it remained little comfort to
Maverick and his supporters, this election revealed that Maverick had again been
able to break the machine's hold on the West Side.
After the election, Maverick determined that he had been defeated because
of the grip that the machine maintained over the city. The only way to make sure
that this did not happen again was to destroy the machine at the local level.
61
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Therefore, Maverick decided to run for mayor in 1939. He challenged Quin, the
political nemesis he had defeated five years earlier in his congressional campaign.
Quin and the machine appeared more susceptible to electoral challenge than they
had in years. Not only had Maverick proved that the West Side could be stripped
away from the machine, but grand jury indictments against Quin and his top aides
for bribery came down in December 1938 and produced a split within the ranks of
the machine between Quin loyalists and those who sought to jettison the troubled
mayor. 64 As a result, two machine candidates ran for mayor. Consciously
modeling his organization on the coalition constructed in New York City by
Fiorello La Guardia, Maverick fronted the Fusion Ticket against the suddenly
divided machine forces. 65
The San Antonio establishment made no secret of its disdain for Maverick,
with the Express publishing a front-page editorial that accused the former
Congressman of "defaming" San Antonio, which they claimed was the cleanest
city in Texas. 66 The local AFL, through its Weekly Dispatch, endorsed Quin
because Maverick openly supported the CIO. Quin also found strong allies in
many of the leaders of the Mexican American middle class within the League of
United Latin American Citizens. 67 While the organization remained non-partisan,
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a number of its leaders were conspicuous at a Quin rally held at Sidney Lanier
High School on the West Side.

68

Despite the opposition of many of the most

powerful political players in the city, Maverick won the 1939 election with 18,375
votes, while Quin received 14,874, and a second machine candidate received
11,503. Journalist Raymond Brooks wrote that Maverick's victory "is a supreme
example that democracy can right conditions, no matter how vicious they get." 69
For the next two years Maverick set about dismantling the structures of
machine government and replacing them with a progressive municipal
government. Even the often antagonistic local newspapers had to admit that
Maverick brought positive change with him. He changed the Health Department
from a national disgrace to one that was recognized by the U.S. Health Service.
Enormous improvements were made in sewage facilities and mosquito control on
the West Side, eliminating some of the most hazardous public health conditions in
the barrio. 70 Maverick was also the driving force behind a campaign to change
the city charter to allow for relief expenditures. 71 He moved to uproot the thriving
red light district west of downtown. Finally, actual civil servants, rather than
cronies and machine loyalists, took over much of the machinery of city
government. 72
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Maverick also aided in the push for public housing in San Antonio that he
had participated in during his years in Congress. Maverick's ties with the
Roosevelt administration helped bring about slum clearance and the construction
of five public housing projects in San Antonio. 73 The US Housing Authority
approved contracts for Alazan and Apache Courts on the West Side, Wheatley
and Lincoln Heights Courts on the East Side, and Victoria Courts on the South
Side between 1938 and 1940.

74

The first, largest, and most important of these was the Alazan Courts in
the heart of the West Side. As the time came to begin construction, however, one
large problem arose. In order to build the new housing, old structures had to be
removed. The owners of these houses, all absentee slum lords who were in large
part responsible for the appalling living conditions on the West Side, stalled in an
attempt to force the federal government to pay more for their properties. Nathan
Straus, the Administrator of the US Housing Authority, personally stepped in and
refused to pay the inflated prices demanded by the owners, writing to Eleanor
Roosevelt that the "San Antonio project has been held up by the selfishness and
greed of individuallandowners." 75 The delay was brief, however, after local
officials pleaded with Eleanor Roosevelt to speak to the president on their behalf,
73
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leading the US Housing Authority reluctantly to accept the prices demanded by
the homeowners. 76 The Alazan Courts opened in 1941, followed shortly
thereafter by the adjacent Apache Courts. 77 While these projects did not eliminate
the problems of the West Side, they did alleviate them to a degree. Just as
importantly, they showed the capacity for progressive government to achieve
some improvement in the general condition of the city after decades of apathetic
machine rule.
The reformism inaugurated by Maverick did not win over his numerous
enemies in the city, however, and the machine began to regroup immediately after
its defeat in 1939, searching for issues and events it could use to discredit the
administration in the 1941 election. That opportunity came on August 25, 1939,
when the Communist Party held its state convention in a room in the Municipal
Auditorium on the northern edge of downtown. Maverick gave them permission
to use the room. Opponents demanded that Maverick rescind the permit, but he
refused. According to Maverick's son, "every newspaper in town whipped up an
air of hatred." 78 Only seven or eight Communists actually arrived at the meeting,
primarily because they rightly feared violence.
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thousand surrounded the auditorium, then surged into the meeting room and
began demolishing the interior of the auditorium, while the Communists managed
to escape unharmed through the basement. After rioting in the auditorium, the
crowd then took to the streets looting nearby buildings before parading to the
Alamo. 80 The mayor's son, Maury Maverick, Jr., later recalled that the family
had to hide at a friend's house the night of the riot after receiving a series of death
threats. "Parts of the mob came to our home looking for us; others went out to
intimidate my grandparents," he wrote. "I saw my father's career come to an end
[that] night." 81
The machine used the events of that night to paint Maverick as a
Communist-sympathizer in the 1941 mayoral election. With only one machine
candidate in this election, Quin won and ended the brief two-year experiment in
progressive government. A journalist for the Light reported that the machine was
"determined to wipe out every vestige of the preceding administration." 82 Even
the arch-conservative Dallas News concluded that Quin's victory meant that San
Antonians voted to rid themselves of responsible government. 83

***
In retrospect, the Maverick interregnum brings into greater relief the ways
in which the politics of the depression at the federal, state, and local levels did
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little to alleviate South Texas's problems in the 1930s. Before 1939, state and
local officials evinced little interest in cooperating with federal reformers and
instead attempted to use the New Deal programs as either sources of graft or as
new tools to enforce control over workers. Only during the two years of
Maverick's reign, in addition to his four years in Congress, did any benefit accrue
to San Antonio. The New Deal's decentralization was its undoing in South
Texas. As a result, the Mexican and Mexican American majority in South Texas
found itself fighting to maintain even the unstable existence of previous decades.
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Chapter 7: Deportation and Repatriation from South Texas
Goodbye Texas, with all of your plantations.
I am leaving your lands and not picking cotton.
Goodbye Texas, with all of your plantations.
I am being thrown out of your lands for not picking cotton.
"Corrido de Texas"'
Espiridion de Leon came to the United States from Mexico in 1916 and
made his residence in Mercedes in Hidalgo County. He married a Texas-born
woman in 1927. By 1931 he and his wife had three children, all of whom were
US citizens. De Leon had worked for a local landowner for years. 2 When the
deportation drives began in the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the late 1920s, he
sought to protect himself against the threat of expulsion from the United States by
obtaining a notarized statement in 1929 that he had been in the United States for
twelve years without returning to Mexico? Despite this precaution, however,
immigration agents seized De Leon in March 1931 while he was walking down a
Mercedes street. One officer grabbed him by the collar and shook him, while the
other pointed a gun at his head and forced De Leon to state that he had entered the
United States after 1925, in violation of the 1924 immigration act. 4 This coerced
confession led to an immediate deportation decision. A few days later De Leon
found himself in Rio Rico, Tamaulipas, unable to return to his family or find a job
in Mexico. He was reduced to writing a letter to the Governor of Texas begging
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for help. Despite De Leon's precautions, he had found himself caught up in the
machinery of immigration control.
While deportations affected immigrants from countries other than Mexico,
immigration officials primarily targeted Mexicans and the Mexican border
throughout the Great Depression. Mexicans accounted for more than forty-five
percent of all deportees in the years from 1929-1939. 6 Furthermore, the
immigration service detained five times as many suspected illegal immigrants in
the vicinity of the Mexican border as they did near the Canadian border. 7 Rather
than a blanket effort to remove all non-citizens, the well-publicized deportation
campaign pursued by the Department of Labor and the Immigration Service
fixated primarily on Mexicans as a way to accomplish the failed immigration
restriction sought by nativists during the 1920s, with economic necessity
replacing the eugenicist arguments of the previous decade. 8
The deportation net that trapped De Leon was the most extreme
manifestation of governmental efforts to rid the nation of Mexicans, but it was
just one aspect of a wide-ranging offensive that targeted Mexicans as scapegoats
during the Great Depression. In fact, worsening economic conditions and
continued harsh treatment of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Texas created
a major shift in the immigration patterns along the US-Mexico border. While the
official immigration numbers from both the United States and Mexico are still

5
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little more than suggestive of general trends, it is clear that massive emigration
from Mexico ended during the Depression, and in its place a large-scale migration
back to Mexico ensued from across the United States.
Most studies of deportation and repatriation during the Great Depression
have focused on campaigns carried on in urban areas of California and the Upper
Midwest, but deportation drives swept through South Texas before any other part
9

of the nation. Texas also sent more deportees and repatriates back to Mexico
than any other state. In addition, deportation and repatriation from Texas was a
largely rural affair, whereas these events took on a much more urban cast in the
rest of the nation. Most estimates place the total number of deportees and
repatriates during the Great Depression at around one million, or roughly the
same number that entered the United States during the years of the Mexican
Revolution. 10 Paul Taylor estimated in 1934 that 21.5 percent of the Mexican
population in Texas had returned to Mexico since the beginning of the depression.
This represented 49.7 percent of all repatriates leaving the United States at a time
that Texas claimed 48.1 percent of all Mexicans in the United States. By
comparison, lllinois, Michigan, and Indiana sent 10.5 percent of the total number
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of repatriates while containing only 3.6 percent of the population. 11 California,
which contained the second largest Mexican and Mexican American population in
the United States after Texas, repatriated only 7.9 percent of its Mexican
population. 12 The Upper Midwest repatriated the highest percentage of resident
Mexicans, in other words, while Texas produced the most repatriates by far.
Just as important, deportation drives began in the Lower Rio Grande
Valley in 1928, before the Great Depression began. These were not simply
random sweeps, but arose directly from the Department of Labor's desire to cut
off immigration from Mexico. Since the Immigration Service had been thwarted
in its attempts to have Mexico included in the quota laws, officials devised largescale deportations in the Rio Grande Valley in 1928 as an end-run around the
State Department and the repeated legislative failures of John Box and other
restrictionists in Congress. After the economic collapse of 1929, these
deportation efforts spread to the rest of the country.
Once the Depression began, the scale of deportation only grew, as the
machinery set in motion in 1928 continued to operate into the 1930s. The
worsening economic conditions, lack of job opportunities, and the threat of
potential deportation convinced many Mexicans and Mexican Americans to
depart the United States voluntarily for a new start south of the border. The
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Mexican government aided in these deportation and repatriation campaigns
through a form of defensive nationalism that sought to bring Mexico de afuera
back into the national fold, while also stressing the objectives annunciated by
Manuel Gamio to utilize the returning emigrants as potential modernizers. In the
last half of the 1930s, after the initial momentum of repatriation had subsided,
these objectives combined with the revolutionary nationalism of the Lazaro
Cardenas administration to create a series of ambitious colonization programs for
returning repatriados. Throughout the Great Depression era, then, Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in the United States felt pressures on all sides to move south,
after decades of being pushed in the other direction.

***
One of the earliest deportation drives occurred in May 1928 in the vicinity
of the Rio Grande Valley town of Donna. 13 Near the end of the month the San
Antonio District Director of the Immigration Commission stated that "our records
as to the number that have been actually deported from this station, Donna, which
includes Weslaco, during the month of May to the present time, is 72; that this
number included several that were not laborers, some prostitutes, some criminals;
also that this number included about thirty persons who were reported by letter, to
the inspector in charge at Hidalgo, giving them specific names and places where
they were located; the others were those encountered during the regular routine
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Located in Hidalgo County, the site of Donna was first settled by Anglos in 1839 when a man
named John Webber moved there from Austin with his wife, a freed slave, to escape
discrimination for their interracial marriage. In the 191 Os, the site would be an important
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work of the Border Patrol."

14

Not surprisingly, a great cry of indignation rose up

in response to these deportations because, as one local complained, "I had been
told that the laboring conditions were being unfavorably hampered through the
activity of the Border Patrol." 15 Congressman John Gamer, one of the most
forceful voices opposing quotas for Mexican immigration, jumped into the fray to
protect the Valley's labor supply, but the deportations continued anyway. 16
In April 1929 the district director of the Brownsville immigration office
reported that more than 2,600 had been deported to Mexico from the district,
while hundreds more remained in custody awaiting deportation. 17 Almost twenty
thousand were deported from the Rio Grande Valley in 1929 alone. 18 These raids
had the predictable result of sowing fear in the Mexican and Mexican American
communities of South Texas, with many refusing to leave their homes for fear
that they would be arrested and sent to Mexico. The raids that took place in 1928
and 1929 primarily targeted Mexican neighborhoods and workplaces, but tactics
changed after the stock market crash and the Depression that followed.
With economic justification added to the restrictionist logic of the first
deportations, raids shifted to places like hospitals and health clinics, while one
particularly shocking raid in March 1931 saw immigration officials launch raids
on El Paso public schools, resulting in the detention of more than 500 school
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children. 19 Whole communities were uprooted as deportation rates continued to
accelerate, rising as high as 450 from the Brownsville district in one month during
the spring of 1931.

20

As in the Espiridi6n de Leon episode, these arrests almost

always occurred without warrants and often came through coerced confessions
and guilty pleas.

21

By the end of 1931, however, deportations from the Rio

Grande Valley declined as large-scale raids ended and the Border Patrol and
immigration service shifted their focus to other parts of the state and the country.
Only after the stock market crash, however, did these campaigns begin in areas
other than South Texas. The Mexicans and Mexican Americans of the Lower Rio
Grande Valley had confronted the threat of forced removal for two years before
the same forces came to bear on the barrios of California. 22
The momentum of deportation, in other words, accelerated after the stock
market crash signaled the severity of the coming crisis. The economics of the
Depression and increased unemployment throughout the nation amplified
nativism, leading many to call for the expulsion of immigrants rather than limits
to their entry. The anti-Mexican sentiment of the 1920s was quickly redirected
into efforts to strip Mexicans and Mexican Americans of their rights of citizenship
and the physical right to remain within the United States. Fears that illegal (or
simply non-white) immigrants might drain public coffers through relief payments
19

McKay, "Texas Mexican Repatriation," 133, 146. El Paso is obviously not in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley, but the audacity of this raid warrants its inclusion in a discussion of deportation
from Texas.
20
Ibid., 111-112.
21
This procedure did not change until 1934 when immigration officials changed the regulations to
require a warrant before raids and arrests. McKay, "Texas Mexican Repatriation," 130.
22
Deportation campaigns began in California in the summer of 1930, but the most famous raid did
not occur until February 1931 at La Placita in the middle of one of the largest Los Angeles barrios.
See Balderrama and Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal, 57-58; Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican
Americans, 71-83.

254

led federal, state, and local officials to carry out well-publicized deportation
campaigns throughout the nation after two years of trial-and-error provided by
operations in South Texas.
In many ways, the pro-immigration forces of the 191 Os and 1920s
introduced the argument that allowed many to rationalize the necessity and even
the righteousness of deportation during the 1930s. Their argument that Mexicans,
defined as a racial group rather than a nationality, possessed an innate homing
instinct that always drew them back to Mexico after time traveling and working in
the United States became the self-fulfilling justification for removing Mexicans.
Restrictionists and anti-restrictionists came to the same conclusions during the
Depression. The workers who had been so sought-after during the farm boom
came to be seen as a potentially catastrophic economic drain after the market
collapsed and unemployment skyrocketed. Mexican Americans also fell under
this scrutiny. The overly simplified notion that "Mexican" connoted an
unchanging racial categorization meant that many U.S. citizens of Mexican
descent found themselves adrift on this tide of cranky nativism and oppressive
state activism after the focus of the deportation campaign shifted in the early
1930s. "When it became apparent last year [ 1932] that the program for the relief
of the unemployed would assume huge proportions in the Mexican quarter, the
community swung to a determination to oust the Mexican," reported Carey
McWilliams in Los Angeles in 1933. "Thanks to the rapacity of his overlords, he
had not been able to accumulate any savings. He was in default in his rent. He
was a burden to the taxpayer. At this juncture, an ingenious social worker
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suggested the desirability of a wholesale deportation." 23 Though his description
of these events drips with angry sarcasm and speaks specifically only of the Los
Angeles area, McWilliams captured the basic reasons why large-scale campaigns
of deportation and repatriation spread across the country.
Complaints of stolen jobs and a sort of economic populism that depicted
Mexicans as the stooges of the wealthy and powerful were the most common
manifestations of anti-Mexican sentiment in depression-era Texas. For instance,
the Bricklayers and Masons International Union, an all-white union with locals in
San Antonio and the Lower Rio Grande Valley, complained vociferously to the
Department of Labor and the War Department that construction jobs on military
bases throughout the region went to Mexicans. In December 1930, the secretary
of the San Antonio local wrote to the international about work at Fort Sam
Houston: "On December twenty second there were thirteen Mexicans and four
white mechanics employed at six dollars a day. The wages were then reduced to
four dollars per day. Consequently the white men refused this cut, leaving the
aliens to complete present masonry work. . . . Will the government employ a
contractor who discriminates not only against organized labor but the white race
as well ?" 24 The secretary of the international then wrote to the Department of
War, complaining that the union saw no reason why the military "preferred
Mexicans to Americans, especially during the present unemployment crisis." 25
Around the same time the international secretary also received a letter from Rio
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Grande City (Starr County) complaining that all masons and carpenters on jobs at
Fort Ringgold were Mexican. "It seems a pity in the face of this depression that
our own government would do this when American citizens of these two crafts
are walking the streets without employment and in need of work to support their
families and pay the heavy taxes and such expenses as it takes to keep their
homes," wrote the local union officer. 26
Along the same lines, a man from Wharton, Texas, complained to the
Immigration Commissioner, "Mexicans are a curse upon Texas, pest in our white
schools, and burden on relief and pension rolls. They come across to work on the
farms, soon drift north to towns and cities, forcing more negroes out of
employment and onto relief rolls." He continued by demanding that the
immigration service not allow more Mexicans into Texas. "I imagine Rep.
Cleberg [sic] [owner of the King Ranch] will be asking you to lift ban on
Mexicans as he (rather his wife) owns perhaps over a million acres down in the
vicinity of the valley. It would be good if such estates as that would have went
under during this depression, but they got most of the AAA benefits." 27 In this
unique juxtaposition the writer depicted Mexicans as a means to achieve greater
concentration of landholding in the same way that AAA payments served as
subsidies to large growers, clearly invoking a variety of economic populism based
on white privilege.
Seeking to take advantage of these widespread nativist feelings, a number
of publications sensationalized crimes committed by illegal immigrants and
26
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publicized a number of social problems supposedly created by immigrants.
Hearst newspapers, the Chicago Tribune, and the Saturday Evening Post called
for the removal of immigrants, but they were not alone. In 1935, Texas
Congressman Martin Dies, the father of the House Un-American Activities
Committee, published an article in the Saturday Evening Post in which he
claimed that no unemployment problem would exist in the United States if the
millions of immigrants who had entered the nation since 1880 had been barred
from entry. He introduced several bills during the 1930s calling for stricter
deportation practices to eliminate millions of illegal immigrants. 28 While Dies
often drifted from issue to issue, he clearly viewed anti-immigrant demagoguery
as a path to personal political advancement in the same way that he latched onto
anti-communism in the late 1930s in a bid for national prominence.
The deportation campaign shifted accordingly in 1931 as the Great
Depression deepened and calls for Mexican removal became more insistent.
From 1928-1931 most deportees were sent to Mexico for either illegal entry or for
lack of documentation, in keeping with the immigration-restriction focus of the
late 1920s. After 1931, however, more deportees were caught for vagrancy
violations and sent back to Mexico as individuals "likely to become a public
charge," signaling a shift to a tactic more in line with the economic crisis of the
1930s. 29
For those caught within the machinery of deportation there was little if any
recourse against the growing momentum of nativism that swept through every
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level of the law enforcement establishment. Once detainees appeared in court
they often faced judges who had predetermined their guilt. One federal judge in
particular, F.M. Kennerly, compiled an astonishing sentencing record in South
Texas. He heard seventy illegal immigration cases in a six-hour session in July
1931, at the peak of the deportation drive in the Valley, and found all seventy
guilty. Eleven went to prison and fifty-nine were deported. A three-hour court
session in Laredo that same year yielded ninety-eight convictions in ninety-eight
cases, seventy-two of whom were deported. 30
The situation in San Antonio, however, was much different. Unlike the
Lower Rio Grande Valley and other portions of deep South Texas, the Federal
Court in San Antonio prosecuted individuals for illegal entry at a rate far below
the courts further south. In fact, impressionistic evidence points to an increased
Mexican and Mexican American population in San Antonio's West Side barrio as
many left areas like the urban Upper Midwest and rural South Texas to avoid
deportation. The explanation for the limited number of deportations from San
Antonio, according to Julia Kirk Blackwelder, "lies most probably in the city's
heavy dependence on the marginal labor of Hispanics, especially women." 31
Many arrested for immigration violations did not go to trial, however, as
officials allowed them to choose voluntary deportation. This method meant that
deportees returned to Mexico without a misdemeanor conviction and therefore
maintained the option of returning to the United States legally. 32 Many of the
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deportees never made it as far as a hearing before a judge, then, instead simply
relinquishing any claim to remain in the United States for the possibility of
returning at a later date when more auspicious economic conditions returned.
While the coercive nature of these "voluntary" deportations are obvious, they did
allow some hope for eventual legal return to the deportees and cut down on the
bureaucratic workload of immigration officials and the federal court system.
More important numerically than deportees, however, were repatriates
who left for Mexico for reasons other than legal entanglements. There were any
number of reasons why Mexicans, and even some Mexican Americans, chose to
leave the United States during the Great Depression. Some left because they
wanted to return to their homeland rather than remain in a country that clearly
sought to get rid of them. Others left because chronic unemployment did not
allow them to keep up with the higher cost of living in the United States, made
worse by the fact that non-citizens were ineligible for public works employment.
Fears of deportation led many to depart. This variety of repatriate became much
more common during the peak of deportations in the early 1930s in South Texas
and elsewhere, and was the desired result of the deportation raids which sought to
frighten Mexican communities as much as remove illegal entrants. Mexicans and
Mexican Americans throughout the nation knew of the deportation drives in
places like South Texas and Los Angeles through word of mouth and extensive
coverage in the Spanish-language press. Others left with help from local charity
organizations that sought to rid their communities of Mexicans, while a number of
municipal relief boards chartered trains to transport Mexicans on relief rolls out of
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the country. The large number of repatriates who accepted these offers of
transportation only strengthened the notion held by both nativists and their
opponents that Mexicans remained little more than temporary sojourners who
would all eventually return south of the border. 33
The Mexican government also emerged as a driving force behind
repatriation. The southward flow of returning immigrants occurred at the same
time as consolidation of the post-revolutionary state in Mexico City entered its
final stages. With the turmoil of the 1920s behind them, the government
energetically sought to draw the substantial pool of emigrants back to Mexico to
aid in the modernization of the nation. Before 1934, the consular service
provided transportation for destitute Mexicans (and some Mexican Americans) to
return south of the Border, while the Cardenista state sought to lure repatriates
back to Mexico as raw material for its ambitious land reform program launched in
the second half of the decade. 34
From the beginning of the depression the Secretariat of Foreign Relations,
through the consular service, sought to provide aid for those hoping to repatriate.
As early as 1930 the Secretary of Foreign Relations reported that the National
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Irrigation Commission hoped to provide land for returning migrants in previously
arid sections of the North. 35 These efforts in the early 1930s served as little more
than temporary palliatives during the depths of the depression. The Callista
leadership that remained in power until 1934 ignored ejidalland reform, instead
hoping to establish small-scale capitalist farming throughout the nation. 36 They
believed that collective farming had failed, and hoped that repatriates would bring
with them sufficient capital to establish themselves as small-scale landowners and
independent farmers.
An early example of these attempts to integrate repatriates back into the
nation came with the establishment of the Don Martfn Colony in Coahuila and
Nuevo Leon, about fifty miles from Laredo, Texas. 37 The construction of a dam
on the Rio Salado created a massive irrigation network across the previously arid
region, opening up an enormous expanse of cultivable land, in individual plots,
that attracted Mexicans and Mexican Americans eager to leave Texas.
Throughout 1930 and 1931 prospective colonists left for the Don Martfn Colony,
and by mid-1931 almost all of the land had been distributed. Almost all of the
colonists had returned to Mexico from Texas, and found initially that they could
actually make more money there than north of the border where cotton prices
remained low. 38 Despite an auspicious beginning, however, the Don Martfn
Colony soon ran into a number of problems, from insufficient federal funding to
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severe drought By the end of 1931 the Mexican government had already begun
to transport colonists elsewhere to alleviate worsening conditions. Much of the
.

colony was deserted by the end of the decade.

39

The difficulties created by these frustrated hopes for repatriation had a
profound effect on the agrarian situation in Mexico, however. The repatriates
helped intensify a growing desire for more radical agrarian reform. 40 Due to these
growing pressures, from the beginning of the Cardenas regime in 1934 a different
set of priorities dominated policymaking. Mexico City paid less attention to the
shrinking flow of repatriates, in decline since 1931, and focused more intently on
rapid land reform, trying to alleviate the spreading problems of the depression
within Mexico rather than the problems created within the United States. 41
Nevertheless, the new regime found itself cleaning up the messes left over from
earlier colonization projects. In 1936 Cirdenas distributed thousands of acres of
public land to destitute colonists, while also shipping a number of other former
repatriates to agricultural colonies in Tamaulipas. By the end of the decade
almost all of the remaining Don Martin colonists subsisted on government relief
funds.
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The Cardenista government attempted to construct one other large-scale
colonization project in northern Mexico for repatriates, primarily from Texas. In
the spring of 1939 work began on the construction of an agricultural colony meant
entirely for repatriates near Matamoros, Tamaulipas, named the "18 de marzo."
Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, Ramon Beteta, undertook a campaign to
publicize the undertaking throughout the United States, but received little interest
outside of Texas. Throughout South Texas, however, Beteta was met with
enthusiasm at each stop. 42 Importantly, Beteta wrote to Cardenas that most of the
prospective repatriates were U.S. citizens. 43 Whether this meant that these
potential colonists simply wanted to leave the United States or that they
responded to the revolutionary nationalism of the Cardenas regime, clearly there
was a substantial number of Mexican Americans despondent enough over their
condition in Texas that they sought expatriation. According to the Texas Farm
Placement Service, the "purpose of the project is to establish Mexicans on
redistributed farm lands in Mexico, principally in the State of Tamaulipas ....
The applicants for land must be agricultural workers; and if accepted, they receive
certain initial assistance from the Government." 44 Beteta hoped to attract 15,000
families to the colony. 45 Instead, a little more than 7,500 repatriates from
throughout South Texas arrived at the "18 de marzo" Colony by the beginning of
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1940, taking up newly irrigated land on the site of an expropriated hacienda. 46
Like the Don Martin Colony, however, lack of funds and drought doomed the
colonization efforts to failure, even though the federal government had expected
far more than 7,500 colonists. The end of the depression and renewed demand for
labor in the United States in the early 1940s sounded the death knell of these
colonization efforts.
Even before the 1940s, however, there was at least of trickle of return
migration to the United States by repatriates who found conditions in Mexico
even worse than those they left north of the border. While the official
immigration statistics again provide little help in uncovering this northward
migration during the depression, by 1937, according to historian Arthur Corwin,
"some repatriates were still heading south, but many more were slipping back to
work for former employers or to rejoin relatives in the United States .... It seems
likely, according to interview statements from old repatriates, that many of the
repatriados were back in the American border states by 1941. " 47 Most of those
who tried to reenter the United States found their way blocked by more stringent
application of immigration laws and more liberal usage of the "likely to become a
public charge" exclusion. Those who had received assistance from charities to
pay for their transportation to Mexico were especially targeted as unfit to reenter
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the country.

48

Thus, many repatriates found themselves stranded between two

nations struggling to reemerge from the depths of the Depression, with neither
government willing or able to help them. Many simply entered illegally rather
than deal with the red tape and probable rejection that came with applying for
legal entry.
Those who did return north of the Rio Grande during the late 1930s found
that agricultural interests still welcomed them. In fact, growers continued to call
for more Mexicans to come and harvest their crops even at the height of
deportations and repatriations back to Mexico. Their voices were often drowned
out in the early years of the Depression, but by the late 1930s the familiar refrains
of farmers declaring acute labor shortages could be heard loud and clear. This
renewed demand for labor from Mexico reached its peak in 1936 and 1937, when
growers throughout South Texas bombarded the federal government with dire
predictions of economic ruin if a labor supply could not be found. 49 Beginning in
the summer of 1936, growers in the Lower Rio Grande Valley complained that
they did not have sufficient labor for what promised to be one of the largest cotton
harvests in years. Additionally, weather conditions during the spring and summer
delayed the harvest by about three weeks, so Valley cotton growers had to
compete with harvests in the cotton fields near Corpus Christi. According to the
INS Inspector in Charge at Brownsville, the farmers of the Valley "started paying
from 40 cents to 50 cents for their cotton picking at the beginning of the season.
48
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A great many farmers from up state, where cotton was also opening at the same
time although ordinarily it opens from three to four weeks later than the Valley
cotton, came here, offered more money to available pickers and hundreds of
Valley residents left for up state to pick the cotton there at better prices." 50
According to the Valley Morning Star, with the labor situation "rapidly reaching a
crisis, protest has been filed with the U.S. Labor Bureau office at Fort Worth,
against alleged practice of growers of the Corpus Christi-Robstown area in
trucking laborers from this section with the promise of higher pay." 51 The
McAllen Chamber of Commerce even went so far as to demand a law that
prevented truckers from taking workers out of the Valley during harvest time,
hoping to create an intrastate version of the Emigrant Agency Law. 52
Growers called for the end of these labor recruitment practices, the
complete suspension of all public works projects, and the institution of a guest
worker program similar to that established during World War I. 53 Despite these
requests, according to the State Administrator of the WP A, "District Immigration
Director Whalen stated in telephone conversation he opposes this because there
will be only about thirty days of this work and experience has taught that cost of
importing labor and then returning it to Mexico, particularly latter, is not justified
by results obtained. He stated this service is still trying to find and expel some
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Mexicans who were imported for this purpose during the war." 54 Despite
repeated refusals by the federal government to accede to a renewed foreign
contract labor program, growers continued to agitate for workers during the 1937
and 1938 harvests. 55 As will be discussed in the Chapter 9, growers did not get
their wishes until 1942 when US entry into World War II changed the situation
and allowed growers to depict their demands for labor as essential to the war
effort.

***
An examination of the deportation and repatriation of Mexicans and
Mexican Americans during the late 1920s and 1930s from South Texas reveals
two major flaws in the historiography. First, the overwhelming focus of many
historians on California and the Midwest has ignored the primacy of Texas in the
geography of deportation and repatriation. Despite its historiographical
dominance, California sent relatively few deportees and repatriates back to
Mexico. 56 The Great Depression did not alter the history of South Texas as an
integral avenue for large-scale migration, even if this migration changed from the
agricultural labor stream of the 1920s into the southward trail of repatriation
during the 1930s.
Second, the deportation and repatriation of Mexicans and Mexican
Americans in South Texas began before the Great Depression. This outburst of
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activist immigration control was not simply a case of scapegoating in reaction to
economic crisis. Instead, the initial campaign of deportation in South Texas
served as the law enforcement fulfillment of nativist desires after legislative
action had failed earlier in the 1920s. The economic collapse in the years after
1929 may have added to the momentum of the deportation and repatriation
campaigns in Texas and the rest of the nation, but they did not create the situation.
The Great Depression was more than coincidental to the law enforcement
campaign that inundated Mexican and Mexican American communities
throughout the nation, but it was not the sole factor in the emergence of largescale deportations. The focus on California and the Midwest has therefore
distorted the nature of deportation and repatriation by ignoring the origins of this
nationwide campaign in the Lower Rio Grande Valley before the onset of the
Great Depression. This truncated version of history has allowed historians to cast
the campaigns as a departure from previous decades when, in fact, they
represented the logical conclusion of the nativist agitation of the previous decade.
The Great Depression, therefore, did not represent a cataclysmic shift in
the history of South Texas, but rather the amplification of trends that had grown
throughout the 191 Os and 1920s. The temporary decline in migration from
Mexico to Texas was the exception to this rule. The years from 1928 to the
outbreak of World War II were a time of increasingly aggressive nativism and
overt challenges to the citizenship rights of Mexicans and Mexican Americans,
complicating the already difficult economic and political situation under which
they toiled. Rather than succumb to these growing pressures during the
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Depression, however, the Mexicans and Mexican Americans of South Texas
launched a series of challenges to the political and economic system that had been
built on their backs. Voluntary repatriation and participation in the agricultural
colonies in Mexico served as one method of resisting these worsening conditions.
Those who remained in the region, however, launched a different sort of
resistance through workplace struggles that proposed basic but thoroughgoing
reforms in the political economy of South Texas.·
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Chapter 8: "Pauper Paid Labor in Revolt": Organization and Rebellion in
Depression-Era South Texa/
"It is my duty to interfere with revolution, and communism is revolution."
Owen Kilday, San Antonio Chief of Police 2

On Friday, February 25, 1938, two hundred and forty men found
themselves crowded into the Bexar County Jail, which had a normal capacity of
sixty. Police arrested roughly two hundred of these inmates in the previous week
in cracking down on what San Antonio's Chief of Police referred to as a
revolution. Almost all of them were charged with illegal picketing or blocking a
sidewalk, crimes they committed in an effort to improve wages and working
conditions in the pecan shelling industry. Despite their crowded conditions, and
the fact that many of the prisoners nursed wounds from street battles with police,
the jail soon echoed with songs and jeering exhortations. The most popular song,
soon heard throughout the jail, declared "Kilday esta loco," referring to San
Antonio's Chief of Police. Others sang mockingly of the "Pecan Czar," against
whom the prisoners had been striking when arrested. After a few hours of this
raucous behavior, interspersed with complaints against overcrowded conditions,
the City Jailer declared that he could not control the prisoners. Chief Kilday
arrived shortly thereafter and directed police officers to tum fire hoses on the
singing inmates. Beyond violating the most basic rights of the Mexicans and
Mexican Americans arrested for activities protected by the First Amendment,

Chief Kilday also provided a perfect symbol of official reactions to working-class
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protest movements in South Texas -rather than allow these efforts to expand into
a full-fledged social movement, Kilday tried to drown them in the county jail. 3

***
The ad hoc system of labor controls developed in earlier decades
combined neatly with the possibility of expulsion from the United States to create
an even more potent system of employer control over labor. In spite of these
conditions, however, the agricultural and semi-industrial workers of South Texas
waged a sustained, if largely unsuccessful, campaign of labor organization during
the nineteen thirties. 4 The efforts by Mexican and Mexican American workers to
organize themselves revealed many of the same broad outlines as labor clashes in
more industrialized areas. New Deal labor legislation heightened workers'
expectations and drove them to confront their employers in South Texas as they
did throughout the nation. Further, many of these organizational efforts grew out
of wildcat strikes and walkouts in reaction to the steadily worsening working
conditions of the Great Depression. But these unionization efforts in South Texas
exhibited a series of complications not present in the CIO and AFL organization
drives in the Midwest, Northeast, or even the Southeast. Employment segregation
3

"Chief Kilday Quells Outbreak with Fire Hose," San Antonio Express (February 26, 1938);
George Lambert interviewed by George Green, November 1971, Oral History Collection, Texas
Labor Archives, University of Texas at Arlington; Mrs. M.M. Adams, Mrs. Hetty Browne, Mrs.
Eron Dies, Mrs. Louise Warren, and Mrs. Cassie Jane Winfrey to C.K. Quin, Maury Maverick,
and James Allred, March 5, 1938, File 530/47/24/6, Record Group 174, Department of Labor,
United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
4
Most historians of the Great Depression and the US labor movement have ignored these efforts
for unionization and workers' rights in San Antonio and other towns in the region. For instance,
no mention is made of any of these activities in Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). Episodes like the San Antonio Pecan Shellers
Strike in 1938 have received substantial attention from Chicano historians and historians of the
Southwest, as will be obvious from the growing historiography sprinkled throughout the footnotes
of this chapter. While the agricultural strikes in California during these years continue to draw
more attention from the profession as a whole, more historians are also looking to the events in
South Texas as important aspects of the regional effects of the Great Depression.

272
and falling wages combined with the growing fear of deportation to create a
volatile situation in South Texas when the violently anti-union businessmen of the
region confronted the largely Mexican and Mexican American workforce. This
confrontation ended in defeats or, at best, pyrrhic victories for the workers. But
as Paul Taylor wrote in describing the San Joaquin Valley cotton strike in 1933,
"As the faulting of the earth exposes its strata and reveals its structure, so a social
disturbance throws into bold relief the structure of society, the attitudes, reactions,
and interests ofits groups."5 The strikers' efforts made visible the violence of
South Texas labor relations that had remained largely hidden in the years since
the Plan de San Diego as police, vigilante groups, and the Texas Rangers reprised
their familiar roles.
The first outbreak of organizing occurred in November 1930 during the
spinach harvest in Crystal City. 6 The Catholic Workers Union of Crystal City,
presided over by Rev. Charles Taylor of the Crystal City parish, demanded wages
determined "not simply by what [employers] can get out of [the workers], but
what [the] laborers need to live," as well as an end to outside labor recruitment
when a sufficient supply of workers lived within the immediate vicinity of the
spinach fields. 7 Less than a week after forming the union and going out on strike
against the spinach growers, twenty-five growers agreed to most of their
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demands. Wages increased, outside labor recruitment diminished, and general
working conditions improved. One result of this settlement, according to Rev.
Taylor, was that higher wages allowed more children to return to school during
the spinach harvest than in previous years. After the settlement, however, the
Catholic Workers Union disappeared. A few more years would pass before
another agricultural union emerged in South Texas. 8
In August 1933 another organizational effort began in Laredo with the
formation of the Asociaci6n de Jomaleros, which welcomed agricultural laborers
as well as miners, construction workers, and other Mexican and Mexican
American laborers. 9 According to one of the leaders of the Asociaci6n, "We
formed our organization when the NRA was inaugurated." 10 The militantly antiunion county machine harassed the Asociaci6n throughout 1934, almost crushing
the organization through the use of blacklisting, agents provocateurs, and the
threat of deportation. 11 The arrival of the onion harvest in March 1935, however,
revived the Asociaci6n as it took over a walkout among onion cutters demanding
higher wages and better work conditions.
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Before the strike onion workers in the Laredo area earned about sixty
cents for a twelve-hour day throughout the one-and-a-half- to two-month harvest
season. 12 These wages would have been low even if work was guaranteed, but
surplus labor made it difficult to guarantee employment throughout the season for
individual workers. Many laborers drove to the fields at their own expense to find
that they could secure only a few hours' work at best. The strike began as a
spontaneous protest by 1,200 onion workers against these conditions, and the

Asociaci6n soon moved in to lead the strike effort. 13 In a petition sent to growers
and the Webb County Chamber of Commerce, the union demanded $1.25 for a
ten-hour day, more than a one-hundred percent raise, with twenty cents per hour
overtime pay. They also asked that drinking water be placed in the fields near the
workers, that employers pay for transportation to and from the fields, and that
growers pay for the treatment of any injuries suffered on the job. 14 "We
represented the workers of the onion fields and approached the growers for
collective bargaining regarding wages, etc.," Jose Jacobs of the Asociaci6n wrote.
"The growers disregarded us completely and the result was our first and only
strike." 15 The union refused to negotiate with individual growers, demanding
instead a uniform agreement covering all Laredo-area onion growers. 16
According to the Laredo Times, "strikers timed their actions just as growers in
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this section were ready to start the movement to market of some 1,000 carloads of
onions." 17
For four days (April 12-15, 1935) strikers lined US Highway 83, leading
from Laredo to the onion farms, and attempted to block all traffic to and from the
fields. Estimates of total numbers of strikers blocking the roadway varied from
300 to 2,000. 18 Accusations of communist infiltration soon swept the city.
Rumors floated through the area that angry workers planned to dynamite bridges
leading out of Laredo. 19 Fears of violence escalated even further when, on the
night of April 14, growers were able to send three truckloads of strikebreakers
through the picket lines after mounting a machine gun on the top of the lead truck,
though the workers from two of the three truckloads left the fields and joined the
strikers. 20 Deputy Sheriffs acted as escorts for this armed convoy under the orders
of District Attorney John Valls, the king of the county political machine. 21 After
this incident, District Judge J.F. Mullally, another important figure in the county
machine, sent an urgent request to Austin for Texas Rangers, writing, "Peace
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officers and onion growers request me to apply to you for sufficient men to
control the onion strike situation which is beyond the control of local officers." 22
A prominent grower, H.G. Samuels, agreed to accept the union wage of
$1.25 a day for ten hours on April13, but the union rank-and-file refused to sign
the individual agreement, afraid that signing a partial agreement would bring the
strike to a halt as workers left for the fields. Department of Labor conciliator J .R.
Steelman, who had been called into the area by the Webb County Chamber of
Commerce, tried to get the workers to sign the contract with Samuels, afraid that
the strike could tum violent if an agreement was not reached. Few doubted that
the situation would change once Texas Rangers appeared.
The Rangers arrived on April 15 and immediately cleared the highway of
strikers, breaking the blockade. 23 Fifty-nine strikers had been arrested by noon on
April 16. 24 J.R. Steelman wrote that the "Texas Rangers and the operators
thought the proper way to handle the situation was to drive the workers back to
the fie1d." 25 Still, Steelman was able to elicit an agreement from a few growers in
the Laredo area for wages of $1.25 for a ten-hour day. On the night of April 16
22
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the workers agreed to the contract, and the strike ended. While the union and its
rank-and-file still doubted that the agreement guaranteed that things would not
1

return to status quo ante as soon as the federal conciliator left, threats of violence
and deportation from local law enforcement, the Rangers, and growers led them to
end the strike. 26 The union declared a victory, but Steelman remained more
circumspect in his immediate reaction to the settlement, telling the Laredo Times
that "it was only a compromise. The growers missed a good opportunity to make
another strike this season impossible had they come in and mutually signed the
agreement. . . . The growers must change their attitude. They must learn that
times have changed and that workmen do have the right of collective
bargaining." 27 Even though Steelman overstated the protections provided to
agricultural workers by the NIRA or Wagner Act, his predictions soon came true
as most growers maintained wages around sixty cents a day. When the union
made noises about renewing the strike, all growers repudiated the $1.25 a day
wage level. No strike followed as most of the workers feared violence and
seemed to have lost confidence in the union's ability to accomplish anything_2 8 In
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the end, the growers probably benefited from the delay in harvesting. Market
prices for onions increased during the strike. 29
While these setbacks muted unionization efforts in the Laredo area for
much of the rest of the decade, a little less than a year after the onion strike
another attempt to organize workers occurred. Juan Richer, Mexican Consul in
Laredo, presided at a meeting of the Asociaci6n de lorna/eros on March 13, 1936,
after Benjamin R. Hill, Consul-General at San Antonio, presided over the
founding of a new labor organization called the Confederation of Mexican and
Mexican-American Laborers in San Antonio on March 11. 30 A Laredo Times
reporter kept shorthand notes of the Laredo meeting. Richer reportedly stated that
he was aiding the Asociaci6n "by instruction of my government." The reporter
also recorded speeches by a number of union leaders, including the statement of
Emilio Martinez that "[ w]e are always intimidated on the fact that we are
Mexican citizens and that we have no rights in this country, but we do have rights,
and this gentleman here (pointing to the Consul) is the one who is going to
demand those rights." 31

29

F.H. Crockett to INS Commissioner, March 17, 1936, File 55854/100, RG 85, INS, USNA.
Details of the organization founded in San Antonio are very sketchy, as is the role of ConsulGeneral Hill in this episode. The Confederation was founded "under sponsorship of the Mexican
consulate general," but I could find little more about it. "Mexicans Form Labor Society," San
Antonio Express, March 11, 1936; J.R. Steelman to Frances Perkins, March 26, 1936, File
195/349, Box 98, RG 280, Department of Labor, USNA. It is also mentioned in report from the
INS Inspector in Charge in San Antonio, who wrote that the new labor organization was founded
to counteract the activities of the company union established by Southern Pecan. W.W. Knopp to
INS Headquarters, March 17, 1936, File 55854/100, RG 85, INS, USNA. This entire episode will
be discussed in great detail later in the chapter.
31
3 pages of notes on March 13 meeting, File 55854/100, RG 85, INS, USNA.
30

279
Cries of foreign subversion soon followed, with Congressman Martin Dies
turning to his continual refrain of communist infiltration. 32 The Texas State
Deputy of the Knights of Columbus wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull to
complain that Richer "presided at meeting of radical element here in Laredo." He
further claimed that Richer acted under orders from President Lazaro Cardenas
"to organize labor groups in the United States," which represented "unwarranted
interference with American affairs" by a foreign government. 33 After the State
Department registered complaints with the Mexican government, the Secretariat
of Foreign Relations replaced Richer as consul and recalled him to Mexico City. 34
But an anonymous informer, writing to J.R. Steelman, revealed that the Richer
episode was actually an abortive attempt to revive the onion strike from a year
earlier: "Indeed, it did look as if we were going to have the same old trouble this
year, the only difference this time was the Mexican Government seemed to have
taken upon its shoulders to agitate the trouble and organize the Mexicans and
Mexican-American citizens. However, the publicity which has resulted from the
meeting in San Antonio and the one here and the resultant investigations by
various departments of our government has completely broken the back of this
Mexican government interference in our affairs, and we do not look for any
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further trouble when the onion shipments start."35 The author's impressions
proved correct, as organizational activities in the border counties continued to
decline throughout the rest of the 1930s.
While the labor movement unraveled in Laredo, CIO unions, primarily the
United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America
(UCAP AW A), began to move into other parts of South Texas. 36 One
UCAP AW A organizational effort occurred among shrimp hullers in Aransas Pass
in 1937 and 1938. Located along the Gulf Coast just north of Corpus Christi, the
town served as the horne of the Rice Brothers Cannery. Shrimp shelling occurred
almost entirely during the fall, with only a few workers remaining throughout the
year. The seasonal workers often had to tum to agricultural1abor during the offseason. Even during the peak of the season the average worker made only about
$1.50 per day. 37 These processing workers dealt with many of the same problems
of low wages and seasonal unemployment as did their farm worker brethren. A
writer for the San Antonio Express described shrimp shellers as unskilled workers
who "present a totally different problem from the transient cotton and fruit picker,
who can follow the seasonal harvestings."

38

The strike began as a spontaneous walkout of 350 workers after the
cannery slashed wages near the end of October 1937. According to A.J. Holmes
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of the shrimp hullers' union, "The shrimp peelers have been peeling a small
bucket of shrimp which holds about 6 lbs of shrimp for 5 cents and they happen to
be small shrimp. So when they began to get larger shrimp which Mr. Rice gets
more for, Mr. Rice proceeds to swap out a large bucket which holds 2 times as
much shrimp and tells them that is all he is going to pay." 39 The UCAPAW A
moved in and took over the strike effort, but the strike fell apart after seven weeks
when the union representative in charge (possibly A.J. Holmes) took all of the
strike funds and disappeared. Disgusted, the workers went back to work. 40
To protect against another strike, Rice Brothers tried to establish a
compulsory union under the company's control, but the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) declared it an illegal company-dominated union in December
1937. Because of the NLRB ruling against Rice's union, the CIO decided to try
its luck among the shrimp shellers the next year. An organizer arrived in July and
began to piece the local back together. Throughout August the UCAP AW A
representative met with Rice management, but they refused to consider any
contract because Mexican workers "have no idea what a contract is made for and
have no conscientious scruples about breaking a contract at will." 41 The union
decided to strike at the peak of the season, starting September 14, 1938.
That morning, as the union set up a picket line around the plant, a group of
armed men assaulted the pickets. It is not clear who these people were, but the
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scant evidence points toward white Rice employees from the boat and cannery
divisions. One of the attackers died, another was shot (probably a case of friendly
fire), and several more were injured. The president of the local, Christopher
Clarich, was beaten into a coma and remained in critical condition for weeks,
during which time he was indicted for the murder of the vigilante. As a result, he
received a twenty-year prison sentence and became a cause celebre nationally for
the UCAPAWA and CI0.

42

A few more days passed before negotiations

restarted, but after several days of fruitless meetings the NLRB commissioner
convinced Rice to accept a contract that allowed for collective bargaining and
pledge of non-discrimination but ignored issues of wages. Rice finally accepted
on the night of September 26, 1938.
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The next day the agreement went before

the union, where it passed by only two votes. The NLRB commissioner reported
that "all of the white members and the intelligent Mexicans who understood
English [voted] to accept and all the other Mexicans [voted] against it. "44 Those
who voted against the agreement threatened not to return to work, but came
around the next day when Christopher Clarich approved the agreement from
behind bars. 45 The strike thus ended with union recognition but no improvement
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in the wage scheme that had caused the first outbreak a year earlier, another
pyrrhic victory for unions in South Texas.
The final depression-era attempt by the UCAP A W A to organize
processing workers in South Texas occurred in 1942 in the spinach fields
surrounding Mathis (San Patricio County, near Corpus Christi). 46 Field workers
began the organization effort in January 1942 when the F.H. Vahlsing Company 47
cut wages from ten cents to seven cents per bushel of spinach. 48 By the end of the
month more than one hundred Vahlsing workers had formed a union and secured
a charter for a UCAP A W A local. While the field workers predominated, the
union also attracted truck drivers and packinghouse workers. They demanded not
only a restoration of the wage cut, but also a series of other community-wide
reforms to improve workers' quality of life. While Vahlsing refused to recognize
the union, the pressure placed on the town by the union's campaign quickly
yielded results. On March 10, completely without warning, Vahlsing restored
picking wages to ten cents per bushel and the local theater owner to agree to allow
Mexicans and Mexican Americans to sit where they pleased, rather than only in
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balcony seats.

49

The local high school even began night classes for field workers,

which ran four nights a week.

50

While it achieved these victories, the union also tried to consolidate its
position within the Vahlsing workforce, which the international realized required
strong support among the truck drivers and packing house workers. By May,
however, the spinach season had ended and the union had not convinced Vahlsing
to sign an agreement. An NLRB petition filed by the UCAP AW A international
had to be withdrawn as the seasonal workers moved out of the Mathis area, but
Regional Director Donald Kobler assured Telesforo Oviedo, head of the local,
that they would be able to pick up where they left off in the fall if Oviedo
discussed their situation with "the leading workers." Kobler wrote, "I am very
anxious to have a permanent and stable organization established among these
agricultural workers for several reasons. They will not only be able to do
themselves a service, but will be maintaining a base from which a broad campaign
among agricultural workers can be launched when the International is in a
51
position to put up the necessary funds." Despite these hopes for a stable

organization from which the UCAPAW A could achieve a substantial presence in
the fields of South Texas, the local had disappeared by the beginning of the next
spinach season. In November 1942 Kobler wrote Oviedo to tell him, "Effective
November 15, I will no longer be on the payroll of UCAPAW A. Because of the
need for concentrating in the larger industrial areas, the International Union will
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no longer have a representative in Texas." 52 So ended the briefly successful
organizational effort in Mathis. Unlike the previous organization and strike
efforts, however, this one failed because of lack of support from the UCAPA WA
rather than threats or overwhelming violence.

***
To the north of these events in the border counties and along the Gulf
Coast, the largest and most sustained unionization efforts in South Texas took
place in San Antonio, where a series of strikes erupted among the Mexican and
Mexican American factory workers during the years from 1933-1938. 53 The
industries that had come to San Antonio to take advantage of its low wages and
exploitable work force suddenly confronted a thoroughgoing, sustained effort for
improved working and living conditions. During these years San Antonio
witnessed the flowering of what Vicki Ruiz described as a "cannery culture"
among the primarily female work force: "This was an intermingling of gender
roles and assembly line conditions, family and peer socialization, and at times
collective resistance and change. The signiftcance of gender cannot be
overstated, as women composed" the vast majority of the work force "and were
clustered into specific work areas." 54 But these organizational efforts on the West
Side also went beyond the creation of a workplace culture of socialization and
52
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collective resistance. They became an essential catalyst for the effort to bring
democracy to San Antonio that briefly flourished late in the decade. It was the
workers of the West Side who served as both the object lessons of the
consequences of municipal incompetence and who carried the city into its brief
interregnum of good government.
The lack of any real municipal efforts to deal with issues like working
conditions or public health meant that the potential for abuse by employers
remained a constant threat, beyond the well-established history of low wage rates
in San Antonio. These conditions allowed for two parallel developments. The
first was the establishment of factories that housed pecan, garment, and cigar
workers. The necessity of a surplus labor pool for this sort of low-wage work
meant that these factories were all located within the West Side barrio, which not
only provided a local workforce but also assured that Mexicans and Mexican
Americans filled all of these jobs due to the effects of residential segregation.
The second development in the 1930s was the explosion of homework in each of
these industries, a phenomenon much more prevalent on the West Side than in
any other part of the city. 55 Even the negligible public health protections provided
by the rudimentary factories on the West Side disappeared for homeworkers, with
whole families crowded around a kitchen table sewing children's clothing or
shelling pecans in order to provide a bare subsistence. The Roosevelt
administration and the NRA attempted to regulate homework, but federal
guidelines that called for health inspections and other protections for workers
remained unenforced on the local level while the machine held political control of
55
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the city.

56

Because these operations all occurred on the West Side, these two

strands of economic development remained hidden from view until the workers
themselves began to pull back the veil in the mid-1930s.
The San Antonio Trades Council, through its newspaper the Weekly

Standard, occasionally provided some comment on working conditions on the
West Side. In January 1934 the paper reprinted a speech given by the chairman of
the Regional Labor Relations Board, Reverend Peter Wynhoven, in which he
stated that San Antonio was the "most deplorable spot for the workingman in the
United States." After claiming that conditions in San Antonio were far worse
than any other city in the South, the reverend fumed that if "one-half of the cities
in the United States had such deplorable working conditions, there would be a
revolution. It is a great surprise that San Antonio people are so long suffering and
patient." 57 In July of that same year the paper's lead headline screamed, "San
Antonio's Pest Hole of Low Paid Labor, Stirred Again." 58 A few months later a
writer in the Dispatch argued, "The selfish few that would profit from this low
paid labor employment, are not of the citizenship that cherish great pride in the
city's history and progress, but are newcomers from other cities suffering from a
congested population that has been exploited by them, or their predecessors, until
education and a desire for higher citizenship has drained their reservoir of low
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paid labor. ... San Antonio is the last frontier for this class of exploiters."59 The
only mention made of homework came in January 1937, when the paper noted
with some surprise, "We are told that an authentic survey has revealed between
15,000 and 20,000 families who eke out a precarious existence from employment
in their homes, such as shelling pecans, garment and handkerchief making, which,
sad to state, are ofttimes [sic] mere hovels for which words can scarcely be found
to portray the squalor existing in them." 60
Cigar making, garment assembly, and pecan shelling dominated the job
market on the West Side and served as employers of first and last resort for the
thousands of Mexicans and Mexican Americans crammed into the barrio. While
pecan shelling remained the least desirable and lowest paid throughout the 1930s,
the other two industries also maintained miniscule wages and appalling health and
safety conditions in their facilities, adding to the already acute public health crisis
on the West Side. Because of these conditions and the refusal of employers or the
city government to deal with them, the West Side witnessed one organization
campaign and strike effort after another from 1933-1938, culminating in the
massive pecan shellers' strike that the city machine decried as an attempted
revolution.
The cigar industry was the first to undergo this turmoil. The Finck Cigar
Company dominated the industry in San Antonio, employing about 800 women in
1933. Wages hovered around twenty cents an hour, but workers also faced a
series of penalties that often drove their actual wages even lower. One of the
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most galling of these penalties was a fine of three good cigars for every poorly
rolled one, though Finck still sold the supposedly ruined cigars. 61 But this was
just one of the cigar workers' many grievances. Any workers who did not
produce their quota of cigars from the material given to them had to pay the
difference back to Finck. For each minute that workers were late, they were
docked one cent from their already meager wages. There was no punch-clock to
determine when they arrived at work, however. Instead, one woman's job was to
remember who was late to work and by how much. The opportunities for abuse
in this system are obvious. Workers were also only allowed five minutes to use
the restroom each day. Finck would often enter the women's restroom to remove
workers he thought had spent too much time away from their work. The company
also placed a quota of five-hundred cigars on each worker, but did not allow them
to go over the quota. If a worker finished a few hours before the workday ended,
they had to stay in the factory until Finck allowed them to leave. 62 Finally, Finck
refused to abide by the newly created NRA Cigar Code, which set wage
minimums at thirty cents an hour. 63
While anger over these issues had simmered for years, the strike broke out
in August 1933 when four hundred women, under the leadership of Mrs. W.H.
Ernst, walked out in the first major strike in depression-era San Antonio. This first
strike lasted for a month before the mayor, C.K. Quin, intervened and had each
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side send representatives to try and negotiate an end to the strike. Finck agreed to
improve conditions, though he never made clear what that entailed, and hire back
the strikers on the condition that Ernst could not return to work. The workers
reluctantly accepted the agreement, though Finck refused to sign anything. In the
end, some of the strikers were hired back while about one hundred remained
blacklisted. The company also reduced penalties for poorly-rolled cigars from
three to two well-rolled cigars. Wage rates remained below the NRA-mandated
thirty cents and hour, with strippers earning $0.17 5 per hour and rollers earning
$0.225 per hour. Inexplicably, though, the NRA accepted Finck's refusal to abide
by industry standards and awarded the company a Blue Eagle. 64
The 1933 strike was just the first of several staged against Finck during
the mid-1930s. Conditions failed to improve after the first strike, Finck continued
to refuse to rehire some of the initial strikers, and the bizarre, often dictatorial,
practices that had initially spurred the workers' anger continued unabated. 65 The
next walkout came in August 1934 after Finck ignored the agreements he had
made with the workers and the NRA and again cut wages and increased penalties
for work deemed substandard. Unlike the first strike, however, the union
attempted to keep strikebreakers from entering the cigar factory. A number of
violent confrontations resulted between strikers and replacement workers. As a
result, the San Antonio Police and Bexar County Sheriffs Department became
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involved in this second strike, after remaining on the sidelines in 1933. Chief of
Police Owen Kilday, a prominent machine official, instituted a policy of
unrestrained hostility toward strikers that would continue throughout the strike
waves of the 1930s. Kilday and Sheriff Albert West threatened to arrest and
deport all picketers who refused to return to work, and on a few occasions
sheriffs deputies threatened strikers in their own homes. 66 Mayor Quin remained
conspicuous by his absence in dealing with this strike, instead allowing Kilday to
crush it as he saw fit. When it became clear that Finck and the city government
were determined to defeat the strikers, they called off the 1934 strike after a few
months. 67
A new strike broke out in March 1935, however, over these same issues of
low pay, horrible working conditions, and dictatorial management, with the final
outrage coming when Finck raised the penalty for poorly-rolled cigars from two
to four. 68 The police and sheriffs deputies continued their determined efforts to
crush the strike, especially after a number of violent outbreaks between strikers
and strikebreakers during the first few days of picketing. A number of these
instances of violence were at least partially instigated by the police, who escorted
strikebreakers past the picket line. There were also instances of police trying to
force strikers into the factory to work. 69 A writer for the Weekly Dispatch noted,
"Evidently the management had arranged for the protection of the law, and Chief
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of Police Kilday, and Sheriff A. West, with their assistants, were on hand to
protect the sanctity of property against the personal rights of the workers." 70 The
Cigarmaker's Union tried to force Finck into arbitration through the new
protections in the Wagner Act, but the company refused, intent on continuing to
use the police to maintain operations during the strike. After eight months, the
strike ended with Finck employing a completely non-union workforce. As a final
insult, all strikers found themselves blacklisted throughout the city after the strike
ended. 71
While the 1935 strike ended in failure, it set the tone for the strikes that
followed, as increasingly militant workers confronted more aggressive and overt
police interference, which only increased the intransigence of San Antonio's
employers. It was against this background of growing tensions that the garment
workers' and pecan shellers' strikes occurred in the aftermath of the collapsed
cigar efforts. Kilday and city officials remained the chief backers of the city's
employers, while a number of future activists emerged from the Finck strikes as
militant organizers determined to create some change in the economic and social
relations of San Antonio. 72
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Shortly after the organizational efforts began in the cigar factories, women
in the city's garment factories also sought to use the opportunities accorded them
by the passage of the NRA to increase wage rates and improve working
conditions. Unlike the cigar industry, which had a long history in San Antonio,
the garment industry was a relative newcomer to the city. Protective legislation
passed in the Northeast, especially New York, led many clothing manufacturers to
establish assembly factories in places like San Antonio. As a result, the industry
grew rapidly in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 73 Like the pecan-shelling industry
discussed below, these factories were almost completely non-mechanized, relying
instead on hand work provided by workers earning wages far below those in the
more mechanized eastern garment assembly plants. The strikes that occurred
from 1934-1938 emerged out of similar conditions as those at Finck Cigar.
The International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) began
operations in San Antonio in 1933 in an effort to raise wages in the industry's
cheapest labor outpost. 74 The union's early activities sought not only to organize
as many of the Mexican and Mexican American female workers as possible, but
also to use the NRA as leverage against companies reluctant to submit to
voluntary, government-mandated standards. The NRA code for the garment
industry required a wage of thirty cents an hour for southern states (two cents
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below the wage level for the rest of the country). The U.S. District Attorney for
San Antonio even filed an injunction against one of the garment manufacturers for
violating the NRA code. 75 These complaints by federal officials, however, fell on
deaf ears according to a writer for the Weekly Dispatch. The employers of the
city sought "to make San Antonio a cesspool for low paid workers" by contending
that "Southwestern garment manufacturers could not compete under the code with
garment workers of Puerto Rico." 76
Recruiting workers into the ILGWU proved difficult, however, as
employers launched a propaganda campaign to dissuade workers from joining the
union, while the conditions of widespread homework complicated organizational
efforts by decentralizing the workforce. Still, through the efforts of a number of
ILGWU organizers and local activists, the union had recruited a number of
workers from a few of the garment manufacturers by 1936. 77 The first strike
occurred in 1936 against the Dorothy Frocks Company for higher wages and
union recognition. The San Antonio police quickly returned to the pattern of
behavior developed during the cigar strikes, acting as armed escorts for
strikebreakers while continually harassing strikers and threatening to deport those
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who did not return to work. 78 In an effort to continue production, the company
shifted its operations to another factory. The strikers set up a picket around this
new location, leading to a memorable confrontation in which fifty strikers
surrounded and disrobed strikebreakers attempting to enter the facility. 79 When
that did not work, Dorothy Frocks simply shut down their San Antonio operations
and moved to Dallas. The company returned to San Antonio a few months later
and signed a union contract, but employment never reached pre-strike levels. A
year later the ILGWU won another victory when the Shirlee Frocks Company
agreed to raise wages to twenty cents an hour, which almost doubled previous
wages but still lagged well behind NRA regulations. 80
These qualified victories brought newfound respect and notoriety to the
ILGWU, with more workers seeking membership while other garment
manufacturers sought to formulate plans to keep the union out of their factories.
A typical response to these events came from the Texas Infant Manufacturing
Company. They summarily fired any workers they suspected of ILGWU
membership or sympathies, while also establishing a company-run union, the
Council of Garment Workers, that all employees had to join. In response to these
clear violations of the Wagner Act, the ILGWU lodged a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board in early 1938, demanding that the ILGWU
members be rehired and that the Council of Garment Workers be dissolved. The
NLRB ruled in favor of the union, but Texas Infant refused to abide by the ruling.
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As a result, the ILGWU declared a strike in March 1938. As with previous
strikes, the company attempted to hold out through the use of strikebreakers,
while the police harassed and arrested strikers when they were not acting as
armed guards for Texas Infant Manufacturing. The company finally gave out
under the pressure of the strike and a boycott effort. On the strength of this string
of victories, the ILGWU continued to grow in San Antonio into the early 1940s,
the only example of such success among Mexican and Mexican American
. 81
work ers .m the regiOn.

While the cigar and garment workers called attention to the brewing
discontent among the workers of the West Side, it was the activities of the
Workers Alliance that represented the most militant reaction to the conditions in
San Antonio. The Workers Alliance was a national organization that sought to
organize public works employees and the unemployed. The San Antonio council
burst onto the scene during 1935 in the aftermath of the early cigar and garment
strikes. "One of the very first issues at the Workers Alliance here was the right of
workers to organize without fear of deportation," according to Emma Tenayuca.
"But the pressure of economic conditions moved faster in the direction of poverty.
. . . The Workers Alliance gathered a tremendous momentum when the workers
returned from the fields, not having worked, without money and without food." 82
City officials responded fiercely to the activities of the Alliance. Tenayuca
reported, "Scores ... were herded before the United States Immigration office
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and threatened with deportation merely for membership in the Workers Alliance,"
including a number of U.S. citizens. 83
By 1937 the Alliance turned its focus to public works employment.
Tenayuca and other activists in the Alliance had conducted a number of letterwriting campaigns to WPA officials in Washington demanding expanded
employment opportunities in San Antonio and the end to wage discrimination that
allowed Anglos to earn more on public works projects than Mexican Americans. 84
On June 29, 1937, however, the Workers Alliance staged a protest at the city's
WP A office after employment rolls had been slashed at the request of Texas farm
interests. According to an Alliance sympathizer, "Realizing the need of large
numbers of petitioners in order to command the attention of local officials,
through them indicating to Federal authorities the necessity for further
continuance of the WPA program, the San Antonio Workers Alliance, on June 29,
1937, sent a complaint committee of about one hundred men and women to the
district WP A office to protest the discharge of over one thousand WP A workers
in San Antonio." 85 The local WPA director returned from lunch to find the
delegation waiting for him. Rather than speak to them, however, he immediately
called the police to remove them from the building. The police arrived and, using
their over-sized nightsticks, drove the protestors out of the building. For his part,
Mayor Quin immediately released a statement to the press declaring that the

83

Emma Tenayuca and Homer Brooks, "The Mexican Question in the Southwest," The
Communist (March 1939), 262-263.
84
Vargas, Labor Rights are Civil Rights, 130.
85
Cassie Jane Winfrey, "Gangster Police Methods Come to Texas," no date, Box 2El89, Folder 5,
Labor Movement in Texas Collection, UT-CAH.

298
Workers Alliance had engaged in a sit-down strike and that he approved of police
actions in violently removing the protestors. 86
A few hours later a squad of police appeared at the Workers Alliance
headquarters on the West Side. Armed with axes and clubs made from the leaded
ends of pool cues, they forced everyone out of the building, clubbing "everyone
within reach."

87

After everyone had been forced out, the police then proceeded to

systematically demolish everything within the office. A reporter for the San
Antonio Light wrote, "Banners, flags, pictures, charters were ripped from the

walls, tom into shreds and stomped on. . . . Benches and chairs were hammered
to pieces. One officer of the law placed a typewriter on the floor and tromped on
it. . . . A duplicating machine was demolished. The stove was kicked over and
broken. A drawerful of dishes was found and officers broke them piece by
piece." 88 The San Antonio News reported that "officers pounded out a tune on the
piano, then turned it over and broke it." 89 Meanwhile, on the street outside police
randomly attacked passersby: "Out in the street one man was struck in the legs
with a nightstick, then arrested as he hobbled off because it was alleged he was
not moving away fast enough. A woman was also arrested because she did not
move fast enough." 90 Such an overwhelming show of force could only have been
meant as a warning to the Workers Alliance and any prospective agitators that the
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San Antonio Police would not hesitate to resort to violence (either systematic or
random) when possible.
In the aftermath of this savage attack, Police Chief Kilday declared that he
had found a large amount of literature, written in a foreign language (if Spanish
can be considered a foreign language in San Antonio), that appeared, to his
trained eye, to be "Communistic."

91

These pamphlets provided all the proof

Kilday and the machine needed to assert that the protests breaking out on the
West Side were led by outside agitators, despite the fact that Tenayuca and the
other leaders were San Antonio natives. Still, when Tenayuca's lawyer tried to
secure her release from jail on a writ of habeas corpus, the judge bellowed back,
"She belongs in jail. Let her stay there!" Since she was a "damned Communist,"
the judge declared that he did not care what the police did to her. 92
Despite the ferocity of this police attack, Tenayuca and the Workers
Alliance continued to agitate on the West Side, especially among the workers of
the city's largest employers: pecan shelling companies. In many ways, pecan
shelling served as a perfect symbol of employment in San Antonio's West Side.
Its workers suffered under horrific working conditions and earned the lowest
factory wages in the nation. These low wages and plentiful labor supply allowed
the pecan companies to maintain completely non-mechanized operations, while
also providing massive profits for the operators. Within the atmosphere of the
depression, however, with strikes breaking out in the other industries of the West
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Side, the pecan workers also launched a series of strikes between 1934 and the
early 1940s.
Because of its location, San Antonio had been the leading center of pecan
shelling for fifty years by the time of the Great Depression. Almost half of the
national pecan crop was produced within a radius of a few hundred miles of the
city. Since pecan shells made up more than half of the total weight of each pecan,
it was cheaper to shell them in nearby San Antonio than to ship them elsewhere to
be processed. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shelling
was done by hand, but by the early 1920s the industry had begun to mechanize
most of its operations. These machines graded and cracked the pecans. Workers
then picked out the shells. San Antonio firms and their primary competition in St.
Louis utilized these machines during the first years of the 1920s. 93
The industry changed drastically in 1926, however, with the formation of
the Southern Pecan Shelling Company. Begun by Julius Seligmann and Joe
Freeman with a $50,000 investment, Southern Pecan rapidly dominated the
industry. 94 Rather than trying to keep up with the mechanized operations of the
other pecan firms, Seligmann and Freeman, in the words of social scientist Harold
Shapiro, "inverted the technological process." 95 Realizing the potential of the
massive surplus labor pool available on the West Side, Southern employed only
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hand labor from the beginning of operations in 1926, slashing their overhead
costs.
They also instituted a contractor system. Through this arrangement,
Southern Pecan sold unshelled pecans to contractors who hired the labor and
provided work space. The contractor then sold the shelled pecans back to the
company at a predetermined price. Since it held a virtual monopoly, Southern
Pecan was able to dictate every aspect of the production process to these
contractors. 96 It set the prices and wages, and anyone who deviated from
Southern Pecan dictates risked blacklisting. By the early 1930s, Southern Pecan
operations stretched out over more than four hundred shelling sheds throughout
the West Side as well as an unknown number of homes where families shelled
pecans.
The contractor system gave Southern a number of advantages over its
competitors. It did not need a large central factory, which limited overhead.
Most importantly, however, by passing off issues of hiring and workplace
management to contractors, the company rid itself of any need to worry about the
consequences of low pay, long hours, and unhealthy working conditions. Even
though the contractors remained little more than impoverished employees of
Southern Pecan, the company could continually pass blame for the consequences
of their business practices down the line to those who operated the shelling sheds.
As a result, Southern Pecan rapidly out-competed its local and national
96
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competitors, and held an almost complete monopoly over San Antonio pecan
shelling by the mid-l930s. 97
At the onset of the Great Depression, Southern Pecan, through its network
of contractors, was the largest employer on the West Side, employing between
IO,OOO and 20,000 shellers during the peak season each year. 98 Only a fraction of
this number worked during non-peak seasons. The seasonality of pecan shelling
was not dictated by the perishability of pecans, however. 99 Instead, labor needs
determined the peak operating season for pecan shelling. During the winter
months, when migrant farm workers returned to their off-season homes on the
West Side, an enormous number of the seasonally unemployed resided near the
pecan sheds, providing Southern Pecan with the largest possible pool of surplus
labor at the lowest possible wages.
Pecan shelling and migrant farm work fed off each other. Pecan shelling
wages acted as a subsidy for agricultural interests in other parts of the state and
country, providing employment for migrant farmworkers between seasons.
Conversely, sugar beet or cotton employment served as a subsidy to the pecan
shelling industry, allowing it to continue paying minuscule wages. This linkage
became especially important as the depression deepened and agricultural jobs
became harder to find. In tum, the infinitesimal wages afforded by both pecan
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shelling and migrant farm work forced many Mexicans and Mexican Americans
to seek out what little relief, public or private, could be found in San Antonio. 100
As a result, pecan shelling and migrant labor acted as a two-headed parasite that
fed off of both local relief and the workers of San Antonio's West Side, creating a
self-sustaining cycle of falling wages and intensifying poverty despite rising
profits for farmers and the pecan industry.
Pecan shelling provided necessary winter employment during the worst
years of the Great Depression for most of these workers. 101 As CIO organizer
George Lambert recalled, 'The pecan shelling industry wasn't that important
economically or any other way to San Antonio except that it provided the barest
subsistence living to the migratory farm workers, who came in and shelled the
pecans for Seligmann in the winter months." 102 In other words, the pecan
industry was the deteriorating cornerstone of the poorly-constructed West Side
labor market, barely holding up a rickety structure that threatened to come
crashing down around its unfortunate inhabitants.
Pecan work was often an option of last resort, however. Pecan jobs were
not sought after, but instead provided the least desirable, but necessary,
employment to help West Siders get through the winter. The 10,000 to 20,000
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workers in the shelling sheds at the peak of each season during the Great
Depression was a product of nothing more than the abject economic desperation
of many on the West Side. The pecan sheds offered the worst wages in the city,
with most workers unable to earn any more than two dollars per week. In the four
month period from September 1 to December 31, 1937, according to Social
Security returns from Southern Pecan, regular employees received between
$10.18 and $4 7 .11. The highest earning employee averaged less than three
dollars per week over that four-month period. 103 Thus, pecan workers actually
made less money in their urban jobs than they did as migrant farm workers.
Cotton pickers, for example, tended to make a dollar more per week than pecan
shellers.
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Taking up the familiar refrain, the owner of a small pecan-shelling

operation claimed that pecan wages were sufficient for Mexican workers: "The
Mexicans don't want much money.... Compared to those shanties they live in,
the pecan shelleries are fine. They are glad to have a warm place to sit in the
winter. They can be warm while they're shelling pecans, they can talk to their
friends while they're working, their kids can come in after school and play
because it's better than going home. If they get hungry they can eat pecans."
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Workers did not need subsistence wages, according to this shed owner, because
they could stuff themselves with pecans while chatting with their friends.
One former sheller, who began working alongside her parents as a young
girl, recalled that "conditions were very, very poor. When you get fifty, sixty
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persons all in one place, you know, sitting side by side, sitting on wooden benches
... and being there for eight hours, maybe nine [or] ten hours a day, that's a bad
situation. Of course, we had no sanitary conditions at all. . . . The majority were
women. Later on as the depression progressed, men had to come in and sit next to
the family to do the work. You take, for example, my father- I think that as a last
resort he had to go in and shell pecans. He was a very proud man, but he had to
leave his pride behind him and to go in there and sit next to us to earn a living
because there was nothing else." 106 Once they found themselves within the
contractors' sheds and began shelling, workers had to deal with a constant cloud
of pecan dust that caused respiratory problems for many elderly workers. Their
fingers often became swollen and infected after hours of handling broken shells
each day. Even worse, basic standards of public health were impossible to
maintain in these structures with poor ventilation and a complete lack of
illumination or running water. For people who already lived in a disease-ridden
environment like the West Side barrio, these additional health hazards at work
only exacerbated an already horrible situation. 107
This long list of dangers and grievances continued to grow during the
1930s as Seligmann and Southern Pecan continually refused to raise wages.
Throughout the depression Seligmann pronounced that he and the rest of the
pecan industry wanted to pay higher wages, but competition and low profits made
it impossible. 108 He also carried this message into his dealings with the federal

106

Alberta Snid interviewed by Maria Flores and Glenn Scott, no date, Oral History Collection,
Texas Labor Archives, Univserity of Texas at Arlington.
107
Blackwelder, Women of the Depression, 104-105.
108
Richard Croxdale, "Pecan Shellers," Texas Humanist (April 1979), 9.

306
government. In August 1933 the National Pecan Shellers' Association, an
industry group of which Southern Pecan was a member, agreed to abide by NRA
regulations to raise weekly wages for workers to around $6.50, with an absolute
ceiling at $12.00. The NRA code committee drew up regulations for a minimum
wage of $11 per week for men and $7 for women. Furious at this agreement,
Seligmann withdrew from the National Pecan Shellers' Association and formed
the Southwestern Pecan Shellers Association, which demanded a separate code
for southern pecan shellers, similar to the garment industry. At a meeting before
the committee, Seligmann testified that "Mexican Pecan Shellers eat a good many
pecans, and five cents a day is enough to support them in addition to what they eat
, while they work." 109 The NRA code committee bowed to the pressure for lower
wages (though not as low as Seligmann wanted) and created a new code with a
minimum wage of fifteen cents per hour or six dollars per week, which would
have tripled pay in San Antonio. When the code became effective in October
1934, however, Seligmann simply ignored it. 110
The first attempts to organize pecan workers predated Southern's refusal
to abide by the NRA code, however. Two separate unions were formed in 1933.
The first, El Nogal, was an independent union that claimed almost 4,000 members
but did little during these years. 111 The second, the Pecan Shelling Workers
Union, was led by Magdaleno Rodriguez and bankrolled by Julius Seligmann in
an effort to keep smaller pecan operations from undercutting Southern's wage
109
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scale. Thus, Rodriguez carried on a strange campaign of threatening to strike any
employer that cut wages, while also demanding that employers not adopt the
NRA code. He argued that NRA wages would force thousands of pecan shellers
out of business, but it seems more likely that he was simply acting as a bludgeon
against any employer who dared offer wages different than those mandated by
Southern Pecan. 112
Nevertheless, Rodriguez led the first pecan strike in July 1934 against
shelling sheds not operated by Seligmann. These sheds had recently cut wages
from six cents a pound for pecan halves and four cents for pieces down to four
and a half and three and a half cents a pound. The strike lasted a few weeks
before collapsing. The same union attempted a number of similar strikes the next
year against a few small pecan operators who sought to cut wages, but again
failed to achieve anything. 113 Rodriguez claimed to represent more than ten
thousand workers, but his union was little more than a one-man affair, and it
faded away during the next few years, only to reemerge when Seligmann required
Rodriguez's obstructionist activities to check the growth of a more legitimate
union in 1938. 114
The industry remained quiet for the next few years until January 31, 1938,
when Southern Pecan told their contractors to lower wages from six cents per

112

Menefee and Cassmore, Pecan Shellers of San Antonio, 16-17; Shapiro, "Pecan Shellers of San
Antonio," 233.
113
Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, 279.
114
Rodriguez appears throughout the primary and secondary evidence, but he remains a shadowy
figure. The only positive depiction I have ever seen is from Ruben Munguia, a labor supporter
who ran a printing shop on the West Side. See Ruben Munguia, The Nueceros Spoke (N.P.:
1982). See also Herbert Henderson to Malcolm Bardwell, February 24, 1935, Document 77,
Tranchese Collection, St. Mary's University Special Collections, San Antonio, Texas; Edward J.
Shaughnessy to Senator Morris Sheppard, April 21, 1936, File 55854/100, RG 85, USNA.

308
pound for pieces and seven cents for halves down to five and six cents. This
twenty percent wage cut caused a spontaneous walkout by more than six thousand
shellers.ll 5 Magdaleno Rodriguez's old union, now rechristened the Union de

Nueceros Unidos, was briefly revived by Seligmann to try and end the strike, but
failed to draw the strikers back to work. Rodriguez's union remained on the
scene, however, as a goon squad sent out by the pecan company to threaten
strikers. 116 The early leadership of this strike came from the veteran activists of
the previous West Side strikes and the Workers Alliance, primarily women like
Emma Tenayuca, Maria Solis Sager, and other local community leaders. 117 A
Department of Labor conciliator later stated, "At the time of the strike there were
no real union leaders present so 3 Communists took charge."ll 8 Within a few
days, however, Donald Henderson and the UCAPAW A arrived in San Antonio
and took control of the strike as part of that union's brief efforts to expand into
Texas.ll 9 They formed Pecan Workers Local No. 172 and demanded union
recognition, collective bargaining rights, and the restoration of the pay cut until
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arbitrators could determine proper wage rates. 120 While these were hardly
revolutionary demands, Southern Pecan and the machine treated them as such.
The importance of this strike soon grew far beyond the efforts of previous
years in the cigar and garment industries. What began as a spontaneous walkout
over slashed pay rates soon morphed into a full-fledged social movement on the
West Side that had repercussions that went far beyond considerations of wage
levels in a single industry, even one so central to the community as pecan
shelling. As CIO organizer George Lambert recalled, "It had at its inception
taken on the aspect of a mass uprising among the Mexican-Americans in the
entire West Side of San Antonio, and was being participated in actively by
hundreds and perhaps thousands who didn't themselves make a living in the
pecan industry." 121 Sugar beet migrants and WPA workers, who formed a
"middle class" among laborers on the West Side, worked as organizers and
bodyguards throughout the strike. 122 This community-wide support only grew
during the length of the strike, as support committees, mass meetings, and picket
lines multiplied throughout the barrio.
On the other side of this struggle, the city machine and Southern Pecan
maintained a grim determination to use any measures necessary to crush the
strike. Joseph Myers, Chief Labor Department Conciliator during the strike,
noted, "The ring feels that if the pecan shellers are allowed to remain organized
they would help to re-elect Maverick. . . . This will explain why the Chief of

°
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Police is determined to break up the union, and to publicly proclaim that there
shall be no peaceful settlement of the strike. They have, apparently, enlisted the
support of Immigration Inspector W.W. Knopp, who has declared his intention to
deport all Mexicans not regularly admitted to this country, some 63 found and
arrested on the picket lines." 123 Chief of Police Kilday declared that he was
attempting to stop a revolution, and under those circumstances any means were
justified.
The pecan operators and the police could count on two unlikely allies in
this struggle: the Mexican American middle class and the Archbishop of San
Antonio. The Mexican Chamber of Commerce and LULAC were conspicuous in
their opposition to the strike, just as they were a few years later in supporting the
city machine against Maury Maverick. According to historian Richard Garcia, "It
seems that the middle class did not want to be disturbed. During the 1934-38
period, when different sectors of the Mexican laboring class were striking, the life
of the ricos and the upper middle class continued as usual. Labor strikes thus did
not unify the Mexican community, they separated it." 124 Likewise, Archbishop
Arthur Drossaerts was an early opponent of the strike effort. In a congratulatory
letter to Chief Kilday during the strike, he wrote, "Our police force has had a hard
task of it these past three weeks. They fought, not the downtrodden sufferers of
an egotistic capitalistic system, but the dangerous leadership trying to make hay
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while the communistic sun was apparently appearing above our San Antonio
horizon." 125
Given the enormous gulf that lay between these forces, it is no surprise
that the ensuing strike became quite contentious and violent. From the very
beginning, Chief Kilday declared that there was no strike, and therefore the city
did not have to allow any form of picketing, thereby performing an end-run
around the First Amendment. A few days after the first walkout, he announced,
"I am going to break up the picket lines this morning or any other morning the
same situation arises, on the grounds that there is no strike." 126 Thus, the police
and the city machine declared that all unrest came, not from any legitimate
grievances, but from outside agitators seeking chaos as a means to their ultimate
end of a communist takeover. Police arrested picketers surrounding the few
shelling sheds attempting to continue operations during the strike, while also
announcing that the pecan industry continued to operate as before. In all, more
than a thousand were arrested and thrown into the Bexar County Jail.
The violence that occurred was almost entirely instigated by San
Antonio's law enforcement establishment. Special police were deputized and sent
into the West Side to enter strikers' homes and threaten them with arrest and
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deportation if they did not return to work. 127 Mass meetings, or even small
crowds of people with no relation to the strike efforts, were tear-gassed. The city
health department even rose from its long slumber to close down a soup kitchen
frequented by strikers for health code violations. A riot then ensued when an
angry crowd protesting the closure was dispersed with teargas and then randomly
beaten by club-wielding police officers. 128 Two days later, the San Antonio Light,
which tended to be the most moderate of San Antonio's daily newspapers, printed
a front-page picture two weeks into the strike of an officer holding new, larger
nightsticks, in what was clearly meant as a warning to the strikers, under the
headline, "Police Get Clubby." 129
Conciliator Joseph Myers remained in San Antonio throughout the strike
and recorded the reign of terror as it occurred. As one of the only people in
contact with both the strike leaders and city officials, he witnessed both sides of
this struggle. On February 11, 1938, he reported that Kilday's claims of
Communist agitation were "[o]nly a subterfuge." In addition, he declared,
"Brutality of police beggars description" and "will ever remain a disgrace to this

°

city." 13 Four days later he reported, "The Chief of Police very curtly informed"
officials looking into the case "that any attempt to picket he would have his police
use tear gas and clubs and break up any kind of picketing. City firemen have also
been armed with clubs and made to aid the police." 131 Whether or not one can
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believe Kilday's statements that he sought to put down a revolution, the lengths to
which he and the police went to crush the strike effort, or any other signs of
dissent on the West Side, seem to indicate that they truly believed they were
fighting against an uprising that threatened to do more than bring higher wages
and unionization in its wake. What is clear is that the police counterattacks did
not derail the protest movement growing among the Mexicans and Mexican
Americans of San Antonio, but instead seem to have imbued it with a radical
determination to force change that only became more determined with each
nightstick and tear gas attack.
During the second week of the strike, Governor James Allred attempted to
force the two sides together to resolve the strike. He sent the State Industrial
Commission to San Antonio to investigate the situation and report back to him.
When the commission tried to convene on February 14, however, Mayor Quin
refused to give the group any accommodations for their meeting. Finally, county
officials allowed the group to meet in a room in the Bexar County Courthouse.
For the next two days the commissioners heard testimony from a number of
individuals on both sides of the strike. At the end of these hearings the
Commission reported back to Allred that "wages are abnormally low, that living
conditions are insupportable, and that no evidence has been adduced to justify
police interference with police picketing." 132 Despite the clear condemnation of
the actions of Southern Pecan and the city government, however, strike efforts
and police counterattacks continued through the end of February.
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Finally, on March 9, both sides came together and agreed to submit the
case to a board of arbitration, which ended picketing and the violence that came
along with it. Southern Pecan would appoint one arbitrator, Local No. 172 would
appoint a second, and the third would be an impartial arbitrator agreed to by both
sides. Each side appointed their arbitrator, but Seligmann refused to agree to a
third person for the arbitration board, in what seems to have been an attempt to
hold up the proceedings and force the union's hand. 133 After almost a month of
stalling the proceedings, however, Seligmann agreed to the final arbitrator and the
board finally sat down on April l to investigate the situation. While the board
collected information and prepared its decision, Seligmann, through Mayor Quin
and Congressman Lyndon Johnson, agitated for relief subsidies from the
Department of Agriculture for pecan companies, especially Southern Pecan,
claiming that the strike and increased foreign competition threatened to destroy
the industry. 134 On April 13 the arbitrators released their report, stating that "the
Pecan Industry in San Antonio is in a perilous plight, conditions are very bad, not
only for the workers, but for the Operators and contractors." 135 They further
decided that an immediate restoration of the wage cut would threaten the industry,
so the board decided that wages would increase to 6.5 cents per pound for halves
and 5.5 cents for pieces, effective for six months. 136 Both sides accepted the
decision, and Southern Pecan and the minor operators agreed to closed-shop
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contracts effective until November 1, 1938. 137 For the time being, it appeared that
the union had won a rousing victory.
The controversy was far from over, however. The passage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 complicated the situation by mandating a
national minimum wage of twenty-five cents. The pecan operators first tried to
get around this law by claiming that pecan shelling was agricultural employment,
and therefore exempt from federal labor law. Others claimed that their business
was entirely intrastate, and therefore did not fall under federal jurisdiction. When
these tactics did not work, Southern Pecan simply shut down the industry in late
October, 1938, while Seligmann went to Washington to lobby for exemption from
the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA. 138 When pecan shelling began again a
few weeks later, most of the shelling sheds never reopened and the operators
instituted a "stretch-out" that forced workers to shell an amount well beyond the
ability of most employed in the sheds. 139 As this slow process of weeding out
workers continued, Southern Pecan persisted in its efforts to gain an exemption
from the minimum wage while planning to re-mechanize the industry more than a
decade after they had reverted to hand shelling. 140 By 1940, the pecan workforce
had shrunk to a fraction of its peak in the 1930s even as the union maintained a
hold on the newly mechanized facilities of Southern Pecan.
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In the end, then, it could be said that, at best, the pecan shellers won a
pyrrhic victory. A few years later, economist Frederic Meyers noted that the
catastrophic effects on business that some had predicted would result from the
Fair Labor Standards Act had not occurred. He wrote that "some 'straggler'
enterprises are forced out of existence, and some employees find themselves
without jobs, although, actually, few cases of reduced employment in industries
affected most by the act have been found." 141 In a footnote below this statement,
however, Meyers noted, "The only major case of unemployment that has come to
the attention of this author was the pecan-shelling industry, in which the increased
wage from prevailing levels of under $0.10 per hour resulted in the utilization of
already existing mechanical techniques for shelling pecans and the displacement
of a very large part of the labor force." 142 Once again, the Mexican and Mexican
American workers of South Texas found themselves victims, whether
intentionally or not, of New Deal legislation meant to ameliorate their situation.
With their union now a hollow shell, especially for those no longer employed in
pecan shelling, and the emergent social movement on the West Side dissolved,
little seemed to have changed by the early 1940s. The reformist tendencies that
emerged around the strike effort helped defeat the city machine in the 1939
mayoral election, but two years later that victory also disappeared. For those who
had previously depended on pecan shelling for subsistence, some could find
employment at Finck Cigar, which claimed no interstate business and therefore
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did not have to pay the minimum wage, while others had no choice but to return
143
.
to the mtgrant stream.

These changes in pecan shelling, like the other commercial activities in
South Texas that depended on cheap labor and low overhead costs, point toward a
few important conclusions. One is the lack of a clear line dividing these urban
processing operations from agricultural fieldwork. While a clear delineation
between agricultural and non-agricultural employment runs through labor law, the
actual conditions of pecan shelling, shrimp hulling, and vegetable canning evince
little difference from the conditions of agricultural labor. Seasonal
unemployment, low wages, and a dependence on agricultural wages during part of
the year by many of the factory workers in South Texas belied the simplistic
dichotomy of agricultural and non-agricultural labor. But this reality points
toward a more important point, made clearer by corporate decentralization in
recent decades. While industrial processes have always been depicted as constant
and eternal with impulses toward growth and increased sophistication, pecan
shelling (as well as the more recent establishment of less technologically
advanced factories overseas to take advantage of cheaper labor) reveals the
illusion of the permanence of industry and mechanization. The de-mechanization
andre-mechanization of Southern Pecan simply served as an early example of the
contingent nature of technology within the capitalist system.

***
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The experience of the Great Depression in South Texas differed in
important ways from other parts of the United States. Most obviously, the
deportation and repatriation drives affected South Texas more profoundly than
any other region during the early years of the Depression. Beyond this obvious
difference, however, there lay a series of more subtle, but equally important,
variations unique to South Texas that had enormous ramifications on everyday
life in the region. The migrant labor stream that had begun and ended in South
Texas for decades now confronted a series of new pressures brought on by the
Dust Bowl migration, reduced agricultural prices, threats of deportation, and a
number of other factors that made the already unstable life of seasonal farm
laborers even more unpredictable. These stresses produced an increasing
urbanization of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who sought the relative safety
against deportation provided by a place like the West Side of San Antonio. The
lack of any established system of public relief then fell hard on the shoulders of
Mexicans and Mexican Americans already reeling from the economic pressures of
the depression. At the same time, the hundreds of thousands who left South
Texas for Mexico during the depression also helped accelerate a trend toward the
formation of a native-born middle class that introduced a more pronounced class
cleavage into these communities.
The results of all of these intense pressures looked very different from
those endured by the working class in other parts of the United States. Lizabeth
Cohen's landmark study of the Chicago working class, for instance, described a
subtle process of change during the 1920s and 1930s that culminated in the

319
increased political participation and sense of class consciousness of the union
drives during the mid-1930s. A common mass culture, a sense of betrayal at the
collapse of the welfare capitalist schemes of the 1920s, and the struggle for
subsistence created by the economic collapse helped erase divisions based on
ethnicity and skill. 144 There were no developments in San Antonio or South
Texas parallel to Cohen's depiction of Depression-era Chicago, however.
Instead, the already rigid lines of ethnicity and class only seemed to harden in
South Texas, as Anglos chose to look away from the conditions in Tejano
communities, and the Mexican American middle class sought to distance itself
from the immigrants and workers that made up the majority of their
.

commumty.
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Standing at the beginning of the 1940s, the situation of the workers in San
Antonio and South Texas must have looked very similar to the way in which they
began the era of the Great Depression. Segregation still held sway in labor and
social relations. Migrant agricultural labor remained the economic mainstay of
the Mexican and Mexican American communities. Violence lurked just below of
the surface of these relations, though primarily as an unspoken threat rather than a
regularly-practiced mode of coercion. Beyond these surface similarities,
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however, the events of the late 1920s and 1930s had substantially altered the
realities of life for many in South Texas.
National scapegoating of Mexicans as· parasites that caused the Great
Depression continued throughout the 1930s. The resulting deportation and
repatriation campaigns that targeted the Mexican and Mexican American
communities made a mockery of the rights of citizenship, while the intensification
of the web of labor controls did the same for workers' rights. When Mexicans
and Mexican Americans attempted to overcome these handicaps through
organization and unionization, they confronted the overwhelming power of
employers, law enforcement, and vigilantes united to crush anything that smacked
of pleas for improved wages or working conditions. Thus, if at the end of the
Depression conditions looked the same as before the economic collapse, these
similarities hid a number of scars that had developed over the previous decade.
While strikers and activists attempted to change the rigid political and racial
structures of South Texas during the Depression, their failures resonated for
decades to come. Unionization efforts disappeared among South Texas Mexicans
and Mexican Americans until the farm worker strikes of the 1960s, while efforts
for political reform and civil rights protection moved into the more genteel arena
of middle class protest movements led by LULAC and the G.I. Forum. 146
If the nation as a whole crawled out of the depths of the Depression with
the beginning of World War II, the Mexicans and Mexican Americans of South
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Texas had a more difficult path to recovery. While their struggle for full
citizenship began with World War II, it would be many years before it would
come to fruition. In the meantime, they watched as the war effort helped spread
the labor relations of South Texas to the rest of the nation in a way that went well
beyond the efforts of northern agricultural and industrial interests in the 1920s to
recruit Mexicans and Mexican Americans.
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Chapter 9: Texas is Everywhere South of the Canadian Border: The Bracero
Program and the Nationalization of South Texas Labor Relations
"Throughout the southwest, from California to Arkansas, a substitute form of industrial
relations was being worked out. Its characteristics were the negotiation of labor contracts
by diplomats, the determination of wages by administrative discretion, the abandonment
of the constitutional rights of the Mexican migrants in exchange for treaty rights of a
lower order, the nullification of the right of administrative appeal of American citizens,
and the enforcement of contractual rights, duties and obligations by one of the parties to a
contract. The fact that these unusual procedures were being tried out on an unorganized
mass of alien laborers; that the United States Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of Mexico, could put themselves up as business agents, mediators,
negotiators, shop stewards and enforcers in a managed labor market - these thing did not
greatly disturb the house of labor, appearing, as they did, quaint rather than ominous."
Ernesto Galarza 1
"I know that we can bring ten thousand Tipica Orchestras here and send five thousand
Rotary Clubs and Kiwanis Clubs and other good will delegations into Mexico, yet so
long as the Mexican knows that he may be killed with impunity by any American who
chooses to kill him, then all our talk about being good neighbors is merely paying lip
service to a friendship we both know is a joke. . . . Our present Good Neighbor policy
with Mexico has nothing of the spontaneous and the warm-hearted about it. Our present
policy is one of pure expediency, forced upon our state and our governor when Mexico
refused to let her laborers come here during the war because we discriminated against
Mexicans."
Hart Stilwell2

In February 1952 Clifford Parliman, absentee farmowner and selfdescribed "industrial engineer" from Edinburg (Hidalgo County), wrote to Texas
Governor Allen Shivers with a simple request: "It would seem the time has come
where we people of this great State of Texas should begin to seek ways and
means to get out from under the yoke of the United States, so that we may operate
independently." What great injustice had caused Parliman to make this radical
suggestion? "The U.S. Congress and Senate enacted a law controlling our
migratory Mexican labor," wrote Parliman, "which law perpetrated a terrible
injustice upon the border farmers." Having apparently forgotten about the Civil
1

Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (Santa Barbara: McNally and
Loftin, 1964), 258.
2
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War, and using the royal "we," he suggested, "We have had a belief that Texas
came into the union under terms wherein we could again take up our
independence if it were un-economical for us to remain as a State of the Union."
He concluded his argument to the governor by arguing, "Texas could, as an
independent territory, place an export tax upon gas and oil and other products that
should give revenue for operating and maintaining a standing Army. With this
independence we could make our own laws as to how we wish to handle Mexican
labor and you and I know Texans could make laws with Mexicans that would not
be unfair but which could and would be closely observed. In other words we
understand the Mexicans and they understand us, hence could draw better laws by
far than the Yankees who do not understand the Mexicans, could draw for us." 3
Despite this complaint that the labor agreement between the United States
and Mexico known as the Bracero Program justified secession from the union,
Parliman proceeded to contract eight braceros for his Hidalgo County cotton farm
in March 1952, one month after his letter to Shivers. These workers fulfilled their
contract and returned to Mexico with no complaints from Parliman. In June of
that same year he contracted for eight more. After less than a month Parliman
complained to the local office of the United States Employment Service (USES)
that these braceros had drunkenly damaged irrigation pipes and other items on his
property. He demanded that the federal agency cancel his contracts immediately,
releasing him from the need to pay off the remainder of the money he owed them.
The local field representative of the USES found no corroborating evidence of

3

Clifford Parliman to Allen Shivers, February 6, 1952, File 1977/81-157, Allen Shivers
Gubernatorial Papers, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.
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any destruction caused by the braceros and refused to release Parliman from his
contractual obligations. Instead, it became clear that Parliman had contracted too
many workers and refused to allow the braceros to work the minimum number of
hours stipulated in their contract. Desperate, Parliman took the issue to the local
court system. After two weeks in prison waiting for their trial, each of the
braceros was found not guilty for lack of evidence by South Texas juries, which
were not known for concern for the civil rights of Mexicans or Mexican
Americans. 4 A friend and associate ofParliman complained that this episode
proved that "Unless these contracts in respect to the farmer and worker are
changed, and changed immediately, then they perpetrate a tremendous injustice
against the farmer, give the whip hand to the common uneducated farmhand and
deny the farmer any right of control, similar to the Russian system behind the Iron
Curtain and they definitely demand severe penalties be paid by the farmer if he
attempts to exert control of his men and discharge the unruly ones." 5
In many ways the complaints raised by Clifford Parliman against the
bracero program at the same time he utilized it as a supply of cheap foreign labor
are a perfect microcosm of the contentious relationship between South Texas
agricultural interests and the bracero program. For more than two decades,
growers in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and other areas of South Texas never
stopped complaining about what they deemed the unfair restrictions of the
4
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program at the same time that the state of Texas contracted more braceros than
any other state. While these complaints did not tend to go quite as far as
Parliman's demands for immediate secession, they all evinced a palpable anger
over government regulation of Mexican labor migration. Nevertheless, their fury
did not stop them from hiring much of their labor force through the binational
contract labor scheme.
Hidden by this gnashing of teeth and public displays of righteous
indignation was the Lone Star heritage of the Bracero Program. The gradual
dissipation of the Great Depression and the specter of war led the growers of
South Texas, along with their compatriots in California and Arizona, to demand
that the federal government allow them to contract seasonal labor from Mexico.
These cries in 1940 and 1941 differed little from their requests in 1936 (see
Chapter 7), but the entry of the United States into World War II at the end of 1941
provided the excuse for putting their pre-war demands into effect. The program
that emerged in 1942 from the negotiations between the governments of the US
and Mexico was much different from the wholly unregulated recruitment scheme
desired by the growers of South Texas, not least because Mexico refused to place
its citizens in Texas until the chronic discrimination suffered by Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in that state had been substantially reduced.
Despite the efforts of the Mexican government to protect its citizens
through the protections of the Bracero Program, however, over the course of more
than two decades the contract labor scheme evolved beyond its control. As the
U.S. government wrested control away from the Mexican government and
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Southwestern agricultural interests got their hands on the Bracero Program, the
South Texas model of labor relations gradually spread to the rest of the nation.
Despite the restrictions written into the initial agreement, it developed into a
source for foreign, surplus labor that lacked the basic free labor rights of mobility
and negotiation. Further, at almost every step of the evolution of the Bracero
Program from 1942-1964, Texas remained central: as an obstacle to binational
agreements, as a voracious exploiter of contract labor after the blacklist expired,
and, when Texas growers turned to mechanization rather than pay the minimum
bracero wage, as the primary cause of the death of the contract labor scheme. 6

***
In 1940 Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wall ace testified before a Senate
committee that as a result of mechanization and technological advancement on the
nation's farms there was a glut of agricultural labor. He claimed that the
agricultural economy required 1,600,000 fewer workers than it had a decade
earlier. 7 One year later, in 1941, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics published
a report claiming that 1.5 million workers could leave agriculture without
threatening the nation's agricultural output. 8 Despite these assertions that the end

6
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of the Great Depression and the recovery of the nation's industrial economy did
not threaten the existence of an agricultural labor force, however, growers
throughout the nation complained that they found themselves in a dire situation
which could only be solved by the importation of workers from Mexico.
Throughout 1940 and 1941 the growers of South Texas fretted that
Mexican American workers had abandoned their fields permanently for the lure
of higher wages further north. Some sought to deal with this problem with more
stringent enforcement of the Emigrant Agency Law of 1929. 9 Most demanded, as
they had in 1936, that the federal government eliminate the immigration
regulations that excluded the entry of illiterates and contract laborers. In effect,
they demanded an open border and the right to take as many workers as they
pleased out of Mexico. Agribusiness interests and their adjuncts in the state
government pleaded for the Texas contingents in the US House and Senate to
introduce legislation creating a contracting system similar to the one established
during World War I. 10 Growers from California and Arizona soon joined in these
demands for an open border for labor. u
The Department of Agriculture denied that a shortage of farm labor
existed, while President Roosevelt reminded the congressmen from Texas that the
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Texas Farm Placement Service had been established a decade earlier to assist in
alleviating labor shortages. 12 But any argument over whether there was or was
not a shortage of labor during 1940-1941 is irrelevant. The salient point is that
growers had come to rely on an overflowing labor pool for so long that they
recognized any decrease in the supply of available workers as a catastrophic
shortage.

13

For the growers of South Texas these beliefs went back to the very

beginning of large-scale agricultural growth around the turn of the century, when
they declared an inalienable right to Mexican immigrant labor that coincided quite
conveniently with their equally fervent desire to continually slash wage rates. In
the end, it is this desire to maintain a surplus labor pool as a protection against
higher labor costs that motivated calls for the lifting of immigration restrictions
from Mexico. Notions of labor shortage were entirely impressionistic, mouthed
piously by farming interests transfixed by federal agricultural subsidies that
seemed certain with the expansion of war in Europe. 14 Pearl Harbor and the US
entry into the war only added to the formidable artillery at the command of
lobbyists and politicians seeking to grant farm interests their desired foreign labor
supply. Early in 1942 the US government moved forcefully to appease growers'
desires for Mexican labor.
Meanwhile, Mexico continued to suffer under the weight of economic
crisis and instability. Industrial and agricultural output grew substantially in the
early 1940s, and the Cardenista land reforms temporarily blunted the agrarian
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radicalism that had plagued rural areas since the revolutionary era, but the capitalintensive nature of economic growth in each sector only exacerbated the class
stratification of the rural majority. Mexican agricultural output grew at an annual
rate of 6.3 percent from 1940-1960, which was among the highest rates in the
world, but the benefits of this growth did not trickle down to the small
landowners, ejidatarios, or farm laborers. 15 Instead, in the words of scholar Roger
Bartra, the "development of Mexican agriculture since the Cardenista years of
agrarian reform has been characterized by the rise of a powerful sector of
capitalist farmers situated in the middle of a sea of semi-proletarianized and
pauperized peasants and of landless day laborers." 16 Small farmers, including
many communal farmers or ejidatarios, found themselves unable to compete with
the irrigated agribusiness enterprises produced by Mexico's Green Revolution.
Many looked to migration and wage labor as the only means of subsistence.
The vast majority of these migrants did not look to the United States, but
instead to the growing urban areas of Mexico, especially Mexico City. 17 For a
substantial minority of migrants, however, the burgeoning wartime economy
north of the Rio Grande created a powerful justification for international
migration. Thus, as Harry Cross and James Sandos argued, altering Eyler
Simpson's classic formulation of agrarian reform, "Migration, not the ejido,
15
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proved to be Mexico's 'way out' of its development crisis of the mid-twentieth
century."

18

As with previous eras, it is impossible to state with any certainty the

number of people crossing the US-Mexico border from 1940-1941, but large
numbers resumed the northward migrations that had all but stopped during the
depths of the Great Depression. This resumption of emigration to the United
States forced the Mexican government to face the same problem it had in the
1920s. How could policymakers turn this out-migration to the advantage of the
Mexican state and nation without entirely discarding the artifice of protective, if
defensive, nationalism?
Shortly after the official entry of the United States into World War II in
December 1941 the two nations began negotiations for the construction of a
binational contract labor program. The growers who demanded access to
Mexican workers had no intention of letting either government dictate the terms
by which this access was granted, but the unilateral contracting of labor from
south of the border that had been acceptable during World War I was not
diplomatically possible in the context of World War II and the Good Neighbor
Policy. 19 For its part, the Mexican government remained wary of allowing its
citizens to work in the United States, remembering the humanitarian crises created
when Mexicans found themselves stranded and destitute in the United States
18
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during the brief economic downturn in the early 1920s and the Great Depression
in the early 1930s. Mexican policymakers also worried that an increased
migration of Mexicans to the United States would only multiply the instances of
discrimination and violence against Mexicans and Mexican Americans throughout
the United States, but especially in Texas. In the end, according to historian
Richard Craig, "Mexico acquiesced to the bracero program because its advantages
far outweighed its disadvantages." 20 The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations
put a patriotic spin on it: ·The immigration of braceros can be considered as one
of the ways in which Mexico aided the effort of the Allied Nations for total
victory, despite negative effects on production in Mexico, by helping sustain
levels of production in the United States as necessary in the war." 21
The result was the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, originally
meant as a temporary mechanism for solving the supposed agricultural labor
shortage in the U.S. The agreement drawn up between the two governments
allowed for contracting of agricultural laborers in Mexico by the US government,
which then subcontracted to US farming interests. The agreement came with a
few important restrictions that the Mexican government hoped would guarantee
fair wages and treatment for its citizens abroad. First, the agreement stated that
Mexican workers could not be used to displace native workers. Second, braceros
were guaranteed the prevailing wage in the area for which they were contracted,

°Craig, Bracero Program, 23.
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with a thirty-cent minimum wage, as well as suitable housing and food. 22 Third,
any signs of discrimination by employers would result in cancellation of their
contracts. Chronic discrimination in any town or region would lead to unilateral
blacklisting by the Mexican government. As a result of this provision, officials in
Mexico City refused to allow braceros into the state of Texas throughout the
wartime program. Finally, any grower that employed undocumented Mexican
workers would not be allowed to contract braceros.

***
Despite the blacklisting of Texas, wartime conditions in the state were
important for the operations of the Bracero Program. The circumstances of
widespread discrimination, biased draft practices that sent Mexican Americans
into the military in numbers that far outweighed their percentage of the
population, pervasive and unapologetic employment of undocumented Mexican
laborers by the region's growers, and the state government's efforts to have Texas
removed from Mexico's bracero blacklist all had a profound effect on the
workings of the international labor agreement during the war. The ways in which
these different strands of social and labor relations carne together in South Texas
in these years dictated not only how the original wartime program operated, but
also proved pivotal in the evolution of the program in the post-war years.
22

Growers especially disliked this prevailing wage clause, which they feared would eliminate their
entire reason for demanding Mexican labor in the first place: the desire to keep wages from rising.
For the first few months of the program many of the worst fears of the growers seemed to be
coming true under the jurisdiction of the Farm Security Administration which tried to extend some
of the guarantees of the bracero program to domestic farm workers. These efforts to finally extend
the New Deal to agricultural labor led to a fierce backlash from farming interests that led to the
shifting of supervision of the program from the Farm Security Administration to the War Food
Administration, which growers considered a much more reliable ally in their fight to keep their
workers from gaining the rights secured by industrial workers during the previous decade. See
Calavita, Inside the State, 20-22.

333
The most obvious and visible aspect of wartime conditions in Texas, at
least from the point of view of Mexico, was the continued segregation and
discrimination against Mexicans and Mexican Americans. While these conditions
had a long and well-documented history before the outbreak of World War II,
added scrutiny from Mexico, the federal government, and an energized Mexican
American civil rights movement helped tum these instances of discrimination into
episodes of national and international importance. The constant empty recitations
by politicians and community leaders in Texas of the ideals of the good neighbor
policy only made these shortcomings that much more glaring.
At its most brutal, this racial system still held the potential for violence,
even if Texas witnessed no single episode like the 1942 Zoot Suit Riots in Los
Angeles. 23 Journalist Hart Stilwell noted in 1946 that, "if an Anglo-American has
served one day in the penitentiary [in Texas] for the killing of a Latin-American
during [the previous twenty-five years], I have not heard of it." Further, he
asserted, "It may be accepted as an established fact in Texas that an AngloAmerican can kill a Latin-American with impunity. The day has passed when the
Anglo-American received a bounty for such an act, and the day has passed, in
most of Texas, when the killing of Latin-Americans was considered a sport."

24

Needless to say, Mexicans and Mexican Americans probably failed to view this as
substantial progress.
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Two instances of violence that briefly drew the focus of the Mexican
government occurred in the town of Runge, Kames County, south of San
Antonio. The first, in early 1942, involved a man named Candelario de la Rosa
who had purchased a used truck from Ellis Sistrunk, a Deputy Sheriff. The truck
broke down shortly after De la Rosa bought it. Since he was unable to find field
work in Kames County, he failed to make a payment owed to Sistrunk. When De
Ia Rosa went with his sixteen-year-old son to explain his situation to Sistrunk, the
Deputy Sheriff immediately grabbed a lead pipe and pummeled De Ia Rosa in the
head, bursting his left ear drum and causing profuse bleeding. Then in March
1943, in a completely unrelated incident, a teenage girl named Frances Martinez
approached Sistrunk at his office to ask why he had arrested her father. He
refused to give her an answer, then followed her out into the street and, in full
view of a crowd on the street, punched her in the face repeatedly and threw her up
against a brick wall. 25
To quiet the outcry that followed these incidents, the state sent Gully
Cowsert, a Texas Ranger, who reported that neither De Ia Rosa nor Martinez
wished to press charges against Sistrunk and that both episodes had merely been
misunderstandings. 26 Not surprisingly, both DelaRosa and Martinez soon told
very different stories. De la Rosa recalled that the Kames County Sheriff and
Ranger Cowsert carne to him and told him that "if I wanted to press the case I
would have to go to Runge and I knew that it was useless for the case to be tried

25
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in Runge where the only law that prevails is Sistrunk.... The Sheriff then
presented a paper to us which he asked me to sign, but I do no know what it was ..
. . Even now I don't know what is the status of the case which I have had pending
for more than 14 months against the Deputy Sheriff." 27 Likewise, Frances
Martinez claimed that the Ranger had tried to dissuade her from filing charges
against Sistrunk. In describing these two cases in a letter to the Kames County
Judge, the Mexican Consul General in San Antonio echoed Stilwell's feelings on
the fear created by continued racial violence in South Texas and its effects on the
ideal of the good neighbor: "Please believe me, that this letter is written in a spirit
of cooperation, as a representative of a country which is allied to the United States
in a mortal struggle for the preservation of democratic rights, for the protection of
the dignity of man, and especially adhering to President Roosevelt's four
principles of the Atlantic Charter and especially the one that refers to 'Freedom
from fear. "' 28
Less dangerous, though no less galling for the Mexican government and
the Mexican and Mexican American populations in South Texas, was the
continuation of segregation in education and public accommodations. Longtime
civil rights activist Alonso Perales testified before Congress that he had a list of
150 towns and cities in Texas "where there exist from 1 to 10 public places of
business and amusement, where Mexicans are denied service, or entrance,"
leading him to declare that the "discriminatory situation in Texas is truly a
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disgrace to our Nation." 29 The Mexican Consulates in Texas published a
seemingly never-ending series of updates on discriminatory actions throughout
the state to justify its refusal to send braceros to Texas, publicizing acts of
residential segregation and violence against Mexicans moving to Anglo
neighborhoods, school segregation, police misconduct against Mexicans and
Mexican Americans, and dozens of other instances of racial discrimination. The
most shocking actions detailed in these reports include the indiscriminate
machine-gunning of a Mexican family by the Sheriff of Bee County and the firebombing by Anglos of a house in the Mayfield Park section of San Antonio
recently purchased by a Mexican American family. 30 The state of Texas made
token efforts to deal with these issues, but rarely moved beyond expressions of
feigned horror at press conferences. 31
The officials who looked the other way when violence threatened
Mexicans and Mexican Americans in South Texas were more than happy to
recruit and draft these same Mexican Americans into the ongoing war effort. As
Zaragoza Vargas has argued, "Tejanos fell victim to the all-white local draft
boards, microcosms of inordinate Anglo political power and authority, bigotry,
and cultural customs." 32 Even those who worked as farm laborers, which made
them eligible for the same deferments as essential industrial workers, found
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themselves pushed into the rnilitary. 33 Presumably, the draft boards knew that
farmers would find their workforce south of the Rio Grande when Mexican
American farmworkers entered the military. As a result, Mexican Americans
made up a disproportionate percentage of the infantry during World War II and
died in much higher numbers than Texas Anglos. In 1944 Alonso Perales wrote
to Congressman Paul Kilday (brother of San Antonio chief of police) asking that
he "ascertain from our War Department why it is that from fifty per cent to
seventy-five per cent of the casualties from South Texas are soldiers of Mexican
descent." He continued, stressing that "we are quite proud of the opportunity
afforded us to defend our country on the firing line, but we want to ascertain for
sure whether the circumstances that fifty to seventy-five per cent of the casualties
from South Texas are of Mexican descent is due to the fact that there are not
sufficient soldiers of other extractions in South Texas to defend our country on
the battle fields, or whether it is because some individuals who are prejudiced
against the Mexican people are rushing our boys to the battle fronts in order that
they may be the first to get killed and get rid of them that way." 34
The state of Texas finally reacted to these protests against chronic
discrimination in 1943, but not because of any pangs of conscience but because it
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was under pressure to break Mexico's blacklist. The first attempt to convince
Mexico to reconsider its position was the passage of the "Caucasian Race
Resolution" by the state legislature, which banned discrimination against
"Caucasians" (which legally included Mexicans and Mexican Americans) in
public accommodations. As historian George Green noted, this resolution implied
"that it was all right with the state if discrimination against black Texans
continued unabated." 35
Governor Coke Stevenson next wrote to the Mexican Secretary of Foreign
Relations, Ezequiel Padilla, that "it has recently come to my attention that the
Mexican Government has contemplated that in view of discrimination which may
exist against Mexicans resident in this State, Mexican laborers who are being sent
elsewhere in the United States under existing agreements between the Mexican
and United States Governments will not be sent to Texas." While he mentioned
efforts to legislate an end to discrimination, Stevenson made his intentions clear
in informing Padilla that the cotton-growing areas around Corpus Christi expected
a large harvest in 1943 and therefore required Mexican labor. He concluded the
letter by assuring Padilla, "I desire further to assure Your Excellency that the
people of this State will wait with the highest interest the decision of the Mexican
Government which I hope will permit Mexican workers to come to Texas in order
to work on our farms, where they are so desperately needed." Padilla responded a
few days later, writing that he appreciated the governor's efforts, but that only
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when the chronic nature of discrimination was eliminated would Mexico consider
lifting the blacklist. 36
When their resolution did not cause Mexico to budge, the state
government next sought to deal with the situation by forming the Good Neighbor
Commission? 7 The Executive Secretary, Pauline Kibbe, wrote to other members
of the commission a year after its founding, "As you know, the occurrence which
actually brought on the creation of the Good Neighbor Commission was the
refusal of the Mexican Government, in the spring of 1943, to allow emergency
agricultural labor to come into Texas to assist in harvesting the crop because of
the 'conditions' which existed here. When the Commission was set up, we agreed
that our first responsibility was to ascertain exactly what those 'conditions' were
and then formulate some program of action to permanently clear up the situation,
not only with regard to farm laborers, but as concerned all Latin Americans in
Texas." 38
The Commission's efforts to discover these "conditions" led them to the
following realizations several years later that nicely capture the nature of the
Commission's activities: "The Second World War brought another wave of
immigrants to Texas to work on farms, ranches, and in industry. Those brought in
legally were augmented by waves of 'wet-backs' andfor the first time, state-wide
physical evidence of discrimination appeared in public places - restaurants,
36

Coke Stevenson to Ezequiel Padilla, July 12, 1943, and Ezequiel Padilla to Coke Stevenson,
July 20, 1943, The Good Neighbor Policy and Mexicans in Texas, in The Mexican American and
Law (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 7-22.
37
Stevenson only authorized the creation of the Commission, however, after he found out that
funding for it would come from the State Department's Office of Inter-American Affairs. Otey M.
Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947," Pacific Historical Review 32 (1963), 257.
38
Pauline Kibbe to Good Neighbor Commission, December 29, 1944, File 1990/16-1, Good
Neighbor Commission Collection, TSA.

340
schools, hotels, movie houses and rental properties - and this brought about a
wave of incidents, particularly from Mexicans of improved economic
circumstances and from soldiers." 39 While the author of this report seemed to
have forgotten that there was no legal contracting of workers in Texas from
Mexico during World War II (though it is unclear if he referred to braceros or
legal immigrants), he also made the argument that wartime immigration created
discrimination against Mexicans and Mexican Americans. This type of
superficial investigation into issues of discrimination led scholar George Sanchez
to complain that the Commission was nothing more than a "glorified tourist
agency" meant to paper over incidents so that Mexico would eliminate the bracero
blacklist. 40
Two episodes in particular illustrate the modus operandi of the
Commission. The most notorious instance of discrimination in which the
Commission found itself embroiled was the Felix Longoria affair. Longoria was
a Mexican American from Three Rivers, south of San Antonio, who entered the
military in 1944 and shipped out to the Pacific. 41 He died in action, but his body
did not return to Three Rivers until January 1949. When his widow and family
tried to arrange for a wake at the only funeral home in Three Rivers, they were
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told by the owner that he did not provide such services for Mexicans because the
town's "whites wouldn't like it." 42
Word of this event quickly reached Dr. Hector Garcia, a veteran and
founder of the American G.I. Forum, in nearby Corpus Christi. Several months
earlier Garcia and his group had undertaken a study of conditions in South Texas
labor camps and segregated schools. The reports of their findings revealed
shocking conditions, but these revelations received little attention from the press
or politicians. 43 With the Longoria affair, however, Garcia found an issue that
finally gained traction in his effort to push for Mexican American civil rights.
The local, state, national, and international press began to take notice when he
demanded that the funeral home allow Longoria's wake, but the issue grew even
more when recently-elected Senator Lyndon Johnson publicly objected to the
treatment of Longoria and his family, eventually receiving permission from
President Truman to have Longoria's body interred at Arlington National
Cemetery.
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Beyond the obvious ci vii rights implication of this case, it complicated the
ongoing negotiations on the bracero program between the United States and
Mexico. As a concrete example of anti-Mexican discrimination in Texas, it gave
more artillery to those in Mexico who sought to maintain the blacklist against
bracero contracting to Texas. The Good Neighbor Commission took this threat to
Texas's standing in relation to the bracero program as its point of departure. An
official memorandum from the Commission after Johnson's intervention stated
that Garcia "was right to insist on the availability of the funeral home chapel for
services for Felix Longoria. However, he could have adjusted the case without
publicity; for instance, by appealing to the Good Neighbor Commission." The
memorandum then continued, "National news is, in the 20 1h Century, international
news. United States prestige and good will were damaged abroad by the everready anti-United States press agents. Specifically, diplomatic conversations with
Mexico on the subject of a labor contract were stopped." Turning to the Anglos
of Three Rivers, the Commission stated that they "did not recognize the serious
international dangers of their customs of discrimination against Mexicans."44 In
other words, the Good Neighbor Commission remained unconcerned with
discrimination as such. Only when its impact moved beyond the local level and
into the realm of international politics did it confront the situation. 45
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The second episode, while far less important than the Longoria affair,
provided a glimpse of the everyday affairs and concerns of the Commission.
Neville Penrose, who was appointed chairman of the Commission by archconservative Allan Shivers when he ascended to the governorship upon the death
of the previous governor in 1949, wrote to another member of the Commission in
August 1952, after Mexico had lifted the blacklist against braceros in Texas, with
a new idea he called the "Bracero Sample Project." He wrote, "I am sending you
a bundle of Mexico City newspapers. I wish you would pore over them and get
the names of some nationally advertised products in this country, also being
marketed down there. Something like Life Buoy Soap, and Phillips Milk of
Magnesia. Write to some of these organizations and see what we can do about
collecting a little kit to hand these braceros as they go back to Mexico. I do not
think it should be very large or expensive. If it is just 25 cents or 50 cents worth
of merchandise it will serve our purpose and I think it would be very good
advertising for the donors and a perfect place for the letter we contemplate." He
then continued, "I am completely sold on the idea that we must do something with
a quarter of a million potential salesmen. They come up here, they stay for a
while and go back to Mexico. We must- we positively must- do everything we
can to send these laborers back singing our praises. I can think of nothing more
important for the Good Neighbor Commission than this project."46 Not satisfied
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that braceros did enough work while contracted in the United States, Penrose and
the Commission clearly believed that returning braceros should be sent back as
walking billboards for US consumer items. While the project never actually
occurred, it provides a stunning example of how the Commission viewed its
responsibilities. They did not seek to protect Mexicans and Mexican Americans
in Texas, but rather to muffle news of discriminatory acts and help the economic
elites of the state to secure cheap labor and new customers.
The Good Neighbor Commission lasted until the 1980s, but never as
anything more than an under-funded public relations body that did little more than
try to contain controversy over periodic cases of discrimination. As the Assistant
Director of the Commission wrote to a local group in Eagle Pass, the primary job
of the Commission was to "look into matters of reported discrimination against
Latin Americans and to smooth them over on the local level to the satisfaction of
all, thus avoiding widespread and unfavorable publicity for your city." In the end,
however, the Good Neighbor Commission served its purpose, as the Mexican
government did finally accede to contracting braceros for employment in Texas.

***
While the growers of Texas griped half-heartedly about not having the
option of legally contracting workers from Mexico during the war, the bracero
program was operating in the rest of the nation. Through a complex arrangement
of overlapping jurisdictions among the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of State, the United States Employment Service, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service the wartime bracero program operated as an executive
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branch program with very little oversight from the legislature. Congress's belated
approval came with the passage of Public Law 45 on April29, 1943, which
accepted the basic parameters of the international agreement. 47 These basic
standards continued until 1947 when the wartime program came to an end two
years after the war itself. 48
During the program's first year, 1942, only 4,203 braceros came to the
United States. The number of braceros increased sharply after 1942, however,
with more than two hundred thousand coming from 1942-1947: 53,098 in 1943,
62,170 in 1944,49,494 in 1945,32,043 in 1946, and 19,632 in 1947.49 More
important than the total numbers, however, is where these workers were sent. The
Pacific Northwest and California received the vast majority of braceros during the
war (63 percent in California, 15 percent for the Northwest), though a total of
twenty-four states received workers from Mexico. 5° As the President's
Commission on Migratory Labor noted in its 1951 examination of the bracero
program, "The areas served by the war emergency program were high-wage
States which had been gaining population by in-migration during the preceding
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decade." 51 As a result, the farm interests used the foreign contract laborers to stall
the upward trend in wages caused by the increase in employment opportunities in
war production in many of these states.
These decreasing wage levels did not go far enough for agribusiness
interests, however. Edward O'Neal of the American Farm Bureau Federation
made a series of complaints before a Senate subcommittee in 1943 that growers
continued to repeat throughout the life of the bracero program. He argued that the
unregulated employment of workers from Mexico, both the semi-organized World
War I program and the hiring of undocumented workers along the border,
"worked just fine until the Administration got to fooling with it." He rejected the
need for or the utility of the standards set by the Mexican government for
minimum wages and living and working conditions of contracted workers, instead
declaring that, "in former years all you had to do was go to Mexico and look at
the men who came in and worked under the old conditions ... they got Mexicans
in large numbers to come over and do this work. " 52
In fact, many growers continued to employ unauthorized Mexicans in

large numbers. Most prominent were the Texas growers left outside of the
bracero agreement, who simply shrugged off the official rebuke of the Mexican
government and went back to employing illegal immigrants in larger numbers
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than ever as wartime demands sent crop prices back up to levels not seen since the
end of World War I. Even though the bracero agreement with Mexico ostensibly
bound the United States to keep undocumented immigrants from crossing north of
the border, the Border Patrol and the INS took a hands-off approach with regards
to the labor needs of border area growers, especially in South Texas. As historian
Otey Scruggs argued, "Since Texans were unable to acquire braceros, the
American government was more easily persuaded to acquiesce in their use of
wetbacks." 53 The Assistant Commissioner of Immigration, W.F. Kelly, later
wrote, "At times, due to manpower shortages and critical need for agricultural
production brought on by the war, the Service officers were instructed to defer the
apprehension of Mexicans employed on Texas farms where to remove them
would likely result in loss of the crops .... This situation resulted first in an
increased illegal migration and second in [encouraging] Texas farmers,
particularly in the border areas, to rely more and more on 'wetback' labor for
producing their crops." 54
Texas growers did not worry about the blacklist creating any labor
shortages because Mexican farmworkers continued to come on their own.
Farmers knew that the seemingly endless supply of workers crossing the border
from Mexico guaranteed a steady oversupply of potential field workers. Concerns
over the continuation of the bracero program and the Mexican blacklist had little
effect on the day-to-day operations of South Texas growers. As World War II
receded further into the past, however, the nature and terms of the program
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continued to change, and Texas became more central to these alterations in the
international agreement.

***
The bracero program definitively shed its origins as an emergency
measure in the years from 1947-1951 and evolved into a permanent feature of
US-Mexican relations and the agricultural economy. However, these years also
witnessed a slow evolution of the program as each nation tried to gain an upper
hand in the administration of the increasingly contentious agreement. Growers in
the US sought to mold the bracero accords to their needs. Mexico sought to gain
leverage over negotiations during this brief interregnum, but found their efforts
frustrated time and again by increasingly aggressive, unilateral actions by the US
government and its growers. As a result, by 1951 the United States and its
growers had gained an upper-hand in their dealings with the Mexican
government, and had begun to shed the earlier protections against wage deflation,
job displacement, and the hiring of illegal labor that served as cornerstones of the
original wartime agreement.
The general terms of the wartime program continued until 1949. 55 On the
ground, however, the basic nature of the bracero program changed drastically
during the two years from 1947-1949, predating the alterations in the international
agreement that came in 1949. The most important of these changes was the
institution of a process known as "drying out" that converted illegal immigrants
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into legal braceros. One of the primary reasons that the Mexican government had
agreed to the wartime bracero program in the first place had been the hope that it
would drastically reduce, if not eliminate, the flow of unauthorized migrants
leaving for the United States without any legal protections. The lack of any
stringent border controls and the blacklist on Texas growers combined to do the
opposite. The flow of illegal immigrants into the United States dramatically
increased. As a result the Mexican government proposed a new system by which
these illegal entrants could be incorporated into the bracero system so that they
would not fall outside of the protections written into the bracero contracts. The
US government and growers agreed to "drying out" as a simple way to legitimize
the continued use of unauthorized laborers. 56
The two nations signed new agreements in 1947 that authorized the
process of "drying out." 57 While many growers in Texas remained skeptical of
the bracero program, fearing that it represented a dangerous precedent for
government regulation of agricultural labor, many still took advantage of the new
agreement to enter the bracero program on their terms. Through this innovation,
farm interests found that the Mexican government and the bracero program as a
whole had come to them, allowing growers to simply legalize the workers they
would have employed anyway. In theory, "drying out" should also have forced
Texas growers to live up to the minimum wage and adverse effect standards
established in the original agreement, but lack of enforcement (or simply the will
56

Arthur F. Corwin, "A Story of Ad Hoc Exemptions: American Immigration Policy toward
Mexico," Immigrants- and Immigrants: Perspectives on Mexican Labor Migration to the United
States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 151.
57
Peter R. Kirstein, Anglo Over Bracero: A History of the Mexican Worker in the United States
from Roosevelt to Nixon (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1977), 55-56.

350
to enforce) allowed these growers to maintain the same employment practices as
they had during the blacklist period. According to two scholars examining the
situation in South Texas during these years, "It is a matter of common knowledge
in the Valley that many of the growers who used contract workers at the same
time used wetbacks yet we were not able to trace a single case where a contract
has been broken in the Valley for this reason." 58 They further observed, "No
official word is given that the farmers are to be left alone, but the Inspectors soon
learn that they are apt to be called before some kind of investigating board if they
are too zealous in doing their jobs. . . . One Inspector, for example, stated that he
never picks up a wetback engaged in irrigating. . . . One of the older Inspectors
has a policy of not picking up anyone who is working or who is carrying any
agricultural implement that would indicate that he had been working." 59
As a result, the INS legalized 55,000 unauthorized workers in Texas alone
during 1947. By comparison, the other bracero states imported or reauthorized
only 31,331 braceros during that same year. Thus, while the blacklist remained in
effect for Texas, the shift had already begun by which it became the primary user
of legal Mexican labor. As historian Arthur Corwin argued, "By that date Mexico
plainly had lost control of the migratory labor program, and many a Texas
employer was grinning with satisfaction."60 The same trend continued during the
next two years. From 1947-1949 only 74,600 Mexicans came under contract
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from Mexico compared to 142,200 workers legalized within the United States
through "drying out." 61 Thus, by virtue of the process of legalization of
unauthorized workers alone, Mexico had lost much of its leverage in dictating (or
even negotiating) the terms of the bracero program.
Within the US government, however, the Department of Labor and the
INS moved to attain more control over the program by unilaterally opening the
border to Mexican workers. According to Kitty Calavita, "A combination of
factors - including the continued refusal of Mexico to allow Texas employers to
contract braceros, the lack of a formal border recruitment system, and the virtual
employer boycott on recruiting braceros from the interior of Mexico- had
resulted in the piling up of thousands of hopeful braceros in border towns." 62 To
relieve this situation and to provide labor to growers, the INS and the Labor
Department sought to throw open the border. The Department of State reprised
its frequent role as the voice of reason, pointing out that opening the border
represented a clear violation of their international agreement and would
drastically complicate future diplomatic relations with Mexico (and presumably
the rest of Latin America). State Department officials had little capacity to
restrain officials on the border from committing such a violation of the bracero
accords, however, and could only watch as INS officials took the situation into
their own hands in 1948, creating a profound crisis within the bracero program.
The Mexican government authorized the border recruitment of two
thousand braceros to alleviate the crowding in Ciudad Jmirez on October 1,
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Problems emerged when cotton growers reported a prevailing wage of

$2.50 per hundredweight. Mexican officials rejected this wage rate, instead
insisting on $3.00 per hundredweight for all braceros. INS officials in El Paso,
angry over what they deemed "an outright breach of the labor agreement,"
decided to open up the border to all willing Mexican farmworkers, bypassing the
formal structures and protections of the international agreement. 64 INS officials
passed word to workers massed on the Mexican side that work was available at
$2.50. From October 16-18, approximately six thousand flowed across the border
at El Paso, were herded together by the Border Patrol, arrested for illegal entry,
sent to temporary enclosures, and then paroled to cotton growers. 65 Grover
Wilmoth, the District Director of the INS at El Paso, justified the opening of the
border by arguing that "they need the work, our farmers need them and the crops
were going to waste." 66 Robert Goodwin, Director of the United States
Employment Service, testified that Wilmoth created the "El Paso incident" (as it
came to be known) "on the allegation that the present treaty is not working in that
we are not getting needed farm labor from Mexico." 67 The Department of Labor
added its two cents on the matter when Don Larin, head of the Farm Placement
Service, declared, "Mexico agreed to send braceros who would receive the
prevailing wages. But Mexican officials came up with a demand that the laborers
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receive $3.00 a hundred pounds for the first cotton picking. These Mexican
officials were pointing a pistol at the American farmers' head." 68
The Mexican government reacted to this breach of the agreement by
immediately canceling the bracero accord, though the flow of workers continued
for several months through a unilateral program operated by the INS and the
Department of Labor, the agencies responsible for the El Paso incident. For its
part, the US government informed Mexico that any new agreement must not
include unilateral blacklisting, clearly meant to lift the continuing ban on
contracting to Texas. For months the two countries tried to gain leverage over the
other in crafting a new agreement, which finally took shape in 1949, eight months
after the previous accord had been voided. 69
With the El Paso incident as an object lesson of what a unilateral program
might look like if Mexico did not accede to the demands of growers and the US
government, the 1949 agreement eliminated unilateral blacklisting, in essence
ending the exclusion of Texas from the program, while also extending the "drying
out" process. 70 Mexico continued to hold out against growers' demands that they
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place contracting centers along the border, but that effort too collapsed in August
1950 when Mexico quietly agreed to allow for contracting from the border towns.
As a result, the traffic through interior contracting centers decreased drastically
and a larger flow of prospective braceros moved toward the US-Mexico border,
producing a larger body of potential undocumented immigrants and crushing the
Mexican government's hopes to eliminate (or at least slow down) the flow of
unauthorized migrants north of the border. "Mexico had lost its battle to contain
the flow of its labor to the United States," according to historian Peter Kirstein. 71
Despite the end of the bracero blacklist, however, Lyle Saunders and Olen
Leonard argued that the 1949 agreement "had little effect on the Valley."
Growers remained angry over the continuation of a minimum wage, which rose to
forty cents per hour in the new contract, and the requirement that employers pay
transportation costs to and from Mexico. 72 They had never paid transportation
costs for undocumented workers or "dried out" braceros, so they saw no reason to
do any different for contract labor. As a result, Valley growers requested few
braceros from contracting centers in Mexico. Lower Rio Grande farm
associations sent requests for only 1,500 workers to the United States
Employment Service in 1950. They remained interested only in legalizing their
unauthorized workers already in the fields. Even after a sizeable deportation
campaign in 1950 in the Lower Valley, the growers still showed little interest in
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curbing their employment of unauthorized labor. Instead they cried that the
Border Patrol was a "Gestapo outfit" that was "siding with Mexico." 73
Despite these howls of protest, the postwar bracero program continued to
evolve toward the wishes of growers and away from the desires of the Mexican
government. These changes resulted in a drastic shift in the geographic dispersal
of braceros in the United States. As the President's Commission reported, change
proceeded at an astonishing rate:
California which in 1945 received 63 percent of the Mexican workers had
only 8 percent in 1949. The States of the Northwest, which with
California, had 78 percent of the Mexican program in 1945, had no
Mexican workers in 1949. Texas, which had no legally contracted
Mexicans in wartime, had 46 percent of all Mexican nationals under
contract in 1949. New Mexico and Arkansas, which had none of the
Mexicans workers in wartime, had 17 and 16 percent, respectively, in
1949. Together, Texas, New Mexico, and Arkansas had 79 percent of the
1949 Mexican labor program. 74
Further, the majority of braceros after the war went to low-wage states that
"disgorged population during the decade of the thirties," a complete reversal of
the situation during the wartime program. 75 These same trends continued in 1950,
as only 19,813 new braceros came through contracting centers, while 96,239
became braceros through "drying out," primarily in South Texas. 76 As a result,
Texas growers, who were denied braceros during the war, dominated the bracero
program for much of the rest of its existence. They may have complained that it
was a flawed system that gave Mexico too much influence, but they also began to
understand that it could serve as a guarantee of surplus labor that allowed them to
73
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maintain, or even lower, wage rates. Adverse effect clauses in the agreements
carne to be seen as little more than rhetorical decoration that lacked any capacity
for enforcement, vestigial artifacts of a past rnultilateralisrn.
The President's Commission on Migratory Labor investigated these
conditions in 1950 and published its findings in 1951. The report began by
examining growers' claims that they required foreign labor to combat rising
prices and increased international competition. "Normally, if there were a labor
shortage, wages would rise," the report stated. "Since on the contrary they have
declined, it seems reasonable to infer that the supply of illegal alien labor, plus the
contract labor the Government admitted or imported, has helped to depress farm
wages relative to factory wages." 77 The Commission argued that the process of
"drying out" assured a continued flow of unauthorized irnmigrants. 78 Not
surprisingly, the Commission pointed to the growers of South Texas as the worst
threats to the proper functioning of the program. It rejected the constantly
repeated assertion that domestic labor would not do field work in the Valley,
instead arguing that the employment of undocumented workers had reduced the
wage level below the subsistence level of any US residents. 79 The Commission's
recommendations were clear: "Foreign labor importation and contracting [should]
be under the terms of intergovernmental agreements which should clearly state
the conditions and standards of employment under which the foreign workers are
to be employed. These should be substantially the same for all countries. No
employer, employer's representative or association of employers, or labor
77
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contractor should be permitted to contract directly with foreign workers for
employment in the United States."

° Clearly, the authors of this report hoped that

8

its conclusions would be applied in the 1951 bracero agreement. Instead, a much
different agreement emerged that continued the trends of the previous few years
and resulted in an almost complete rejection of the Commission's
recommendations.

***
The publication of the Commission's report came as Congress considered
a bill to extend the bracero program and negotiations between the two countries
continued. Mexico demanded that the United States pass a law that made the
federal government the guarantor of the contracts, rather than the employers, as it
had been during the Second World War. Interested parties within the United
States also sought to shape the outcome of the latest alteration of the bracero
program. Texas State Federation of Labor official Andy McClellan reported that
"we're pouring the messages and wires into Mexico City asking all of the big
labor leaders to try to stop the signing of the new bracero accord. . . . In the
meantime, however, the Valley farmers are threatening rebellion if nothing is
done to get labor for the cotton picking. They have behaved like a bunch of
spoiled kids since this deal started, and their 'squawking' is turning a lot of good
people against them." 81 Despite these efforts to alter the nature of the renewed
labor agreement, however, the bill and negotiations resulted in few concrete
changes.
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That bill, eventually passed as Public Law 78, ignored the
recommendations laid out by the Commission, instead providing only a cosmetic
stabilization of the program that did nothing to solve issues of adverse effect. It
reiterated the restrictions placed on the wartime program - contracting required
the certification of non-availability of domestic labor, braceros could create no
adverse effect to domestic labor, and employers had to make reasonable efforts to
attract domestic workers - but did little to improve the mechanisms for ensuring
that employers lived up to these restrictions. 82 Instead, the law permanently
erased the decades-old tradition of prohibiting foreign contract labor from
entering the United States, while providing no methods for determining labor
shortages or prevailing wages. Thus, PL 78 served to maintain and expand the
bracero program, with all of its problems left to continue for the life of the
agreement. As Kitty Calavita wrote, "PL 78 and subsequent international
agreements reestablished the role of the state as farm labor contractor par
excellence. . . . PL 78 formalized that commitment, and in so doing, injected
increased predictability and control into the contract labor system that had begun
a decade earlier as a wartime emergency measure."
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Similarly, Emesto Galarza

argued, "Ten years of employer experimentation with braceros concluded with
Public Law 78. . . . In a sense, these were years of trial and error as growers made
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one delightful discovery after another. Like the sprinkling systems of mechanized
irrigation, braceros could be turned on and off." 84
Equally important was the gradual loss of leverage by the Mexican
government in shaping the future of the program. While PL 78 made the federal
government the ultimate guarantor of contracts, US officials, prodded by growers'
interests demanding cheaper and more plentiful labor, continually worked to
erode the Mexican government's control over the agreement. Mexico entered into
negotiations with the United States in late 1953 determined to strengthen the
protections within the program, including raising the minimum wage, but the US
refused to budge. Instead it returned to a familiar tactic to eliminate any strategic
advantage Mexico possessed. By January 1954 these negotiations had fallen apart
over Mexico's desire to eliminate border recruitment and to ensure legitimate
determination of prevailing wages and labor shortages. On January 16 the US
announced that it would unilaterally contract braceros at the border, again opening
the border to undercut the Mexican government as in 1948. For the next few
weeks, US officials stood at the border and called out the number of workers
needed that day, creating near-riots as thousands crowded at entry points for the
chance at legal employment north of the border. 85 The effects of this open-border
incident were profound- it proved definitively that the US possessed a trump
card in negotiations with Mexico. As long as thousands of Mexicans crowded
along the border for the chance to become braceros, the United States and its
growers could control the program regardless of the desires of the Mexican
84
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government. By again violating the international agreement, the US brought
Mexico to heel and gained complete control over its future operation. This
incident was an "irrefutable demonstration of Yankee imperialism," according to
Mexican scholar Jose Lazaro Salinas .86
With the Mexican government removed as an obstacle to unilateral
operation of the Bracero Program, US policymakers looked to eliminate the
continued use of undocumented workers in the Southwest, especially in Texas,
and consolidate federal control over foreign labor. Growers continued to argue,
as they had for decades, that they had an inherent right to Mexican labor,
regardless of international accords or immigration law. Thus, they viewed the
bracero program as a violation of their rights, even as they availed themselves of
contract laborers. As one South Texas landowner explained, "I could go across
the border and within a radius of 50 miles hire 12 to 15 good, experienced
cowhands. That's the way we used to do it, we knew these people and they knew
us. . . . As it is under the program, we have to take whatever Mexican nationals
they give us, and hope they can do the job." 87 Another grower, looking back on
these years, wrote that "the Valley cotton farmer became completely dependent
upon the wetbacks to harvest his cotton. This seemed to be satisfactory to
everyone concerned .... A few farmers considered themselves to be farsighted
and purchased some of the newfangled cotton picking machines. Their
investment was so high that they were reluctant to admit they had bought white
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elephants and held out until they could find suckers to sell the machines to." 88 As
long as the option of hiring unauthorized entrants from Mexico remained,
mechanization and braceros remained secondary for the growers of South Texas,
who decried any efforts to curtail their well-worn practices as illegal and
Communist-inspired.
The response to these complaints about the operation of the program and
the continued reliance of many growers on undocumented labor came in mid1954 when the INS moved to entrench the bracero program further by making it
the only game in town. The lack of Border Patrol activity in South Texas
remained a poorly guarded secret in the early 1950s. In 1952 the Mexican
government filed an official complaint with the Department of State after learning
that the Border Patrol had been removed from large swaths of South Texas. 89
Rumors circulated that the head of the Patrol ordered his officers to stay away
from the South Texas farm of Governor Allan Shivers, a well-known and
unapologetic employer of undocumented Mexican labor. 90 The Congressional
contingents from Texas and the other Southwestern states also limited the federal
government's ability to deal with this situation by restricting the flow of money to
the INS. As scholar and activist Ernesto Galarza wrote, "It never appeared to be
the intention of Congress to finance the Service adequately so that the gateway to
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illegal labor could be firmly closed .... With the purse half shut the gate could
remain half open. " 91
During 1954, however, the INS and the Border Patrol conducted a
deportation campaign that temporarily altered the traditional, if always unofficial,
alliance between border officials and South Texas growers. The newly appointed
head of the INS, General Joseph Swing, launched Operation Wetback in the
summer of 1954 as a military campaign meant to deport undocumented Mexicans
throughout the Southwest. With the support of President Eisenhower and
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the operation began in California in early
June by rounding up and repatriating thousands as officers moved north from the
Imperial Valley. Before the operation began Swing assured employers that they
could legally contract braceros through the INS, but that he intended to rid the
Southwest of all illegal entrants, assuring them that "I am quite emphatic about
this because I know I am going to run into some opposition in southern Texas.',n
Word of the operations in California spread rapidly to Texas, leading tens
of thousands of Mexicans to return to Mexico ahead of the deportation force. 93
South Texas growers, however, either ignored the warnings that Operation
Wetback would eventually come to Texas, or simply believed that the INS would
not dare take their workers away. 94 The INS District Director in San Antonio
reported that the Valley Farm Bureau "intend[s] to destroy our effort at
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enforcement of the law here in the Valley." 95 Some growers, like Governor
Shivers, did take the INS seriously and began removing their undocumented
workers by the end of June. 96 But most had done nothing by the time the Mobile
Task Force arrived in South Texas in early July to begin the operation. Starting
on July 3 the task force set up roadblocks and patrolled rail traffic, arresting any
illegal entrants attempting to travel north ahead of the deportation sweeps. These
efforts led to the apprehension of approximately 800 before the full operation
began. The full sweeps began on July 15. By the end of the month more than
40,000 had been captured in South Texas. 97
Rather than return them to Mexico at nearby border towns, however, the
INS shipped the vast majority of the deportees hundreds of miles away to Presidio
and El Paso in West Texas, approximately 750 miles from the Lower Rio Grande
Valley. Not only did this mean that the deportees could not quickly cross the
border and return to the same employer, but it also meant that the Mexican
government had to cover the transportation of tens of thousands of repatriates
from Ojinaga and Ciudad Juarez to their homes. 98 Whether Swing and the INS
meant to punish Mexico in this way is unclear, but their actions had the effect of
adding to the tensions between the two governments that remained in the
aftermath of the unilateral recruitment episode in January.

95

Quoted in Garcia, Operation Wetback, 208-209.
%Andy McClellan to Jerry Holleman, June 28, 1954, Box 1, Folder 2, Series 7, Texas AFL-CIO
Collection (AR-110), Texas Labor Archives, University of Texas, Arlington.
97
Garcia, Operation Wetback, 210-212.
98
"US Wetback Plan Puzzles Mexico, Too," Laredo Times (July 16, 1954); "Details of Work
Secret," Hidalgo County News (Edinburg) (July 15, 1954).

364
Not surprisingly, the opposition that Swing had anticipated from the
growers of South Texas was not long in coming. In addition to the oft-repeated
claims that the federal government was trampling their rights, some Valley
observers viewed the operation as a far more insidious undertaking. A writer for
the San Benito News surmised that the "CIO may be getting lists of union
membership prospects from the bracero centers. If the Border Patrolmen were
racing through cotton fields with pistol in one hand and union membership
application in the other, the union bosses in Washington might be content." 99 The
editor of the Weslaco News went even further a few weeks after the operation
began, writing, "After watching the tactics of Uncle Sam's invading force of
crack tan-shirts for 14 days, it becomes our opinion that the whole situation
amounts to about the same thing as undeclared martiallaw." 100 One grower, who
described Operation Wetback as an "old-fashioned West Texas rabbit drive,"
wrote, "It is amazing that the [Task Force] did not meet resistance, even armed
resistance, for in four short days the way of life for more than a million people
was drastically and irrevocably changed." 101
By the time the campaign came to an end in September more than a
hundred thousand Mexicans had been deported from South Texas, in addition to
an unknown number who left for Mexico just ahead of the task forces. 102 As
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General Swing had intended when he launched the operation, the removal of
unauthorized workers forced South Texas growers to grudgingly accept the need
to sign bracero contracts. Between July 1 and July 15 the threat of Operation
Wetback led Valley growers to send requests for 30,000 braceros to the Hidalgo
reception center, with more than 15,000 Mexicans contracted by the middle of the
month. The previous year, by contrast, only seven hundred had been contracted
in the first two weeks of July. 103 The increased use of braceros in the nation as a
whole, and South Texas in particular, continued for the next few years. One
Texas grower noted, "the bracero substituted for our wetbacks for several years.
We did not accept him as a permanent fixture, but we contemplated using him for
quite a while." 104 When the bracero program reached its peak of contracted
workers in 1956, Texas received forty-three percent of the total of 445,197,
almost twice as many as second-place California. 105
Rather than seeking to keep these farmers from hiring foreign workers,
Operation Wetback served as a means to shift the source of those foreign workers.
As such, the deportation campaign served as a complement to the border incident
in January of the same year- the first subjugated Mexican desires to US labor
supply needs, while the second disciplined growers who sought to avoid
bureaucratic entanglements and federal regulation of their workforce. More than
ever before, the federal government assumed the role of labor contractor,
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maintaining within the executive branch a benevolent monopoly on the
recruitment of foreign labor. As Kitty Calavita argued, "the drive had the effect
of buttressing and entrenching a system of contract labor that was uniquely suited
to agricultural production." 106 The G.I. Forum denigrated this new system as
"legalized wetbackism." 107 Along the same lines, Emesto Galarza declared, "The
most skeptical of farm employers could see that the private black market was no
longer vital, now that a public one could be created at will. . . . The Wetback
obbligato thus ended on a harmonious chord. In the difficult transition from
clandestine to legal labor which it had marked, the essential controls over the
labor pool had not been jarred and the principles of employer determination of
wages had not been undermined." 108
For the remainder of the 1950s Texas was the primary recipient of
braceros. The slight change in the source of their labor did little to change
growers' general employment practices and wage rates, however. According to
Andy McClellan, a Texas State Federation of Labor official well versed in the
Valley labor situation, a number ofbracero users ignored the fifty-cent minimum
bracero wage and substituted a standardized wage of thirty cents an hour (though
they dropped even lower in some areas). Employers simply forced workers to
sign falsified payroll documents. 109 In April 1955 the Mexican Consul at
McAllen stated in an interview that 40% of the bracero users in his consular
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district, which covered much of the Lower Rio Grande Valley, violated the
minimum wage. A few months later he claimed that the percentage was even
higher. 110 As a result, the Rio Grande Valley had the highest bracero desertion
rate in the nation, at 20-35% in the mid-1950s. 111 For its part, the federal
government did little to solve the problem, often only warning minimum wage
violators. 112
By the early 1960s, however, the trajectory of the bracero program
changed. What had seemed like a permanent part of the US agricultural economy
in the late 1950s suddenly ran up against pressure from two sides: demands for
the end of the program from Mexican Americans and organized labor, and
increased use of mechanization in the cotton fields of Texas, which made braceros
superfluous. While the AFL-CIO and Mexican American groups like the G.I.
Forum and LULAC had long criticized the bracero program, growers in South
Texas and elsewhere also slowly turned against the program as bracero minimum
wages increased and agricultural technology improved. Both trends came
together at the beginning of the Kennedy presidency to bring the international
agreement to an anticlimactic end when Congress failed to renew the program in
1964.
Texas growers proved as important to the disappearance of the program as
they were to its beginning and its enormous growth during the 1950s. The
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majority of braceros in Texas worked in cotton fields, and when cotton growers
turned against the program they eliminated their state as the primary bracero
recipient almost overnight. In 1961 Texas received 40% (approximately 116,000)
of all braceros, while California received 34% (approximately 100,000). A year
later, after Congress passed a seventy-cent minimum wage for the program, Texas
received only 15% (29,000) of the braceros while California received 60%
(116,000).m Total numbers decreased even further in 1963, when Texas growers
contracted only 17,700 braceros for 20% of the national total, barely more than
Florida and Michigan and only a third of California's total. 114 In 1964, the final
year of the bracero program, braceros made up a negligible force in the Texas
cotton fields. In their stead came the much-delayed mechanization of Texas
cotton. 115 The Good Neighbor Commission reported in 1967 that "Texas cotton
farmers, anticipating the day when Braceros would no longer be available as
shock troops in the fields, started converting to machine harvesting several years
ago. Thus the gradual annual reduction in the number of Braceros allowed to
enter, and the final termination of Public Law 78, found Texas growers relatively
well prepared to carry on without them."ll 6
The growers themselves, who had pleaded so fervently for these braceros
just a few years earlier, evinced little nostalgia for the end of the program. As one
grower noted as the international agreement came to a screeching halt, "I have
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said that we had to have braceros to pick our 1954 cotton crop; then, later, I said
that braceros were not needed at all in 1962; so something must have happened
during those years besides our hassle with Mr. Goodwin [Director of Bureau of
Employment Security]. Quite a bit did happen," he noted. "Simply stated," he
went on "Valley farmers changed to using machines to pick their rank cotton and
to using local and migratory labor to snap their burnt -up cotton, and the Valley
ginners each invested fifty thousand dollars or more in cleaning machinery,
trailers, and other things in order to properly handle this rougher harvested
cotton." 117 Newspapers throughout Texas echoed these sentiments. The Dallas

Times Herald editorialized that "Texas' farm labor will not be much affected by
the end of the bracero farm program, farmers have predicted, because the federal
70-cent hourly wage minimum for braceros had already priced them out." 118
Likewise, the Corpus Christi Caller argued, "The U.S. Congress may think it
killed the Mexican contract worker program last week. All it actually did was
write the obituary."u 9
At the same time that bracero recruitment numbers dropped in the early
1960s, a number of groups spoke out against the continuation of the contract labor
program. Henry Mufi.oz, the Director of the Department of Equal Opportunity for
the Texas AFL-CIO, succinctly summarized Mexican American and labor
opposition to the foreign labor program when he informed the Department of
Labor, "We imported 195,000 Mexican workers [in 1963] at a time when our total
117
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rate of unemployment is almost 5 million - 4,846,000. I doubt if history offers
any other example of any nation suffering from massive unemployment recruiting
hundreds of thousands of foreign workers of an unskilled character, to do
unskilled work in the nation of recruitment." 120 Though organized labor and
agribusiness interests seldom made comfortable bedfellows, both combined quite
effectively to end the bracero program.

***
While Mexican Braceros poured into South Texas during the peak years of
the international agreement, Mexican Americans poured out. The proper
functioning of the international agreement should have made this impossible, or at
least less likely, since Braceros were not supposed to replace domestic workers,
but the failure of enforcement mechanisms and the lack of concern for domestic
labor that animated the primary supporters of the bracero program meant that
these two massive population shifts occurred simultaneously, each reinforcing the
other.
An increase in out-of-state migration occurred during World War II as
many Mexican Americans left Texas for employment in the booming war
industries and the fields of the Midwest and West. Rather than decrease after the
war, however, the number of out-of-state migrants who registered with the state
jumped from 22,460 in 1945 to 39,801 in 1947 and 71,353 in 1949, not to
mention the unknown number who left without registering. At the same time,
undocumented workers made up a substantial portion (if not a majority) of the
South Texas agricultural workforce while tens of thousands of these unauthorized
120
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foreign workers became braceros through the "drying out" process. 121 As civil
rights activist Gus Garcia wrote to the editor of the Corpus Christi Caller, "So
long as stalwart champions of the people- like your idolized Mr. Allan Shivers continue to hire wetback labor and to harass the Immigration Officials in their
attempts to enforce the law, thousands upon thousands of South Texas families
will continue to be uprooted year after year from their homes and forced to
wander about the country, seeking a living, or at least a subsistence wage." 122
When Texas growers first gained access to workers legally contracted
from Mexico in the early 1950s, the migrant stream out of Texas only grew.
Underlying this amplification of previous migration patterns was an unchanging
belief among the political and economic elites of South Texas that Mexican
Americans refused to do field work, necessitating their reliance on foreign labor,
whether legal or illegal. Even while Tejanos worked in fields throughout the
nation, farmers in South Texas claimed that they refused to do agricultural work.
As the President's Commission on Migratory Labor reported, "Texas farm
employers told us that Texas-Mexicans were 'no good,' but farm employers in
Arizona, Colorado, and other States told us with equal emphasis that the TexasMexicans are good and reliable workers." 123 During the early 1950s, before the
crackdown of Operation Wetback, a state representative from the Lower Valley
echoed this feeling in justifying the employment of undocumented workers: "The
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farmers need labor; the wetbacks need work; and the local Spanish-speaking
people have a gypsy spirit which makes them want to travel. They just can't
resist going north each year, and it is fortunate that there are wetbacks around to
take their place. Then, too, the local Spanish-speaking people are tending to leave
agriculture. They don't like the hard work." 124 An employee of the Texas
Employment Commission likewise reported that local Mexican Americans were
"extremely lazy and won't work, even for 50 or 60 cents an hour." 125 Whether
these opinions came from willful ignorance or not, Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz came close to the truth when he wrote, "The false notion that 'Americans
won't do stoop labor' was carefully nurtured from the truer fact that they won't
work for stoop wages." 126
In 1955, the first full season after Operation Wetback, Texas growers
imported just over 150,000 braceros. 75,000 of these went to the four counties of
the Lower Rio Grande Valley, and another 19,000 went to the seven county area
stretching from Laredo north through the Winter Garden. These same counties
sent almost 70,000 Mexican Americans into the interstate migrant stream. In such
a situation, growers could complain that they suffered from a labor shortage, but
only because their reliance on foreign labor had long since pushed local Mexican
Americans out of the local employment market. Thus, the bracero minimum
became the prevailing wage, as there was no local workforce against which
adverse effect could be measured. Even when a small local workforce did
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remain, as Lamar Jones found, these protections meant very little on the ground:
"In the Rio Grande Valley in the 1950s it was not uncommon for domestic
workers to receive 35 to 40 cents per hour for chopping cotton while braceros
similarly employed earned 50 cents per hour." 127 As a result, by the late 1950s
agricultural wages in South Texas dropped below the rates of the late 1940s (the
peak years of undocumented workers). 128 Unlike the 1960s, however,
mechanization remained negligible during the 1950s as farmers still found little
economic utility in the purchase and maintenance of expensive harvesting
machinery. 129 Clearly, growers' preference for foreign labor made almost
inevitable these entries into the migrant stream.
The decrease in bracero recruitment by South Texas growers in the early
1960s did not reverse this trend, however. The 1961 migration included an
estimated 127,000 from South Texas, up from approximately 105,000 each of the
previous two years. Five counties in South Texas sent the largest number of these
migrants- 18,000 from Hidalgo (McAllen), 12,000 from Webb (Laredo), 10,000
from Bexar (San Antonio), 9,000 from Cameron (Brownsville), and 8,000 from
Nueces (Corpus Christi). 130 The next two years witnessed similar numbers of
migrants- 127,800 in 1962 and 128,000 in 1963. Importantly, however, the
nature of these migrations had changed, as the number of interstate migrants
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increased from 91,000 in 1962 to 95,000 in 1961, while intrastate migrants
decreased from 36,800 in 1962 to 33,000 in 1963. Likewise, a larger percentage
of these migrants came from the primary South Texas counties - 25,000 from
Hidalgo, 10,000 from Cameron, 8,000 from Bexar, and 5,000 from Nueces. 131
The combined effects of widespread mechanization and the return of South Texas
farmers to undocumented workers blunted any improvement for domestic farm
labor that could have come with the end of the bracero program.
The upward trends in interstate migration continued after the end of the
bracero program. The number of registered migrants grew to 167,000 in 1965,
38,000 more than the previous year. Interstate migration grew to 128,500, 24%
more than the previous year, but the intrastate stream grew from 25,000 in 1964 to
38,600 in 1965, an increase of 54%, as jobs previously closed to domestic
workers opened with the end of the bracero program. 132 The migrant stream
shrunk slightly in 1966, down to 162,000. Interstate migration remained roughly
the same, but intrastate migration reversed the trend of the previous year and
declined drastically (16%) as fewer South Texas migrants proved willing to
accept employment from Texas growers. 133 These trends continued for the rest of
the decade, so that by 1972 only 30,000 registered as migrants, and almost all of
these traveled out of state. 134 Some growers went to the trouble of claiming that
labor contractors threatened their livelihood by sending Mexican Americans
131
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elsewhere for employment, echoing their predecessors' claims during the 1920s,
but most simply returned to their well-worn practice of hiring undocumented
workers with little concern for the Mexican Americans in their midst. When the
Good Neighbor Commission predicted that "other states will intensify and perfect
still more their methods of recruiting in Texas, since Texas has far more surplus
farm labor than any other state," most growers simply ignored it. 135

***
When the bracero program came to a halt after two decades in 1964, all of
the justifications that politicians and growers had repeated since the beginning of
World War II for their continued use of foreign labor disappeared, replaced
instead by quiet resignation and shrugged shoulders. 136 Despite the hushed
ending to the contract labor system from Mexico, the bracero program served as
an essential aspect of the development of the post-war economic order in the
United States. While it only provided labor for agriculture after World War II,
never again moving into the realm of industrial employment, it served as the
nexus of two economic forces with enormous consequences for the future. The
bracero program served at once as both a regional variant of a global trend toward
increased reliance on guestworkers and the widespread adoption of a local variant
of labor relations, applying the peculiar arrangements developed in South Texas
135
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to the rest of the nation. As such, the bracero program's importance extends
beyond the fields of the Southwest, instead impacting directly on the development
of an increasingly globalized model of labor relations.
Guestworker programs developed in the early Twentieth Century in
response to growing nativist pressures throughout the world. They ~eplaced the
"coolie trade" that had sent indentured servants around the world throughout the
Nineteenth Century. 137 The simultaneous rise of welfare states and increased
international migration elicited nativist hostility, and a number of nations looked
to guestworkers as a potential solution. "For there was an essential fact that
separated guestworker from indentured servants: indentured servants were
generally encouraged to stay after the expiration of their contracts, while
guestworkers were, by definition, expected to leave," according to Cindy
Hahamovitch.
Temporary labor schemes were thus state-brokered compromises designed
to maintain high levels of migration while placating anti-immigrant
movements. They offered employers foreign workers who could still be
bound like indentured servants but who could also be disciplined by the
threat of deportation. They placated trade unionists who feared foreign
competition by promising to restrict guestworkers to the most onerous
work and to expel them during economic downturns. And they assuaged
nativists by isolating guestworkers from the general population. Finally,
states got development aid from poor countries in the form of ready
workers, without the responsibility of having to integrate those workers or
provide for their welfare. The perfect immigrant was born. 138
The lure of guestworkers grew during World War II and its aftermath, as
the US joined several European nations and South Africa as habitual users of
temporary foreign labor. Long after wartime justifications had passed, these labor
137
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schemes continued to operate as "variations on a theme: each program stabilized
(or depressed) wages by enlarging the workforce available to certain target
industries." 139 Supporters in all of these nations rationalized the programs as the
sole source of labor for jobs that native workers would not perform, with South
African mine owners repeating a refrain similar to the cotton growers in South
Texas. 140 Ignored by these arguments were the implications of creating a
managed workforce that lacked the basic rights of free labor. 141
The voices raised against the Bracero Program in the United States
remained lonely voices in the wilderness, seemingly the only ones who cared to
notice that the US had ventured down the same path as the apartheid state in
South Africa. The comparison made by the Agricultural Workers Organizing
Committee of the AFL-CIO is remarkable as one of the few voices of dissent
during the life of the bracero program that considered the global nature of the
guestworker phenomenon: "We believe that America deserves a more honorable
place in the world community than the Union of South Africa, but at the present
time we and South Africa are the only countries on earth which tolerate largescale alien contract labor programs," the author asserted, before extending the
analogy. "South African mine owners import Negroes from segregated kraals,
under contract, and return them home to their kraals when their labor is no longer
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needed. Southwest farm owners import Mexicans, under contract, and return
them to Mexico when their labor is no longer needed." 142
This international backdrop for the bracero program provides only part of
the explanation for the existence and longevity of the bracero program, however.
The global context existed in tandem with a more localized heritage that applied
the labor practices developed in South Texas during the 191 Os and 1920s to the
rest of the nation. While agricultural and industrial interests in the Midwest and
West had contracted thousands of workers from South Texas during the 1920s,
creating a small and unregulated version of an international labor system, World
War II provided the opportunity to stabilize and nationalize this method of
artificially creating a surplus labor pool through international migration. And in
the best tradition of Lone Star democracy, political elites helped assure the
availability of this excess labor pool at every step, nationalizing the spirit of the
Emigrant Agency Law.
Despite growers' constant complaints against it, the Bracero Program
witnessed "the most complete coincidence between government intervention and
the interests of agribusiness to date." 143 In the words of Mae Ngai, the essential
political aspects of the bracero program "signaled consolidation of industrial farm
production as a low-wage enterprise beyond the reach of federal labor standards
and workers' rights. In 1955 farm wages in the United States were 36.1 percent
of manufacturing wages, a decline from 4 7. 9 percent in 1946. That downward
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trend in large part resulted from the semicolonial use of foreign contract and
undocumented laborers - workers who had no legal standing in the society in
which they worked." 144
With agricultural interests able to dictate how their labor needs were filled,
especially during the peak years of the bracero program in the late 1950s when the
US had wrested any leverage out of the hands of the Mexican government, they
simply recreated the practices of South Texas growers they had long envied and
sought to emulate. As Hahamovitch argued in her study of migrant farmworkers
on the Atlantic Coast, when guestworker programs (both the bracero and smaller
H2) "gave the nation's growers the power to seek labor from abroad at taxpayers'
expense, Atlantic Coast growers began to employ western methods of labor
control.'" 45 As a result, the fields of the East took on many of the aspects of the
fields of South Texas as "farm employers enjoyed a sort of international shape-up,
whereby each group of workers was pitted against the others, and if one nation's
workers refused to get on the back of a grower's truck at the prices offered,
another would. Braceros competed against illegal immigrants, West Indians
against Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, domestic workers against foreigners
generally- all in a race to the bottom." 146
At the most basic level, the labor relations of South Texas had long denied
the basic rights of workers. By emulating this model, the bracero program and
other guestworker schemes inevitably stripped individuals of the basic rights of
movement and choice in the name of cheap labor for the employing country and
144
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needed income for the sending country. As a result, even though Mexico
continually protested against the conditions of the bracero program and the
treatment meted out to its citizens, it continued to endure these indignities
because, in the words of historian Richard Craig, "its advantages far outweighed
its disadvantages. It was the United States who eventually rejected a program that
Mexico by necessity accepted." 147 For agricultural workers, Texas became
everything south of the Canadian border.

***
Emesto Galarza concluded his analysis of the bracero program by arguing
that "the ideal worker" for bracero users and their supporters was "the man of the
barracks, the man in a camp who spent all his time under supervision if not under
surveillance. . . .

Outside the barracks the limits of freedom were prescribed,

and they were also the limits of the job. Liberty had found its economic
determinant." 148 Likewise, the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee
declared, "We are convinced that foreign contract labor programs, whatever their
announced purpose, by their very nature wreck vast harm upon the general farm
labor market. These programs contain inescapable contradictions between
purported purpose and practical effect - contradictions which cannot be removed
legislatively or adrninistratively." 149
In the decades since these observations the bracero program disappeared
from the public consciousness, only to appear again in recent years as a nostrum
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to solve the "immigration crisis." "In an era in which governments seem to be
racing each other to throw up obstacles to free movement across border,"
Hahamovitch has explained, "guestworker programs have been promoted as an
alternative to illegal immigration." 150 Unfortunately, the proponents of such a
system seem never to have examined the history of the bracero program. They
not only ignore the rampant violations of the spirit and letter of the law that were
endemic to the Mexican labor agreement, but they also fail to realize that the
bracero program created illegal immigration by intensifying the pressure to
emigrate, "institutionalizing migration to the United States as an accepted and
expected life experience," according to Harry Cross and James Sandos. 151 In the
place of research and reasoned evaluation of guestworker programs, intellectual
sophistry and disingenuous demagoguery have dominated these debates over the
current immigration situation. A new bracero program has thus improbably
emerged four decades after the original was killed off as a deus ex machina for
complicated issues of labor relations and international migration.
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Epilogue
"Back in the 1950s I wrote a short story in which Mexico gains admittance to the United
States, puts all its problems at Washington's feet, and is promptly expelled. The United
States has enough troubles of its own without taking on Mexico's. In my story, Mexico
is offered its former territories in the Southwest as compensation for its expulsion. It
accepts them all- except Texas."
Carlos Fuentes 1
"I am working on a theory that there may actually be a scientific explanation for why this
state is so strange. We know there's helium in the air around Amarillo and lithium in the
water in El Paso. In West Texas, the water has so much naturally occurring fluoride that
everyone has strong yellow teeth, and it sometimes kills off African violets and goldfish.
(This is the subject of Robin Dorsey's semi-famous country song, 'Her Teeth Was
Stained but Her Heart Was Pure.') Don't you think it's likely fluoride affects the old
psyche as well? Of course, in East Texas, where fluoride is still considered a communist
plot, we'lljust have to admit that the problem is genetic. And if there's a natural element
responsible for South Texas, we probably don't want to know what it is."
Molly Ivins 2
On October 24, 1966, sixteen men stood across the international bridge
that connected Roma, Texas, to Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas. For thirteen hours
they remained on the bridge and stopped all traffic at the international boundary.
Led by Antonio Orendain, an organizer for the United Farm Workers, they
blocked the bridge to keep strikebreakers from crossing the border to work in the
fields of Starr County. "That day only seven workers made it to the fields,"
recalled Orendain, "and three ofthose swam across the river." When officials in
Roma learned of these activities, they tried to arrest Orendain and his men, but "I
pointed out to them that they had no authority to do so because we were about
three feet inside Mexican territory." Foiled, the police went back to Roma and
called the Mexican police to arrest the strikers. When the Mexican police arrived,
however, Orendain and his men stepped across to the US side. "We continued
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moving back and forth across the international line until the Texas Rangers got
together with the Mexican police and we found ourselves in between both of
them," according to Orendain. "We placed one foot in the United States and one
foot in Mexico, but the Mexican police pushed us toward the Rangers and they
began arresting us." Texas Rangers took them to jail, but after their release, "we
shut the bridge again, this time by locking these gates at the bridge that were no
longer used. This time three ofus did the job during the night." 3

***
While HemisFair was still in its planning stages, an uprising had begun
among migrant farm workers in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas. The
Texas farm workers' strike, centered in the border town of Rio Grande City in
isolated Starr County, faced local and state opposition far more intense and
violent than that experienced in the contemporary farm unionization efforts in
California. 4 Like the farmworker movement in California, however, strikers in
South Texas sought to take advantage of the end of the bracero program to push
for agricultural unionization. With the guest worker program's potential for
strikebreaking gone, activists and workers hoped to realize the minimum rights
enjoyed by nonagricultural workers that previous movements in South Texas had
failed to achieve.
3
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In 1966 the wages paid to farm workers in the Rio Grande Valley varied
from forty cents an hour to eighty-five cents an hour. 5 Eugene Nelson, a United
Farm Worker organizer, was sent to Texas in early 1966 by Cesar Chavez. He
established a union organization among local melon pickers, and they planned to
strike before the harvest began in the summer of 1966. The primary target was La
Casita farms, referred to by the strikers as the "General Motors of Valley
agribusiness. " 6 The strikers' only demands were a minimum wage of $1.25 and
the right to organize. One of the first actions, on June 8, 1966, was the
establishment of a picket line along the international bridge at Roma. Nelson and
others stood along the side of the bridge, careful not to obstruct traffic, and tried
to convince workers crossing the border not to take jobs in the fields of Starr
County. They were all arrested by Starr County Deputies and taken to the county
courthouse. Once there, the County Attorney informed Nelson that, in addition to
charges of illegal picketing, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was also
investigating a supposed plot by strikers to blow up the courthouse and trucks
used to transport strikebreakers to the fields. 7 Throughout the strike, similarly
fabricated charges were used to deny bail and tie up the strike leadership in
endless litigation. 8
Things then went from bad to worse with the arrival of the Texas Rangers.
The Rangers slid easily into the pattern of official harassment begun by local law
enforcement. Hundreds of strikers and strike sympathizers were arrested for such
5
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egregious violations as obstructing a bridge, secondary picketing, mass picketing,
using loud and vociferous language, and "disturbing the janitor in performance of
his duties." 9 Local law enforcement and the Texas Rangers tried to break up a
number of picket lines by offering strikers jobs for $1.25 an hour (the wage
sought by the union) to work for La Casita. 10 Strikers and union officials were
also continuously threatened with physical violence. One union member,
Magdaleno Dimas, was arrested and beaten on three separate occasions. The last
instance ended with Dimas in the hospital with a concussion and spinal trauma
after he was savagely beaten with the butt of a shotgun by Ranger Captain A.Y.
Allee, a veteran of Ranger crackdowns on Depression-era organizing campaigns.
The UFW leadership in California sent Orendain in late September 1966
to reenergize the strike effort after it began to wane in the face of unmitigated
official hostility. When he arrived, he found that the local strikers resented the
imposition of new leadership from California. One striker, Librado de Ia Cruz,
confronted Orendain shortly after his arrival in Starr County: "You haven't done
nothing in Texas. Besides, you don't believe in violence, and here we are
preparing ourselves to do something stronger than has been done in California." 11
Orendain found that the Texas farmworkers had collected a small arsenal of guns
and dynamite to defend themselves against the Texas Rangers and local sheriffs
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deputies. They rejected nonviolence, and instead pushed Orendain toward a more
confrontational strategy.
The efforts to keep strikebreakers from crossing the international bridge
emerged from this local initiative, not from the directives of the UFW leadership
in California. Cesar Chavez arrived in Starr County in late October 1966, shortly
after Orendain's protest on the bridge, and complained to Orendain, "I sent you to
Texas to organize workers, not inmates. You're in jail all the time." 12 A few
days later, on November 3, 1966, strikers stopped a train filled with green chiles
as it left Rio Grande City. "We convinced the engineers to respect the picket
line," recalled Orendain. "That was about 6 P.M. By 10 P.M. we heard that the
Texas Rangers were on the way. They arrived an hour or two later with machine
guns and accompanied by engineers from the railroad company." 13 When they
tried to move the train, however, they discovered that a nearby bridge had burned.
Orendain and the entire union leadership were again arrested.
The strike continued until early 1967 when Cesar Chavez pulled Orendain,
and almost all financial support, back to California because it was too violent in
Starr County. 14 The UFW had been successful in California largely through
boycott activities. Their accomplishments came from their ability to construct a
network of urban sympathizers throughout the nation, rather than any ability to
keep workers out of the fields. The national media failed to take notice of the
strike in Texas, however, which made a successful boycott difficult. In addition,
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the workers of South Texas implicitly rejected Chavez's nonviolent philosophy
and were determined to confront the growers ofthe Rio Grande Valley directly.
Rather than accede control ofUFW activities and funds to the local leadership in
South Texas, Chavez and the California leadership simply pulled their support.
The remaining activists and strikers in South Texas tried to reenergize the strike
in May 1967 before the next harvest began, but by that time the efforts of law
enforcement and local courts to crush the farmworkers movement had drained the
local union of funds. By the end ofJune 1967 the strike had folded, snuffed out
through the same means as the strikes ofthe 1930s. 15
Focusing on the ability of the UFW to sustain an agricultural strike in
California, Philip Martin argued that the years after the end of the bracero
program represented a "golden era" of agricultural unionism. 16 "In the virtuous
cycle that developed in the 1960s and 1970s," claims Martin, "there were
relatively few immigrant strike breakers, and growers proved that they could raise
wages and introduce fringe benefits to get seasonal workers." 17 This golden age
disappeared in the 1980s, according to Martin, but he clearly points toward a brief
period in which farmworkers wielded unprecedented leverage in their relations
with growers. While such a situation may have existed in California or the
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Midwest, the farm workers of South Texas saw no "golden era." The growers and
their allies in law enforcement saw to that. Instead, conditions in the fields and in
the migrant stream remained much the same after the Bracero Program ended.
For the farmworkers of South Texas, the so-called "golden era" looked a lot like
the old days.
The condition of Mexican and Mexican American farm workers in South
Texas changed little from the beginning of the farm boom in the 191 Os until the
post-Bracero era. From the beginning of large-scale migration from Mexico
during the Revolution, Mexicans and Mexican Americans were viewed by
potential employers as a never-ending supply of labor power, more beasts of
burden than citizens. This system was merely amplified over the next several
decades, even as massive economic and political changes occurred in both
nations. Temporary shifts in migration flows, immigration legislation, and
demographic changes may have altered some of the specifics of these trends, but
have not changed their broad outlines. Migrants have continued to flow from
northern Mexico to South Texas and the rest of the United States, while
employers have continued to formulate countless methods to put these migrants to
work. If anything, migration flows have only increased in the years since the end
of the Bracero Program, with little thought or energy given to improving the
treatment meted out to these migrants. 18
Underlying this continuity is the fact that farm labor has remained
completely outside of the realm of normal labor relations, even during the "golden
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age." When farmworker issues have come to the attention of the general public,
such as during the Great Depression and the years ofUFW activities in California,
they have been treated as issues of poverty. The New Deal and Great Society
dealt with them through temporary relief programs, but did nothing to attack the
roots of the problem. They dispensed some money, spoke solemnly about rural
poverty, passed some legislation, but then forgot about the farmworkers who
continued to travel along the migrant circuit year after year. This shameful baitand-switch, with the rightful protections of labor rights and civil rights replaced
by the bland rhetoric of alleviating rural poverty, has continued to the present day.
Even when the public has paid attention to the plight of farmworkers, issues of
labor supply have always taken precedence as politicians bend over backwards to
appease agribusiness interests. 19
Rather than trying to solve these problems, however, current political
leaders have responded to these conditions by resuscitating two relics of the Cold
War era: a revamped bracero program and a Berlin-style wall along the USMexico border. As I write, both are still in the planning stages. Both Republicans
and Democrats seem intent on responding to the supposed "immigration crisis" by
resuscitating ideas that were relegated to the dustbin of history just a few years
ago. The renewed bracero program and the border wall have emerged as twin
responses to the new nativism- one allows some Mexicans in temporarily for
their labor power, and the other shows Mexico that its citizens are not welcome as
permanent residents of the United States. A new bracero program "would
19
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represent governmental acceptance that farmers will normally reach outside U.S.
borders for workers," according to Philip Martin, "continuing agricultural
exceptionalism. " 20 A border wall carries a much more ominous meaning,
however. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, has said that the
border wall has "symbolic value ... (but) the idea that you are going to solve the
problem simply by building a fence is undercut by the fact that yesterday we
discovered a tunnel." 21 In other words, Chertoff admits that a wall cannot stop
unauthorized immigration. But it will tie the stigma of illegal migration even
more tightly to Mexican and Mexican American communities throughout the
United States, reiterating in symbolic form the idea that immigrants from south of
the border lack the capacity for full citizenship and represent a threat to the
nation.
Looked at together, a new guest worker program and the rise of a border
wall represent nothing less than a denial that Mexico and its citizens are anything
more than potential producers and consumers to be exploited by the United States
economy. Their goods, capital, and labor power are welcome in the United
States, but the people must remain permanently south of the border. In addition,
the Department of Homeland Security has taken advantage of an article tacked on
to the REAL ID Act of 2005 that gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the
power to waive all laws that might slow down the construction of a border wall,
while also specifically limiting the ability of the courts to challenge this
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consolidation of control in the executive branch. 22 While this abdication of
legislative control is blatantly unconstitutional, it provides the opening through
which the wall can be built. For now, the path toward the construction of this
monument to exclusion seems open.
The appearance of a wall along the border or a guest worker program will
do nothing to answer the larger problems of the US-Mexico border region,
however. A wall will merely provide a temporary political nostrum, built on
nativist mania, for a far more complex series of issues. Migration will not stop.
Criminalizing it will only drive immigrants further into the shadows. Reasoned
consideration of issues of citizenship and civil rights will disappear, and the
notion of a "confluence of civilizations" along the US-Mexico border will be
reduced to a quaint notion from a long-dead past.
Only rigid enforcement of civil rights and labor laws can improve this
situation. Hopefully, this latest wave of nativism will recede as all others have,
but the disappearance of overt racism is just a beginning. Only when the civil
rights of all workers, regardless of citizenship or country of origin, are honored
can South Texas, the US-Mexico border region, and the United States as a whole
avoid repeating the history of labor repression and racial segregation in South
Texas.
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